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One of the most important challenges in the field of asset pricing is to understand anomalies: empirical 
patterns in asset returns that cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models. Currently, there is 
no consensus in the academic literature on the underlying causes of well-known anomalies, such as 
the value and momentum anomalies. Anomalies could be the result of data mining, disappear when 
trading costs are taken into account, be a compensation for a particular form of risk, or have a behavioral 
explanation. The motivation of this research project is to gain more and better insight into possible 
explanations for well-known asset pricing anomalies. Understanding asset pricing anomalies is of the 
utmost importance for investors. It allows them to make better informed investment decisions, and 
thereby achieve higher return premiums. 
The first study in this dissertation shows that the value, momentum and size anomalies are also present 
in the new emerging equity markets, the so-called frontier emerging markets, which makes data 
mining as an explanation for these anomalies unlikely. The second study focuses on trading costs as a 
possible explanation for the short-term reversal anomaly. Focusing on large-cap stocks and applying a 
more sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm lower trading costs significantly, such that reversal 
strategies generate profitable results net of trading costs. The third study examines risk as an explanation 
for the value and size anomalies. Although value and small-cap exposures are typically associated with 
distress risk, the results indicate that distress risk is not priced and that the small-cap and value premiums 
are priced beyond distress risk. The fourth and last study examines a behavioral explanation for the 
low-risk anomaly. Based on a general equilibrium model, tournament behavior causes the returns of 
low-risk (high-risk) assets to be larger (smaller) than expected according to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. In addition, empirical analyses confirm a positive and significant relation between tournament 
behavior and the low-risk premium. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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 1. Introduction 
 
One of the most important challenges in the field of asset pricing is to understand anomalies: 
empirical patterns in asset returns that cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models 
such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). An example of a well-known asset pricing 
anomaly is the value anomaly. A range of academic studies have shown that value stocks 
with high book-to-price ratios yield a return premium, i.e.: higher returns than predicted by 
the CAPM. Many more asset pricing anomalies exist, some of which appear to be more 
persistent than others. In this dissertation, I focus on five well-known anomalies: value, 
momentum, size, low-risk and short-term reversal.  
 So, why do asset pricing anomalies exist? Currently, there is no consensus in the 
academic literature on the underlying causes of these anomalies. However, the explanations 
that have been given in different studies can be grouped into four categories: 1) the anomaly 
is a result of data mining; 2) the anomaly disappears when trading costs are taken into 
account; 3) the return premium associated with the anomaly is a compensation for a 
particular form of risk or 4) the anomaly has a behavioral explanation, meaning that behavior 
of market participants systematically influences asset prices and thereby causes market 
inefficiencies.  
 Understanding asset pricing anomalies is of the utmost importance for investors. It 
allows them to make better informed investment decisions, and thereby achieve higher return 
premiums. Let us take as an example the value anomaly. Investors can create an investment 
strategy to exploit this anomaly by creating a market capitalization weighted portfolio of the 
20 percent stocks with the highest book-to-price ratios and repeat this every month. How 
does understanding of this anomaly actually help to achieve higher return premiums? Let us 
walk through the four categories of explanations and start with the data mining explanation. 
The robustness of the value effect can be determined by analyzing the anomaly on different 
data sets than the one where the anomaly was discovered, such as other regional samples or 
different time periods. If the anomaly is not robust, this means that exploiting it will likely 
result in disappointing out-of-sample results. Vice versa, the more evidence on the existence 
of the value anomaly, the higher the probability that investors are able to capture the 
premium.  
 Second, although an anomaly might lead to theoretically strong premiums, if these 
are eaten up by trading costs, an investor ends up with lower return premiums than expected. 
If the trading costs are too high to capture the value premium, investors need to think about 
smarter ways of implementing the investment strategy, for example by trading slower. A 
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careful trade-off between gross returns on the one hand and trading costs on the other hand 
can lead to higher return premiums net of trading costs.  
 Third, if it is common knowledge that the return premium of the value anomaly is 
in fact a compensation for risk, investors can make an appropriate trade-off between risk and 
return. However, if the value anomaly does not appear to be a compensation for risk, one 
does not need to take that risk on board to capture the value premium. Investors can then 
create advanced investment strategies to capture the return premium with lower risk.  
 Finally, if the explanation of the value anomaly is more behavioral, the investor can 
make a judgement whether this behavior will continue to exist in the future. If the behavior 
disappears, the investor should not be surprised that the anomaly will also cease to exist. But 
if the behavior is structural, for example, because of the set-up of financial markets, investors 
can be more confident to capture the return premium going forward. 
 The motivation of this thesis is to gain more and better insight in possible 
explanations for well-known asset pricing anomalies. Each of the next four chapters of this 
thesis focuses on one of the four categories of explanations for asset pricing anomalies.  
 Chapter 2 analyzes whether well-known asset pricing anomalies, i.e. value, 
momentum, size and low-risk factors, are also present in the new emerging equity markets, 
the so-called frontier emerging markets. 1  We investigate whether these asset pricing 
anomalies that have been documented in developed countries also exist in these markets, 
where they have not been analyzed before. The sample serves as a clear out-of-sample test, 
as it is a unique dataset of more than 1,400 stocks over the period 1997 to 2008 and covers 
24 of the most liquid frontier emerging markets. We document the presence of economically 
and statistically significant value and momentum effects, and a local size effect and can 
therefore conclude that data mining as an explanation for these effects is unlikely. Our results 
indicate that the value and momentum effects still exist when incorporating conservative 
assumptions of transaction costs. Additionally, we show that value, momentum, and local 
size returns in frontier markets cannot be explained by these effects in global international 
markets. We therefore indicate that global risk factors are less plausible to account for the 
effects and conclude that local risk factors or investors’ behavior are more likely to explain 
the investigated anomalies.  
 Chapter 3 focuses on trading costs as a possible explanation for the short-term 
reversal anomaly.2 Although trading costs are relevant for every asset pricing anomaly when 
                                                          
1 This chapter is published as De Groot, W., Pang, J., and Swinkels, L., 2012, The cross-section of 
stock returns in frontier emerging markets, Journal of Empirical Finance, 19, 796-818.  
2 This chapter is published as De Groot, W., Huij, J. and Zhou, W., 2012, Another look at trading costs 
and short-term reversal profits, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 371-382. 
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it is being exploited by investors, the short-term reversal effect is the most interesting 
anomaly on which to analyze the effect. Gross returns are very high for this strategy, but so 
are turnover and therefore trading costs. The trade-off between gross-returns and trading 
costs for this strategy is therefore extremely delicate. Several studies report that the return 
premium associated with short-term reversal investment strategies diminishes once trading 
costs are taken into account. We show that the impact of trading costs on the strategies’ 
profitability can largely be attributed to excessive trading in small-cap stocks. Limiting the 
stock universe to large-cap stocks significantly reduces trading costs. Applying a more 
sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm to lower turnover reduces trading costs even 
further. Our finding that reversal strategies generate 30–50 basis points per week net of 
trading costs poses a serious challenge to standard rational asset pricing models. Our findings 
also have important implications for the understanding and practical implementation of 
reversal strategies.  
 Chapter 4 examines risk as an explanation for the value and size effects.3 Following 
the work of Fama and French (1992, 1993), a large stream of literature has been developed 
on the small-cap and value anomalies and numerous attempts have been made to better 
understand the economic origins of these anomalies. In particular, several papers attribute 
the small-cap and value anomalies to a common risk factor and contend that the premiums 
are compensation for investors bearing distress risk. We revisit the question whether the 
Fama-French factors are a manifestation of distress risk premiums. To this end, we develop 
new tests specifically aimed at dissecting the Fama-French factor returns from a distress risk 
premium. While we find that value and small-cap exposures are typically associated with 
distress risk, our results also indicate that distress risk is not priced and that the small-cap 
and value premiums are priced beyond distress risk. Moreover, the distress risk exposures 
of common small-cap and value factors do not have explanatory power in asset pricing tests. 
Our results have important implications for investors engaging in small-cap and value 
strategies, as by avoiding distress risk, they can capture the value and small-cap premiums 
with much lower risk. 
 Chapter 5 examines a behavioral explanation for the low-risk anomaly.4 Due to the 
large shift of assets from individual investors to fund managers over the past decades, the 
impact of these managers’ behavior on asset prices has grown. A large stream of literature 
has been developed on an important behavioral characteristic of these intermediaries, 
                                                          
3 This chapter is based on De Groot, W., and Huij, J., 2017, Are the Fama-French factors really 
compensation for distress risk, resubmitted to the Journal of International Money and Finance. 
4 This chapter is based on De Groot, W., 2017, The low-risk anomaly and mutual fund tournaments, 
working paper. 
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namely tournament behavior. In this chapter we examine the relationship between 
tournament behavior of mutual fund managers and the low-risk anomaly. Based on a general 
equilibrium model we show that tournament behavior causes the returns of low-risk (high-
risk) assets to be larger (smaller) than expected according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
Using mutual fund data and pricing data of individual assets from twelve different asset 
categories, we find a positive and significant relation between tournament behavior and the 
low-risk premium. The results indicate that the low-risk effect is not only more prominent 
in a period following stronger tournament behavior, but is also larger in asset categories 
where more tournament behavior is observed. As there is no reason to assume that 
tournament behavior among mutual fund managers is likely to disappear anytime soon, 
investors can be more confident to capture the low-risk premium going forward.
 2. The cross-section of stock returns in frontier emerging 
markets5 
 
In this chapter we investigate the cross-section of stock returns in the new emerging equity 
markets, the so-called frontier emerging markets. Our unique survivorship-bias free data set 
consists of more than 1,400 stocks over the period 1997 to 2008 and covers 24 of the most 
liquid frontier emerging markets. The major benefit of using individual stock characteristics 
is that it allows us to investigate whether return factors that have been documented in 
developed countries also exist in these markets. We document the presence of economically 
and statistically significant value and momentum effects, and a local size effect. Our results 
indicate that the value and momentum effects still exist when incorporating conservative 
assumptions of transaction costs. Additionally, we show that value, momentum, and local 
size returns in frontier markets cannot be explained by global risk factors. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Traditional emerging markets have developed rapidly over the past decades, both 
economically and financially. A group of countries less developed than emerging markets 
with established stock exchanges has appeared on the radar screen of global investors. These 
new emerging markets as a group are also known as frontier emerging markets, or in short, 
frontier markets. These countries vary greatly in their economic development. The GDP per 
capita in 2008 of Bangladesh, for example, is just $497 while that of Slovenia is $27,019.6 
The market capitalization of stocks in frontier emerging markets in October 2008 is $113.6 
billion.7 Although still smaller than traditional emerging and developed stock markets, these 
markets are becoming more important, as evidenced for example by recent listings of new 
mutual funds and exchange-traded funds on frontier markets.8 In addition, for academics, 
                                                          
5 This chapter is published as De Groot, W., Pang, J., and Swinkels, L., 2012, The cross-section of 
stock returns in frontier emerging markets, Journal of Empirical Finance, 19, 796-818.  
6 Data source: World Bank Development Indicators, available online at http://data.worldbank.org. For 
comparison the GDP per capita of some other countries: Brazil $8,205, Russia $11,832, India $1,019, 
China $3,267, Afghanistan $366, Portugal $22,923, and the United States $46,350.  
7 This is the market capitalisation of the constituents of the Standard & Poor's Frontier Broad Market 
Index. Actual market capitalisation is higher because of exchange listed stocks that are not in this index 
and adjustments made to exclude the market capitalization part of the company that is inaccessible to 
(foreign) investors. 
8 For example, the Harding Loevner Frontier Emerging Markets Institutional (ticker: HLFMX) fund 
was launched on 27 May 2008 (total assets 5/31/2012: $68 mln), the Morgan Stanley Frontier 
Emerging Markets (ticker: FFD) fund was launched on 22 August 2008 (total assets 3/31/2012: $78 
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frontier emerging markets are an untapped data source that provides excellent out-of-sample 
research opportunities.  
 Investors who are interested in improving the risk-return trade-off of their 
portfolios could expand their investment opportunity set by including frontier equity 
markets. Goetzmann, Li, and Rouwenhorst (2005) indicate that investors should be willing 
to keep expanding their investment horizon to new equity markets to get a better diversified 
portfolio. Speidell and Krohne (2007) also mention diversification benefits as a key 
motivation for investors to include frontier markets in their investment portfolios. Berger, 
Pukthuanthong, and Yang (2011) investigate whether frontier equity markets are integrated 
with developed equity markets and conclude that this is not the case. These studies have in 
common that they consider frontier markets as a group or consider them at the country level. 
However, little is known about the risk, return, and diversification characteristics of return 
factors based on individual stock data in frontier markets.9 Our unique survivorship-bias free 
data set on individual stock characteristics in frontier markets allows us to construct 
portfolios based on other characteristics than the country of stock exchange listing. Hence, 
we are able to investigate the existence of value, momentum, size, and low-risk effects in 
these markets over the period 1997 to 2008 and gauge how much stronger these effects are 
when employed at the stock rather than the country level. Moreover, our data enables us to 
investigate whether investment strategies based on these cross-sectional stock attributes are 
correlated between developed, emerging, and frontier markets. Our research aims to fill 
these gaps in the literature. 
 This study contributes to the literature on at least three dimensions. First, our results 
provide out-of-sample evidence for the existence of value, momentum, and local size effects. 
Sorting stocks in frontier markets on value characteristics, such as book-to-price ratios, 
momentum characteristics, such as past 6-month returns, or market capitalization per 
country yield statistically significant positive excess returns for the top quintile portfolios 
versus the index of 5% to 15% per annum. Our study extends the results by Fama and French 
(1998) and Rouwenhorst (1999) for international evidence on the value effect. Our results 
also reinforce the international evidence of the momentum effect reported by Griffin, Ji, and 
Martin (2003) and Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999). Our results are further empirical evidence 
                                                          
mln), the Templeton Frontier Markets (ticker: TFMAX) fund was launched on 14 October 2008 (total 
assets 4/30/2011: $383 mln), the Forward Frontier Markets (ticker: FRNMX) fund was launched on 
31 December 2008 (total assets 5/31/2012: $70 mln) and the Guggenheim Frontier Markets (ticker: 
FRN) exchange-traded fund was launched on 12 June 2008 (total assets 4/30/2012: $137mln). Sources: 
Morningstar and Yahoo Finance. 
9 A notable exception is Girard and Sanha (2008), who use individual stock data of frontier markets to 
assess the importance of political risk in frontier market investments. 
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that value and momentum are present everywhere, as suggested by Asness, Moskowitz, and 
Pedersen (2013). The presence of a local size effect confirms evidence in Europe by Heston, 
Rouwenhorst, and Wessels (1999) and emerging markets by Rouwenhorst (1999). Our 
results are important, as frontier markets are least integrated with developed and emerging 
equity markets, yet, the cross-section of stock returns seems to produce excess returns on 
exactly the same factors.   
 Second, we are the first to investigate the profitability of value and momentum 
effects in frontier markets in detail when faced with real life market imperfections. We 
incorporate transaction costs estimates of 2.5% per single-trip transaction from Marshall, 
Nguyen, and Visaltanochoti (2013) covering bid-ask spreads, market impact and 
commissions. We deem this to be a conservative estimate as we consider the largest half of 
our sample and apply a one-month lag between ranking and portfolio formation to account 
for possible opportunity costs. Our empirical findings indicate that transaction costs have a 
large impact on the profitability of value and momentum strategies. However, we still 
observe economically and statistically significant returns of approximately 6.6% to 7.7% per 
annum after incorporating transactions costs for value strategies and net returns of 4.6% to 
7.2% for momentum strategies. These findings seem to be inconsistent with market 
efficiency. 
 Third, we analyze whether exposure to global risk factors can explain the existence 
of the factor anomalies and whether the factors are prone to extreme downside risk. We 
document that the value, momentum, and local size effects in frontier markets cannot be 
explained by value, momentum, and local size effects in developed and emerging markets. 
This indicates that the excess returns are not caused by exposures to global risk factors and 
implies that our findings are independent of the existence of the effects in other markets. In 
addition we show that the downside risk of value, momentum and local size portfolios in 
frontier markets is lower than can be expected based on the assumptions of normality. Hence, 
we deem it unlikely that downside risk can explain the empirical results we document.  
This chapter is organized as follows. We start in Section 2.2 by describing the data 
and methodology used in our analyses. We investigate the value, momentum, size and low-
risk effect in more detail in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we incorporate transactions costs in 
order to determine whether the cross-sectional return patterns still exist when faced with real 
life market imperfections. In Section 2.5 we investigate whether value, momentum, and local 
size effects in frontier markets can be explained by global risk factors. Finally, Section 2.6 
concludes. 
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2.2. Data and methodology 
 
Our research on individual stocks in frontier emerging markets makes use of a unique data 
set with high quality data from different sources. In this section we describe our data 
collection procedure. 
 All stocks are index constituents of the Standard & Poor’s Frontier Broad Market 
Index (S&P Frontier BMI). The sample period runs from the inception of the index in 
January 1997 to November 2008, meaning our sample contains almost 12 years of data. The 
firm characteristics that we use to investigate the value effect are book-to-market ratios, 
earnings-to-price ratios, and dividend yields. We use past local stock returns ranging from 6 
to 36 months to investigate momentum10 and low-volatility strategies and past 36 months 
dollar stock returns to construct the beta strategy. We use market capitalizations to 
investigate the size effect.  
 
2.2.1. Sample selection 
 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) selects the S&P Frontier BMI constituents according to their 
country as well as according to company selection criteria. To select countries, they analyze 
potential frontier markets for investor interest and accessibility. A market’s turnover, 
number of listings and whether it has attracted a minimum amount of foreign investor 
interest are considered. S&P also considers a market’s development prospects and, in 
particular, whether a market is likely to develop in breadth, depth and infrastructure. These 
requirements ensure that many small and inaccessible countries are not included in our data 
set. 
 In each country, S&P selects the publicly listed equities, including local listings 
and listings from Hong Kong, London and New York, based on market capitalization and 
lack of foreign investment restrictions. The aggregation of the market capitalization of 
selected stocks should exceed 80% of the total market capitalization of each country. S&P 
reduces the number of shares outstanding used in the index calculation to reflect any limits 
or restrictions on investments by foreign investors or entities. Hence, our sample contains 
only the larger and more investable part of frontier equity markets. Our sample does not 
suffer from survivorship bias, as the index constituents are known real-time. Each month, 
                                                          
10 This is in line with Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006), whose results suggest that using local returns 
for international momentum strategies leads to higher excess returns. 
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we include only those stocks in our sample that are index constituents at that moment in 
time.11 
Table 2.1 shows the frontier market countries in our sample with, in column two, 
the region classification and, in columns three to seven, country inclusion information: dates 
of inclusion in index, country index weights and number of firms at the moment of inclusion 
and as of the last sample month of October 2008. The largest countries (in terms of index 
weight) in October 2008 are Kazakhstan, Lebanon and Slovenia. During the sample period, 
the number of countries increased from 14 to 24, and the number of firms increased from 
204 to 290. The last two columns contain the turnover ratio of stocks in a particular country 
in the inclusion year in the index and in 2008. The turnover ratio is a measure of liquidity 
and defined as the total value of stock trades in a year divided by the average market 
capitalization of the entire stock market. This data is obtained at the country level from the 
World Bank online database.12 The turnover rate for developed markets is typically between 
50% and 150%. For emerging markets the turnover rate is generally between 25% and 75%. 
The turnover rate in frontier markets is on average close to 15%, which is substantially 
smaller than for developed markets. In 2008, the frontier countries with the largest turnover 
ratios are Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Vietnam.  
 
2.2.2. Returns and market capitalizations 
 
We calculate stock returns as monthly total returns in US dollars. Since S&P does not 
provide total return data for individual stocks in frontier markets, we use total monthly 
returns from Interactive Data Exshare as our first data source. If total return data is not 
available from Exshare, then we aggregate S&P monthly price returns and the cumulative 
daily dividend in that month divided by the price at the previous month-end to get monthly 
total returns. In case of extreme monthly return observations with large differences between 
the above two data sources, we check with alternative data sources, such as Bloomberg or 
the local stock exchange.13 If one of the total returns still cannot be confirmed, we use the 
smallest available in absolute value to limit the potential influence of outliers.  
                                                          
11 Still, one could wonder whether the historical index has been constructed using future information. 
We verified with the IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1998 and the index construction 
methodology by S&P that no surviving countries were later added to the historical index. We also 
verified that no countries were excluded from the index during our sample period. 
12  Data retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR. Note that we cross-
checked the data for 1997 with those available in the IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1998 and 
find that these are similar.  
13 We define monthly total returns larger than 100% and smaller than -60% as extreme returns. 
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 To further gauge the quality of our data, we replicate the index returns for the 
individual countries in the S&P Frontier BMI in US dollars and local currency using total 
returns, S&P market capitalization, and index constituent identifiers in our individual stock 
database. The correlation between our replication and the index returns reported by S&P is 
above 98%. This high number gives us additional comfort that our data set is of high quality. 
Note that, in order to be eligible for inclusion in a portfolio, the stock needs to be included 
in the index. If a stock is in a portfolio and is taken out of the index, we still use its price 
return from the databases to calculate the portfolio return until the strategy excludes the stock 
from the portfolio.14  
 Table 2.1 shows information on return data per country and for the total market. 
The average monthly dollar return of the equally- and value-weighted frontier market 
portfolio equals 0.8%. The difference between these two is not statistically significant (t-
value 0.4). Nevertheless, it suggests that small capitalization stocks outperformed large 
capitalization stocks in our sample. The average return in frontier markets is higher than in 
developed and emerging markets over this sample period, where the average equally-
weighted returns are 0.5% and 0.6%, respectively.15 The standard deviation of the equally-
weighted frontier markets index return is 4.2%. This is marginally lower than the volatility 
of developed markets (4.4%) and substantially lower than the volatility of the emerging 
markets index (7.2%). Note that the low volatility in frontier markets is mainly due to low 
correlation among this group of countries. Individual country volatilities can be above 15% 
per month.16 The local returns are somewhat higher with 1.4% per month for the equally-
weighted, and 1.1% per month for the value-weighted index. Volatilities for local returns 
are approximately the same as for the returns in USD.  
 In addition, we present median market capitalizations in Table 2.1. We can see that 
the median firm size of frontier market stocks is USD 36 million. This is substantially lower 
than in emerging markets (EM) where the median firm size is approximately ten times larger 
at USD 337 million. 
                                                          
14 In most cases, stocks dropping from the index are not (immediately) delisted, limiting the concerns 
raised by Shumway (1997) on the potential effect of a delisting bias for US stock returns. For 20 
individual stocks, we observe monthly returns below -90%, indicating severe stress for the companies 
involved. These negative returns are included in the portfolio returns. Nevertheless, despite extensive 
data checks, we cannot guarantee that there are some individual cases for which delisting returns are 
not accurately accounted for in our databases. 
15 The developed markets universe consists of stocks included in the FTSE World index and for 
emerging markets it is stocks in the S&P/IFCI Emerging Markets index. 
16 Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) predict the risk of equity markets in 135 countries. For the frontier 
markets, they predict 8-14% volatility on a monthly basis. This is roughly in line with our summary 
statistics in Table 2.1 for the individual countries. 
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2.2.3. Accounting data 
 
For the firm characteristics book-to-market and earnings-to-price ratio, we use S&P as our 
first data source. If for a particular stock S&P data is not available, we use Worldscope data, 
which we lag with 6 months to account for delayed availability of the annual reports. We 
extract dividend yield data from the Interactive Data Exshare database, which we calculate 
as the cumulative daily dividend payments over the past twelve months, divided by the price 
at each month-end.  
 We check the data quality of each of these variables using various statistics, such 
as coverage, median, maximum value and minimum value in each month during our sample 
period. In addition, we examine alternative data sources, such as Bloomberg, in the case of 
suspicious values. This battery of quality checks has led to a unique, high-quality frontier 
emerging markets data set. 
  We summarize these firm characteristics of our sample data with statistics in Table 
2.1. The median book-to-market ratio is 0.8 (EM 0.6), the median earnings-to-price ratio 
8.5% (EM 6.1%) and the median dividend yield 2.5% (EM 1.7%). Based on these value 
characteristics, frontier market stocks are considered to have been cheaper than emerging 
markets stocks over this sample period. Kazakhstan and Panama do not have any dividend 
yield data, as they only entered the index in December 2007 and have a history of less than 
one year. Furthermore, for the entire sample of frontier markets, approximately one-third of 
the stocks have a dividend yield equal to 0%.  
 
2.2.4. Data coverage of stock and firm characteristics 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the number of S&P Frontier BMI constituents through time and the 
number of firms that have data available for the different characteristics. The number of 
index constituents is stable, with 204 at the start and varying between 250 and 300 over our 
sample period. There were 290 stocks at the end of the sample period in October 2008. Since 
stocks enter and exit the index, the total number of individual stocks over the entire sample 
period is slightly more than 1,400. For each stock, the market capitalization is available. For 
the return-related variables we show only the coverage of 1-month momentum, for which 
we have almost 100% data coverage.17 The coverage of the book-to-market and earnings-
to-price ratio is almost 100% before 2007, and slightly decreased thereafter, because our 
                                                          
17 To prevent losing three years of our sample for the 36-month momentum and low-risk variables, we 
assume an expanding window in the beginning of our sample period starting with 12 monthly return 
observations. 
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data sources do not provide information for several stocks that newly entered the index. 
Dividend yield is the characteristic with the lowest data coverage, as it depends on a single 
data source. Nonetheless, dividend yields are available for at least 200 firms in most of the 
months of the sample period, meaning that the average coverage is above 80%. We conclude 
that the data coverage and quality is sufficiently high to examine the profitability of 
investment strategies in frontier markets. 
 
FIGURE 2.1. Data coverage of stock and firm characteristics 
The bold black line represents the number of firms in the S&P Frontier BMI. The other lines represent 
the data availability for the book-to-market ratio (B/M), the earnings-to-price ratio (E/P), the dividend 
yield (D/P), and 1-month momentum (MOM1). 
 
 
2.2.5. Portfolio construction methodology 
 
We form investment portfolios in a style similar to, e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). At 
the end of each month, we rank the stocks on a particular characteristic.18 For our baseline 
strategy, we form an equally-weighted portfolio from the top 20% of the ranking, label this 
the Top portfolio, and compare these with the equally-weighted average return from the 
                                                          
18 Note that we treat companies that pay no dividend at all separately when calculating the excess 
return for the D/P strategy. We treat them in the same way as firms with missing data and rank them 
in the middle, so that it does not appear in the top or bottom portfolio that month. This methodology 
of dealing with companies that pay no dividend and the empirical results are in line with Fama and 
French (1993).  
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entire sample, the Index portfolio. We additionally create an equally-weighted portfolio from 
the least attractive 20% of stocks, and label this the Bottom portfolio to investigate long-
short strategies. For most frontier equity markets it is nearly impossible to short sell stocks. 
However, in a portfolio management context, the short portfolio can be used to underweight 
assets relative to the frontier market benchmark index. A lower portfolio weight than in the 
benchmark index means in essence a short position for the portfolio manager. Note that these 
short positions in the benchmark in this context are capped at the benchmark weight, while 
for long-short portfolios these weights are (in theory) uncapped. For small-cap stocks such 
long-only constraint is most problematic, as short positions relative to the benchmark are by 
definition small. For this reason, the main focus in all our analyses is on the top portfolio. 
Each month, new portfolios are constructed, which we hold for a period of twelve months, 
unless a stock gets delisted before the end of the holding period. These stocks exit the 
relevant portfolio, and the weights of the remaining stocks are adjusted proportionally.  
 As we construct new portfolios every month and use a 12-month holding period, at 
any point in time the strategies effectively hold stocks from twelve portfolios, each formed 
one month apart. We calculate monthly returns for a particular strategy as the average of the 
returns of the twelve portfolios. All returns are expressed in US dollars. For country- or 
region-neutral portfolios, we rank the stocks within each country on a characteristic and 
assign the top 20% of each country to the Top portfolio. Hence, the country-neutral Top 
portfolio has the same country distribution as the Bottom portfolio and the Index portfolio. 
An additional side-effect is that country-neutral portfolios contain the same percentage of 
stocks in a certain currency as the bottom or index portfolio and therefore the associated 
excess returns cannot be attributed to currency movements. 
 
2.3. Value, momentum, size, and low-risk effects in frontier markets 
 
In this section, we analyze the cross-section of returns on four common types of 
characteristics on which we have high-quality data available for our frontier emerging 
markets. First, we investigate three valuation characteristics, followed by an investigation of 
three momentum characteristics. We continue with firm size as measured by market 
capitalization and end with two low-risk characteristics. We continue the section by 
analyzing the impact of capital constraints on the results and conclude by investigating the 
diversification benefits between the three types of characteristics. 
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2.3.1. Value 
 
We start by investigating value investment strategies for which Fama and French (1992) and 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Visney (1994) report significantly positive excess returns for US 
stocks. Fama and French (1998) and Rouwenhorst (1999) find out-of-sample evidence for 
international developed and emerging equity markets. We rank the cross-section of stocks 
in our sample on three value characteristics: the book-to-market ratio (B/M), earnings-to-
price ratio (E/P), and dividend-to-price ratio (D/P). Stocks with high B/M, E/P, and D/P 
ratios have on average higher returns than stocks with low ratios. This is called the value 
effect. The left part of the results in Panel A of Table 2.2 indicates that our sample of frontier 
market stocks also exhibits strong value effects. The first row in Table 2.2 indicates that B/M 
sorted portfolios have a Top-Minus-Index (TMI) excess return of 0.74% per month, which 
is statistically significant with a t-value of 3.05.19 For portfolios ranked on E/P, we find 
economically and statistically significant TMI returns of 1.26% per month with a t-value of 
5.55. The D/P valuation strategy has the least positive excess returns, with 0.41% per month 
and a t-value of 1.72.  
 We also investigate the average return of Top-Minus-Bottom (TMB) portfolios. 
Table 2.2 shows that the documented excess return of the B/M strategy is almost equally 
split between the long and the short side, as the return of the B/M factor of 0.74% is roughly 
doubled to 1.66% when viewed in excess of the bottom portfolio. We find comparable results 
for E/P and D/P. Due to the increased volatility of this Top-Minus-Bottom strategy, the t-
values increase to a lesser extent and decrease somewhat for E/P. 
We compare our results to Top-Minus-Bottom returns of more developed equity 
markets. Fama and French (1998) report 0.64% excess return per month for B/M, 0.57% for 
E/P, and 0.46% for D/P for a global equity portfolio consisting of 13 countries over the 
period 1975 to 1995. They furthermore show that the value premium exists for most 
countries individually and are not limited only to the US. Rouwenhorst (1999) reports a 
0.72% per month excess return for B/M for stocks in 20 emerging markets over the period 
1987 to 1997, and Van der Hart, De Zwart, and Van Dijk (2005) report 0.73% and 0.68% 
per month excess return for B/M and E/P in 31 emerging markets over the period 1988 to 
2004. Thus, the excess returns based on value-characteristics sorted investment strategies in 
frontier markets are economically at least as large as those reported in the literature for 
developed and emerging stock markets. 
 
                                                          
19 Throughout our research, we use the method described in Newey and West (1987) to calculate t-
values that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
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  As our results might be driven by frontier market risk, we also calculate the alphas 
relative to a single-factor model with the equally- or value-weighted frontier market index 
as the single risk factor. The betas of the TMI strategies are close to zero for each of the 
value strategies (not reported). This implies that the alphas reported in Table 2.2 (‘market 
risk adjusted’) here are close to the raw TMI returns reported before. For example, the 0.74% 
raw excess return of the B/M strategy is slightly reduced to a significant risk-adjusted alpha 
of 0.69% per month when we use an equally-weighted market index and stays 0.74% per 
month when we use a value-weighted market index. An important exception is the D/P 
strategy. This strategy selects stocks with a relatively low beta to the market index.20 Hence, 
the market risk-adjusted excess return is 0.59% (t-value 3.00) per month for an equally-
weighted index and 0.50% (t-value 2.43) per month for a value-weighted index, whereas the 
raw excess return was only 0.41% (t-value 1.72). Summarizing, our results indicate that 
unconditional beta risk cannot explain the excess returns on the investment strategies. This 
observation is in line with results documented for these strategies in developed and emerging 
equity markets. 
 As these investment strategies rank all stocks at each period in time, the raw results 
reported in the first row of Panel A of Table 2.2 might be influenced by regional effects. In 
other words, the top portfolio might be more exposed to certain regions than the index which 
could explain part of the abnormal returns. Therefore, we also calculate each of the 
investment strategies per region and also display the region-neutral TMI investment 
strategies in the second part of Table 2.2. These investment strategies require the 20% most 
attractive stocks from each region to be in the top portfolios, which ensures that the regional 
distribution of the top portfolio is equal to the index.21 The results in Table 2.2 indicate that 
the results are not driven by regional effects. The region-neutral strategy yields value returns 
of 0.73% (B/M), 1.08% (E/P), and 0.56% (D/P) per month, which are all statistically 
significant and similar in magnitude as the non-neutral returns. We document a positive TMI 
return for most of the valuation characteristics of each of the regions separately. The D/P 
strategy seems to be the weakest valuation variable where both Europa and Asia have 
negative returns. These low returns for the long-only D/P strategy is caused by its low beta, 
as we also saw for the non-neutral strategy. Summarizing our region-neutral results, we 
conclude that the presence of the value effect is robust to regional influences. 
                                                          
20 Fama and French (1998) also report that the global high D/P strategy has a beta of 0.87, lower than 
the beta of the B/M and E/P strategy, which are 0.94 and 0.95, respectively. 
21 The number of stocks is not exactly equal with or without region or country neutrality imposed, as 
we require each region or country to have at least 4 stocks available and data coverage of at least 40% 
at a point in time to be included in the analysis. The average number of stocks in the strategy per region 
is as follows: America 35, Europe 103, Africa 80, Asia 49. 
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 While the value effect is present across regions, it is possible that differences in 
country-specific accounting standards or currency effects might drive our results, at least to 
some extent. Therefore, we take the analysis one step further and calculate country-neutral 
investment strategies. In this way, country and currency effects are hedged out relative to 
the index, as explained in Section 2.2.5 on the portfolio construction methodology. Table 
2.2 shows that imposing country neutrality does not alter our conclusions about the 
significant presence of value effects in frontier markets. Nevertheless, part of the global TMI 
returns can be attributed to country allocation, as TMI returns for the country-neutral strategy 
are about half of the non-country-neutral returns. Our finding that part of the value effect is 
driven by country allocation is in line with Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), who 
report that ranking country indexes based on valuation measures leads to significant excess 
returns. This analysis shows the benefits of using stock-specific data as our results indicate 
that valuation measures at the individual stock level contain information above and beyond 
the country level which is vital to fully capture the factor return. 
 The analyses in this sub-section show that the value effect is robust and strongly 
present in our data set consisting of frontier emerging equity stocks. 
 
2.3.2. Momentum 
 
In this sub-section, we investigate the profitability of momentum strategies in frontier 
emerging markets. This means that stocks in the cross-section are ranked on their past 
returns. Stocks with higher past returns are expected to have higher future returns. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) report significantly positive excess returns for winner stocks relative to 
loser stocks over the past 3 to 12 months in the US, and Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) confirms 
these findings for international developed and emerging market stocks. 
 In Table 2.2 we display momentum strategies with a look-back period of 3, 6, and 
12 months, and a holding period of 12 months. Similar to the value strategies, we choose a 
relatively long holding period of 12 months as we know that transactions costs can be 
substantial in frontier emerging markets.22 We see that the 3-month look-back period results 
in a 0.95% per month excess return relative to the index. For longer look-back periods the 
excess returns are smaller, with 0.59% per month for a 12-month look-back period. In order 
to compare our results to the literature, we also display how much excess returns the short 
positions generate and how this adds up to returns of the Top-Minus-Bottom portfolios. In 
all cases, the results are stronger for the top than for the bottom portfolio. TMB returns are 
                                                          
22 In Section 2.4 we investigate the sensitivity of value and momentum effects to other holding periods. 
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higher than for TMI, but with lower t-values. For the 6-month momentum strategy, e.g., we 
obtain a 1.19% per month excess return with a t-value of 2.80 for the TMB portfolio 
compared to an excess return of 0.77% per month with a t-value of 4.02 for the TMI 
portfolio. 
 The magnitude of our momentum profits in the medium term is in line with those 
observed for developed and emerging markets. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) report an 
excess return of 1.09% per month for past 6-month winners relative to losers for the US over 
the period 1965 to 1997. Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) documents 1.16% per month for 
European stock markets (1980-1995) and 0.39% per month for emerging markets (1982-
1997). Van der Hart, De Zwart, and Van Dijk (2005) report 0.74% for their sample of 31 
emerging markets over the period 1988 to 2004. The short-term momentum returns are in 
line with Chan, Hameed, and Tong (2000), who report a 1.1% per month excess return for 
short-term country momentum strategies using a sample of 23 developed and emerging 
countries over the period 1980 to 1995. We conclude that the excess returns from our frontier 
equity markets momentum strategies are economically at least as strong as those reported 
previously for developed and emerging equity markets. 
 We also calculate the alphas relative to a single-factor model with the equally- 
weighted and value-weighted frontier market index as the risk factor. The betas of the TMI 
strategies are close to zero for each of the excess returns of the momentum strategies (not 
reported). This implies that the alphas reported in Table 2.2 are about the same as the raw 
TMI returns reported before. Hence, these results indicate that unconditional beta risk cannot 
explain the excess returns of the momentum investment strategies. This is in line with results 
documented for momentum strategies in developed and emerging equity markets. 
 In the second part of Panel A, Table 2.2 we investigate in more detail the influence 
of regional and country effects on the return of momentum strategies. We see that the raw 
momentum returns slightly decrease when we impose region neutrality. For example, the 6-
month momentum strategy decreases from 0.77% per month to 0.69% per month. For all 
momentum strategies, each of the regions separately also have a positive excess return. 
Particularly for the 6-month momentum strategy we find the strongest results for Africa 
(0.94% per month) and the weakest for America (0.31% per month). Imposing country 
neutrality further reduces the momentum profits, although only for the 12-month momentum 
strategy we do not find significant results anymore. The 6-month momentum profits reduce 
to 0.21% per month, implying that country momentum is part of the total momentum profit. 
Rouwenhorst (1998), Chan, Hameed, and Tong (2000) and Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006) 
provide empirical evidence of momentum profits at the country level for developed and 
emerging equity markets. Our results confirm the existence of country momentum within 
26 Chapter 2 
the group of frontier markets and may serve as out-of-sample evidence for what is sometimes 
called macro-momentum, since it is at the country level. 
Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) link the existence of the momentum effect to the 
degree of individualism of investors within a country.23 Their results suggest that countries 
with a high Hofstede score on individualism also earn higher average momentum returns.24 
For several of the frontier markets countries, a score on individualism is available; see 
Hofstede (2001) and Appendix 2.B. The average score is low for frontier markets for which 
the score is available. A low score suggests that social groups such as families play a more 
important role than individuals. Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) claim that the medium-term 
momentum effect is weaker for countries with low individualism. The low individualism 
score for frontier markets would imply that momentum effects in these markets are rather 
small. Hence, we investigate the momentum returns for the sub-sample of countries with a 
low individualism score. Estonia, Jamaica, Lebanon, and Slovakia are excluded because they 
have an individualism score above the threshold of the low individualism sub-sample from 
Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010). From the last row of Panel A in Table 2.2, we observe that 
the momentum returns from our low individualism sub-sample are at least as high as those 
in the full sample. Hence, our results do not seem to indicate that momentum is weak in 
countries with a low score on cultural individualism.  
 The analyses in this sub-section show that the momentum effect is robust and 
strongly present in our data set consisting of frontier emerging equity stocks. 
 
2.3.3. Size 
 
The size effect means that the cross-section of stocks is ranked according to market 
capitalization of equity. Stocks with a relatively low market capitalization experience higher 
returns than stocks with a relatively large market capitalization. The existence of the size 
effect has been first documented by Banz (1981) for US equity markets and has later been 
confirmed by many other researchers in equity markets around the world. Van Dijk (2011) 
provides a comprehensive review on the size effect around the world. 
 Panel A of Table 2.2 indicates that we do not find a size effect among the total 
group of frontier emerging markets countries. The excess return of a portfolio of stocks with 
a small market capitalization relative to the index is an insignificant 0.23% per month. Also, 
                                                          
23 Speidell (2009) reports some anecdotal evidence of differences in investor behavior in frontier 
markets. 
24 See www.geert-hofstede.com for detailed information on the scores on different aspects of culture. 
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small capitalization stocks do not significantly outperform large capitalization stocks, as the 
return of the Top-Minus-Bottom portfolio is 0.51% with a t-value of 1.19. 
 Our results on a region and country-neutral level indicate that the size effect is a 
local effect. In three out of four regions the return of small stocks is higher than that of the 
index. Due to diversification benefits across regions, the region-neutral size effect is 
economically and statistically significant with an excess return of 0.81% per month and an 
associated t-value of 3.64. Imposing country-neutrality leads to qualitatively similar results 
as imposing region-neutrality. The finding of only a local size effect again emphasizes the 
need of individual stock data to fully capture the return premium related to the size factor, 
as the country allocation decision does not seem to add significant value.  
 These results are in line with the empirical literature on the international existence 
of the size effect. For example, Heston, Rouwenhorst, and Wessels (1999) report a 
significant size effect in Europe, which is due to small stocks within a country earning higher 
risk-adjusted returns than large stocks within the same country. Barry, Goldreyer, 
Lockwood, and Rodriguez (2002) also only find evidence of a size effect in emerging 
markets when they measure size relative to the local market. The size effect in Rouwenhorst 
(1999) is significant in 12 out of 20 individual emerging markets. 
 The analyses in this sub-section show that only the local size effect is present in our 
data set consisting of frontier emerging equity stocks. For that reason we only focus on the 
local size factor in the remainder of the analyses. 
 
2.3.4. Low-risk 
 
Another factor that is difficult to reconcile with the CAPM is the low-risk effect. This factor 
is constructed by ranking stocks on historical risk measures, such as beta or volatility. To 
our knowledge, Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) are the first to document the abnormal 
returns of these low-risk portfolios. Later, Blitz and Van Vliet (2007) documented that low-
risk stocks have alpha relative to the CAPM not only in the US, but also in international 
markets. There are at least three explanations put forward for the existence of the low-risk 
effect. First, investors might not be allowed to or willing to apply leverage to their 
investment portfolio. When they wish to increase expected returns without employing 
leverage they are forced to buy high-risk stocks (under the assumption that expected returns 
and risk are positively correlated); see Black (1972), Falkenstein (2009), and Baker, Bradley, 
and Wurgler (2011). Second, the existence of the low-risk effect might be caused by a two-
step investment process. In the first step the asset allocation decision is taken by the chief 
investment officer using absolute risk and return criteria. In the second step, investment 
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managers are hired to outperform a benchmark, causing them to focus on relative risk and 
return criteria. Such delegated portfolio management decisions may lead to suboptimal 
portfolios and may distort aggregate asset prices in such a way that high-risk assets are 
structurally overpriced and low-risk assets structurally underpriced; see Van Binsbergen, 
Brandt, and Koijen (2008). Thirdly, Shefrin and Statman (2000) suggest that private 
investors may hold part of their wealth, above a certain threshold level, as a gamble to 
quickly become rich. This might explain why many private investors only hold a limited 
number of stocks in their portfolio. This behavioral effect might lead highly volatile stocks 
to be overpriced. 
 In Panel A of Table 2.2, we display the returns of a portfolio of low-beta stocks and 
low-volatility stocks. For the TMB portfolio this is the low-beta (low-volatility) portfolio 
minus the high-beta (high-volatility) portfolio. Both risk measures beta and volatility are 
calculated using historic 36 month returns. The empirical results in Table 2.2 indicate that 
we do not find a strong low-risk effect in frontier emerging markets countries. The excess 
return of a portfolio of stocks with a low-volatility relative to the index is an insignificant 
0.07% per month, whereas low-beta stocks underperform the index by an insignificant 
0.32% per month. As risks are persistent, portfolios formed on low-risk characteristics are 
also in the investment period less risky than the index. Hence, it makes more sense to look 
at risk-adjusted returns than absolute levels of return. We see that the low-volatility effect, 
with an alpha of 0.41% per month relative to the equally-weighted index, is economically 
and statistically significant. However, this result is not robust. For other specifications, for 
example using low-beta instead of low-volatility or measured against a value-weighted 
index, the results are not statistically significant. For our region- or country-neutral analyses, 
we occasionally find a significantly positive relation between risk and return as one would 
expect from standard textbook finance. 
 Blitz, Pang, and Van Vliet (2013) suggest that low-risk strategies also earn higher 
risk-adjusted returns in emerging equity markets. However, they observe that in the first half 
of their sample (1989-1999) the low-risk effect in emerging markets is weaker than in the 
second half of their sample (2000-2010). They attribute this to the lack of benchmark-driven 
investors in the first half of their sample. We expect that for frontier markets over our sample 
period the number of benchmark-driven investors is limited, and only recently has started to 
become an asset class that institutional investors might allocate to. If the conjecture of Blitz, 
Pang, and Van Vliet (2013) is correct, we also expect a small low-risk effect in our sample. 
Our results seem consistent with their explanation. This means that our findings casts doubt 
on the explanation that the low-risk effect is caused by market frictions such as short sales 
constraints, which are more likely to exist in frontier markets.  
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 The analyses in this sub-section show that the low-risk effect is neither statistically 
nor economically significant in our sample of frontier emerging equity stocks. For that 
reason, we only analyze the value, momentum and local-size strategies in subsequent 
sections. 
 
2.3.5. Influence of capital constraints 
 
The empirical results on the value, momentum, and local size effect that we displayed in 
Table 2.2 could be related to capital constraints in frontier equity markets, as these markets 
have not always been as open as they currently are. Although our data provider takes these 
requirements into account before admitting a country to the frontier markets index, the 
investment strategies could potentially still be tilted towards countries with the most or least 
investment restrictions in our sample.25 Although a priori it is not clear what the effect would 
be of this tilt, we want to make sure that our findings are robust in this respect. Therefore, 
we use data on financial market liberalization to separate the frontier markets into a most 
and least liberalized group and verify whether our results still hold for these sub-samples.26  
 We use three different measures of financial market liberalization, namely relevant 
sub-indices of the Index of Economic Freedom reported by The Heritage Foundation (HF)27, 
the KOF Index of Globalization constructed by the ETH Zurich (KOF)28 and the Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW) reported by the Fraser Institute.29 We choose sub-indices in 
such a way that they best represent investment freedom.30 The higher the score, the higher 
the financial liberalization, meaning it is less likely that capital constraints play an important 
role in that country. We omit scores when a country is not yet included in the S&P Frontier 
BMI. For all three indices the coverage is high, although not all data is always available, 
such as KOF and EFW data for Lebanon. As can be expected, the rank correlations between 
                                                          
25 Note that unreported empirical results indicate that the average returns of the frontier emerging 
markets are not related to their average financial market liberalization score or the change thereof. 
26 See Bekaert and Harvey (2003) for an overview on integration and liberalization measures for 
emerging markets. Unfortunately, Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 2000) do not have integration data 
available for the frontier equity markets in our sample. 
27 Data are available at http://www.heritage.org. We use the average of the sub-indices Financial 
Freedom and Investment Freedom, as these two are closest to the definition of freedom that we prefer 
to measure for our analyses. 
28 Data available at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch. For more details on this index: see Dreher (2006). 
We use the Economic Globalization dimension scores, as the Political and Social Globalization 
dimensions are less relevant for our analyses.  
29 Data from the Fraser Institute available at http://www.freetheworld.com. We use the area Freedom 
to Trade Internationally as this area most directly represents the measure we are interested in.  
30 Appendix 2.A contains the annual scores per frontier country and a comparison of the liberalization 
measures for frontier markets with developed and emerging countries.  
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these indices are relatively high with roughly 75% over the sample period. Nevertheless, 
some differences are present and therefore we investigate the impact of each of the three 
measures separately.  
 At the end of each month, we rank all countries based on each of the three financial 
liberalization indices.31 We choose the thresholds to split the countries into a most and least 
liberalized group in such a way that the two groups contain approximately an equal number 
of stocks. We then form investment portfolios on the most and least liberalized stocks 
separately. Panel B of Table 2.2 contains the results for the sub-samples with the highest and 
lowest financial liberalization according to each of these measures. With the exception of 
the D/P factor, which also showed the weakest overall results, we observe that value 
strategies still deliver significantly positive excess returns in liberalized as well as non-
liberalized countries, both from an economic and statistical point of view. Therefore, we 
conclude that capital constraints do not seem to drive the value effects. We also check the 
influence of capital constraints of each of the countries on our momentum results and on the 
country-neutral size results. These strategies all still deliver substantial positive excess 
returns in both liberalized and non-liberalized sub-samples.32 Therefore, we also conclude 
that capital constraints do not seem to drive momentum and size returns. 
 
2.3.6. Diversification effects 
 
Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) indicate that value and momentum strategies are 
negatively correlated within asset classes. This negative correlation implies diversification 
benefits from combining value and momentum effects in one investment strategy. We 
therefore investigate the correlation between the three value strategies, the three momentum 
strategies, and the local size strategy that we analyzed before. 
 
                                                          
31 We incorporate appropriate time lags when using the index scores. Heritage Foundation informed 
us that annual scores have become available in the first quarter. Therefore we use the scores as of the 
end of March every year. KOF data has become available every year around January based on data of 
two years ago. So, around January 2008, the new index became available based on 2005 data. To be 
conservative, we use a two years and one quarter lag, meaning we assume 2005 data is available at the 
end of March 2008. Note that this index contains a look-ahead bias, as data of previous years changes 
with the introduction of a new methodology. The same holds for EFW, although data becomes 
available a bit earlier. We use a one year and three quarters lag, meaning that we assume 2005 data is 
available at the end of September 2007.  
32 Our proxies are related to capital constraints, which could be related to more practical difficulties 
for international investors. These measures of capital constraints could therefore also be interpreted as 
efficiency measures. Griffin, Kelly, and Nadari (2010) suggest that traditional return-based efficiency 
measures, such as variance-ratio tests, are not related to the magnitude of momentum returns in 56 
developed and emerging markets. 
The cross-section of stock returns in frontier emerging markets 31 
 
TABLE 2.3. Correlation between value, momentum, and size strategies in frontier markets 
The table contains the correlations between the monthly top-minus-index excess returns of the value, 
momentum, and size strategies in frontier emerging markets. All portfolios are formed as described in 
Table 2.2. Country neutrality is only applied to the size portfolio. 
 
In Table 2.3, the correlations over the period 1997 to 2008 are displayed. The 
momentum strategies are all positively correlated, ranging from 0.35 to 0.75 for different 
formation periods. The correlation between valuation strategies is mixed. B/M and E/P 
strategies are positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.47. The D/P strategy is negatively 
correlated to the B/M strategy and uncorrelated to the E/P strategy. Our empirical results 
suggest that combining different valuation indicators improves the risk-adjusted 
performance of a long-only valuation investment strategy.  
 The off-diagonal block of the correlation matrix indicates that valuation strategies 
are on average unrelated to the momentum strategies with correlations ranging from -0.25 
between B/M and 12-month momentum to 0.20 between E/P and 3-month momentum. 
Hence, the diversification benefits between value and momentum within frontier markets 
are large. The size strategy is also virtually uncorrelated with value and momentum 
strategies, indicating that diversification benefits also exist with the size factor.  
 
2.4. Incorporating transaction costs  
 
The results in the previous section are based on market prices without taking transaction 
costs explicitly into account. Fortunately, our data provider S&P explicitly takes liquidity 
into account when deciding to include a country or a stock in their frontier markets index. 
Hence, we expect that the stocks in our sample can be traded in reasonable quantities.33 
Furthermore, our results in Sub-section 2.3.5 already indicate that for our sample of stocks, 
constraints on the free movement of capital into frontier countries does not explain the 
                                                          
33 See Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) for a detailed investigation of 
liquidity in emerging markets. 
Size
B/M E/P D/P MOM3 MOM6 MOM12 Size
B/M 1 0.47 -0.33 0.18 -0.17 -0.25 0.23
E/P 1 0.00 0.20 0.03 -0.21 0.01
D/P 1 -0.18 -0.12 -0.09 -0.26
MOM3 1 0.51 0.35 -0.03
MOM6 1 0.75 -0.07
MOM12 1 -0.07
Size 1
Value Momentum
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existence of the value and momentum effects. Nevertheless, actual transaction costs, such 
as bid-ask spreads, market impact costs and commissions might be a particular issue for 
frontier markets, as liquidity is typically lower than for more developed equity markets (see, 
e.g., Speidell and Krohne 2007) as indicated in Table 2.1. This raises the question on whether 
the abnormal returns associated with value and momentum investment strategies are truly 
inconsistent with market efficiency. In this section we analyze the profitability of the 
investment strategies when faced with real life market imperfections. 
  Not much has been documented on actual trading costs in frontier markets. Papers 
that examine stock market anomalies after incorporating trading costs in U.S. markets often 
make use of the model of Keim and Madhaven (1997), see e.g. Avramov, Chordia and Goyal 
(2006). However, as this model is only calibrated on the U.S. market it can therefore not be 
applied to frontier markets. Recently, Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti (2013) 
estimated the transactions costs for a sample of 19 frontier markets stocks using data over 
the period 2002 to 2010 from Thomson Reuters Tick History database. They report average 
value-weighted effective spreads of 0.95% and market impact costs of 0.45% over their 
sample period.34 Furthermore they use commission data based on Quisenberry (2010) which 
the author estimates to be 1.09% on average in 2007. We therefore assume total single-trip 
transaction costs of 2.5% for each stock in our analysis which is equal to the sum of the 
spread between mid and bid/ask price, market impact, and commission costs. This estimate 
for frontier emerging markets is substantially larger than recent estimates for more 
developed equity markets. E.g., De Groot, Huij and Zhou (2012) report average transaction 
costs estimates incorporating spread, market impact and commissions of 9 basis points for 
S&P 500 stocks over the period 1990 to 2009 and 26 basis points for the 600 largest 
European stocks over the same sample period. This means that our assumption of transaction 
costs is 28 times larger than the US estimates and 10 times larger than the European 
estimates. Although our sample seems to be more liquid than that of Marshall, Nguyen, and 
Visaltanachoti (2013), we prefer to be conservative and apply these cost estimates only to 
the largest 150 stocks in our sample. In Figure 2.1 we showed that our sample consists of 
approximately 300 stocks at each point in time, which means that we disregard the smallest 
half of our sample in our analysis in this section. An additional important trading cost 
component in frontier markets are opportunity costs, since finding a counterparty to trade 
with might not be that easy in frontier markets. As a consequence, we therefore skip one 
                                                          
34 In addition, we asked a large stock broker (Nomura) for estimates on bid-ask spreads in frontier 
markets. They find that these spreads are generally below 1%, confirming the results by Marshall, 
Nguyen, and Visaltanochoti (2011).  
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month between ranking and portfolio formation. This means that an investor may spend a 
whole month searching for a counterparty to trade with.  
The results in Table 2.4 incorporate transaction costs in the value and momentum 
investment strategies. We do not include the size effect here for two important reasons. First, 
the size effect is defined as the excess returns of small caps versus large caps. We focus on 
the largest 150 stocks in our analysis after transactions costs, which excludes investigating 
the small-cap effect as this requires trading in the smallest stocks of our sample. Second, our 
estimates on transaction costs are conservative for our sample of large-cap stocks. It is less 
clear what the trading costs in practice may be for a portfolio of small-cap stocks. Hence, 
we decide to focus only on value and momentum strategies in this section.  
Panel A of Table 2.4 contains the results based on a 12-months holding period. The 
first row in the panel contains the gross returns of each of the effects based on the sample of 
150 largest stocks and with a one-month skip between ranking and implementation. 
Although these raw returns are slightly smaller in magnitude compared to those reported in 
Table 2.2 on the entire sample and without assuming an implementation lag, the returns are 
still statistically significant. For example, the B/M strategy yields a 0.66% per month excess 
return versus a 0.74% that we saw before on the entire sample. Hence, the gross returns are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude as we reported before, but are less likely to incur substantial 
transactions costs. Only for dividend yield we find a significant improvement from 0.41% 
per month (t-value of 1.72) to 0.74% per month (t-value of 3.47). Omitting the small-cap 
stocks from our analysis leads to a larger beta of the D/P strategy compared to our results on 
the whole sample reported in Sub-section 2.3.1.  
The remainder part of Panel A of Table 2.4 contains the excess returns of the top 
portfolio after incorporating transaction costs compared to the equally-weighted index 
return. More precisely, at the end of every 12-month holding period we investigate which 
stocks exit and enter the portfolio, multiply this total turnover weight by 2.5% single-trip 
trading costs and subtract it from the gross return of that portfolio in that month. The second 
row in the panel assumes a theoretical equally-weighted index that we assume can be 
invested in against zero costs. However, more realistic would be to evaluate the profitability 
of anomalies against an index net of transaction costs which could be seen as the passive 
alternative of the trading strategies. The third row in the panel displays the excess returns of 
the strategies relative to the index return where we assume that stocks entering and leaving 
the index also incur the same transactions costs as for the stocks in our trading strategies. 
The one-way turnover of the benchmark is relatively high with approximately 2.5% per 
month which leads to about 12 basis points difference in returns between the gross and net 
benchmark.    
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  When we focus on the value strategies with a 12-month holding period we observe 
in the last row of the panel that the one-way turnover is ranging from 4.8% to 5.6% per 
month (or 57% to 67% per year), indicating that not all stocks have to be traded at the end 
of the holding period. Some value stocks remain value stocks, not inducing a trade after 12 
months. This turnover leads to a decrease in returns of 10 to 14 basis points per month when 
compared to a net benchmark and 22 to 26 basis points per month when compared to a gross 
benchmark. Still, we observe economically and statistically significant returns of 
approximately 6.6% to 7.7% per annum after incorporating transactions costs compared to 
a net benchmark.35 Momentum returns are less robust to transactions costs than valuation 
strategies. The turnover of these strategies is higher than for valuation strategies with almost 
7% per month (or around 80% per year), and in combination with lower gross excess returns 
the 12-month momentum strategy is no longer statistically significant. However, also the net 
returns of 4.6% and 7.2% per annum for the 6-month and 3-month momentum strategy, 
respectively, compared to a net index indicates that also these strategies are economically 
and statistically significant. 
 In addition to the 12-month holding period, Table 2.4 also contains the after 
transaction costs returns of the same investment strategies with holding periods ranging from 
6 months to 24 months in Panel B to D. Shorter holding periods imply more aggressive 
trading when a stock drops out of the top 20% portfolio. However, gross returns are also 
likely to be higher. We investigate the trade-off between turnover and gross returns by 
examining the net returns of the strategies with different holding periods. Since valuation 
characteristics do not change significantly over time, we see that the turnover increases to 
approximately 7% to 8% per month for a 6-month holding period, and declines to 
approximately 3% for a 24-month holding period. Simultaneously, we observe that the gross 
returns of the value strategies remain relatively stable for different holding periods. This 
analysis indicates that the holding period matters for the net returns of an investor. Investors 
that try to capture the value effect in frontier markets might prefer to hold stocks somewhat 
longer than the 12 months that we use in our standard analysis, as net returns do not seem to 
decrease for longer holding periods. Momentum strategies are more dynamic by nature, 
which results in higher trading activity for shorter holding periods. A strategy with a 6-month 
formation and holding period yields 12.7% turnover per month. This eats up about one half 
of the gross excess returns. Holding periods longer than 12 months lead to lower turnover, 
but also to lower gross returns, which results in lower net returns. We find that only 
momentum strategies with a 3-month formation period remain economically and statistically 
                                                          
35 This is at odds with Houge and Loughran (2006), who suggest that the value effect is driven by 
stocks with little liquidity and hence cannot be exploited by investors.  
36 Chapter 2 
significant for holding periods longer than one year. We conclude based on this analysis, 
that the optimal holding period for momentum strategies is around 6 to 12 months.  
 The findings above indicate that the value and momentum effects still exist when 
incorporating conservative assumptions of transaction costs and therefore seem to be 
inconsistent with market efficiency. Note that we assume the same transaction costs for each 
of the 150 largest stocks in our sample, while it could be the case that, e.g., momentum 
stocks are more expensive than the average stock (see, e.g., Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and 
Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004)). Since we do not have transactions costs data on 
individual stocks, we cannot undertake such analysis in this study. We leave this as a topic 
for further research. On the other hand, our assumption on transaction costs is conservative. 
Transaction costs in reality might be lower, leading to higher net returns for momentum 
investors in frontier emerging markets.  
 
2.5. Risk-based explanations 
 
In this section we analyze whether exposure to global risk factors can explain the existence 
of the factor anomalies and whether the factors are prone to extreme downside risk. We 
conclude this section with an analysis of the return factors in the recent crisis period. 
 
2.5.1. Exposure to global risk factors  
 
In the previous sections we showed that value and momentum effects, and to a lesser extent 
the local size effect, are present in frontier emerging markets. However, to which extent do 
the results serve as out-of-sample evidence of these effects? In this sub-section we address 
the question of whether our findings are independent of the existence of the effects in 
emerging and developed markets. In other words, we investigate to which extent the results 
are driven by well-known global risk factors.  
 A first analysis to get insight in the independence of our results is by examining the 
correlations between the strategies across frontier, emerging and developed markets. Miles 
(2005), Speidell and Krohne (2007), and Berger, Pukthuanthong, and Yang (2011) indicate 
that investors may benefit from the diversification opportunities of frontier equity market 
returns. They consider frontier markets as a group at the index level or at the country index 
level. We want to go one step further in our analysis and examine whether investment 
strategies in frontier markets correlate with the same strategies in developed and emerging 
equity markets. If the correlation is low, this might be an indication that value, momentum 
and size strategies do not have common components across markets.  
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 In order to use international risk factors we need to construct international 
investment portfolios. The global developed markets size, value, and momentum returns are 
constructed as follows. Using a survivorship-bias free data set of stock constituents of the 
FTSE World index, we form monthly rankings according to local size (measured by market 
capitalization relative to the stocks within their own country), value, and momentum. We 
form equally-weighted portfolios and calculate US dollar hedged returns using a 12-month 
holding period. For the emerging markets factor returns we use the same methodology based 
on all stocks in the S&P/IFCI Emerging Markets index. Returns of these strategies are 
measured in US dollars.36 
 
TABLE 2.5. Correlation between frontier, emerging, and developed market investment 
strategies 
The first row contains the correlations between the equally-weighted market portfolios. The next rows 
contain the correlations of monthly excess returns of the value, momentum, and size top-minus-index 
portfolios between frontier markets (FM), emerging markets (EM) and developed markets (DM), for 
which we respectively use the S&P Frontier BMI, S&P/IFCI Emerging Markets and the FTSE World 
index. All portfolios are formed as described in Table 2.2. Country neutrality is only applied to the 
size portfolio. The row denoted by “average” contains the average correlation of the value and 
momentum strategies. The table contains correlations over the full sample period January 1997 to 
November 2008 and two sub-samples January 1997 to December 2002 and January 2003 to November 
2008. 
 
Table 2.5 contains the correlations of returns for the equally-weighted market index 
and the value, momentum, and size factors between the frontier, emerging and developed 
markets. The correlations are estimated over the full sample period 1997-2008 and two sub-
sample periods from 1997-2002 and 2003-2008. Based on the first row of Table 2.5, we 
observe that the correlation between the frontier market index and the emerging and 
developed market indexes over the entire sample period is moderately positive (0.48 and 
                                                          
36 Hedging emerging markets currencies for the entire index for our entire sample period is virtually 
impossible because of a lack of sufficiently liquid instruments for some emerging currencies, 
especially in the beginning of our sample period. 
FM, EM FM, DM EM, DM FM, EM FM, DM EM, DM FM, EM FM, DM EM, DM
Market 0.48 0.50 0.82 0.04 0.05 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.91
B/M 0.09 0.06 0.46 0.09 0.05 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.22
E/P 0.01 -0.05 0.27 -0.05 -0.06 0.30 0.16 -0.03 0.17
D/P 0.14 -0.15 0.12 -0.03 -0.19 0.18 0.32 -0.13 -0.03
Average value 0.08 -0.05 0.28 0.00 -0.07 0.33 0.19 -0.02 0.12
MOM3 0.05 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.23 -0.01 0.10 0.47
MOM6 0.03 0.08 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.09 0.45
MOM12 0.07 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.01 0.30 0.08 -0.03 0.46
Average momentum 0.05 0.09 0.30 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.03 0.05 0.46
Size 0.13 0.08 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.24
Full sample 1997-2008 First half 1997-2002 Second half 2003-2008
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0.50, respectively), confirming the other studies stating that diversification benefits may be 
obtained from investing in frontier markets. The sub-sample analysis suggests that recently 
the correlation has increased, although this could be due to the financial crisis in the second 
half of 2008 in which all risky asset classes were highly correlated. 
A different picture emerges when looking at the correlation of Top-Minus-Index 
investment strategy returns. Strikingly, none of the correlations with the frontier market 
investment strategies on the full sample exceed 0.2, with the average correlation below 0.10. 
As an example, the correlation of the 6-month momentum strategy between frontier markets 
and emerging markets is 0.03 and between frontier and developed markets is 0.08. 
Furthermore, we do not find higher correlations between frontier and emerging markets than 
between frontier and developed markets. In the most recent sub-sample, correlations of the 
value factors between frontier and emerging markets slightly increased, but are still low with 
an average below 0.2.  
 These preliminary results indicate that the return factors in frontier markets seem 
to be independent of the existence of the effects in emerging and developed markets. 
Additionally, our results support findings of Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005), Naranjo 
and Porter (2007), and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), who suggest that investors 
may benefit from combining the same strategies in different (non-frontier) countries, as the 
returns from these strategies are far from perfectly positively correlated. 
 We continue by investigating whether the mean-variance efficient frontier of a 
portfolio invested in developed equity factor portfolios can be expanded by including 
investment strategies from frontier markets. In an unreported analysis, we find that when the 
frontier markets index is used as the new asset and emerging and developed markets indexes 
are used as the two base assets that the mean-variance efficient frontier is significantly 
expanded. We take our mean-variance spanning analysis one step further by testing whether 
the frontier market factor returns can expand the mean-variance frontier for investors in the 
same factors in developed and emerging markets. This is illustrated by Figure 2.2, in which 
the average return and volatility risk of the four international developed markets Carhart 
(1997) benchmark assets (market, value, size, and momentum) are displayed, as well as the 
dashed line that represents the mean-variance frontier based on these assets. The square 
indicates the B/M strategy in frontier markets. The optimal benchmark portfolio scaled to 
sum to 100% consists of 17% in the entire market, -1% in the size strategy, 41% in the value 
strategy and 44% in the momentum strategy. This strategy is shown on the mean-variance 
frontier with a triangle at a risk of 1.6% per month. In case the B/M strategy based on frontier 
markets is added to the investment opportunity set, the mean-variance frontier expands with 
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the optimal weight to this new asset class of 31%. This portfolio is also shown on the mean-
variance frontier.  
 
FIGURE 2.2. Mean-variance spanning tests for frontier markets value strategy 
This figure plots portfolios by their average excess return and volatility risk. The base assets are based 
on global developed markets and indicated with diamonds: RMRF is the market, SMB the size 
strategy, HML the value (book-to-market) strategy, and UMD the (6-month) momentum strategy. The 
dashed line with triangle is on the mean-variance frontier of the four developed markets portfolios. 
The solid line is the mean-variance frontier with in addition to the four base assets from the developed 
markets also the Top minus Index B/M value strategy based on frontier markets included (the stand 
alone frontier markets Top minus Index B/M value strategy is indicated with a square). The portfolio 
weights from each of these lines are also displayed in the figure, scaled such that the weights equal 
one. 
 
 
 
Whether this portfolio weight of 31% is also significantly different from zero from 
a statistical point of view can be tested using mean-variance spanning tests; see De Roon 
and Nijman (2001) for an overview of interpretations of mean-variance spanning tests. They 
also indicate that tests for differences in Sharpe ratios of these two efficient portfolios, for 
example using the Jobson and Korkie (1981) test, is closely related to using alphas from 
regression-based mean-variance spanning tests. Sharpe ratios can be used to determine 
whether one portfolio is to be preferred over another, whereas alpha answers the question 
whether investors can improve the efficiency of their portfolio by investing in the new asset. 
In case the optimal portfolio weight of the new asset would be zero, the mean-variance 
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frontiers would coincide, the alpha would be zero, and the Sharpe ratios of both portfolios 
would be the same. 
A more direct analysis to assess the influence of global components would be to 
run a multiple regression of the frontier market return factors on their global counterparts. 
This approach is closely related to a formal mean-variance spanning test; see Huberman and 
Kandel (1987). For that purpose we estimate the following regression equation: 
 
(2.1) t
e
tUMDUMD
e
tHMLHML
e
tSMBSMB
e
tMM
e
tTMI RRRRR   ,,,,,   
 
with SMB the local size factor, HML the value factor measured by the book-to-market ratio, 
and UMD the 6-month momentum factor. In line with the literature, we use Top minus 
Bottom portfolio returns for the developed and emerging factors. These are essentially the 
four factors from Carhart (1997). An alpha statistically different from zero implies that the 
excess returns in frontier markets cannot be explained by global risk factors and hence these 
frontier market return factors are independent of existing effects in other markets.  
The estimation results of Equation 2.1 are displayed in Table 2.6. Panel A contains 
the estimates for global developed risk factors and Panel B for global emerging risk factors.37 
The positive alphas reported in Panel A and Panel B are similar to the previously reported 
excess returns as shown in the first two columns and are statistically significantly different 
from zero.  
For example, the E/P strategy has a statistically significant alpha of 1.23% and 
1.26% per month relative to the developed and emerging risk factors, respectively. 
Corresponding t-values are 5.69 and 5.28, respectively. The excess return of the TMI 
strategy reported before is 1.26%, as indicated in the first column. For the 6-month 
momentum strategy the alpha is 0.75% (t-value 4.26) when adjusted for developed markets 
and 0.76% (t-value 3.73) when adjusted for emerging markets risk factors compared to a 
TMI excess return of 0.77% per month. We find similar results for the local size factor where 
the alpha is 0.52% (t-value of 3.03) when adjusted for developed markets and 0.50% (t-value 
is 2.93) when adjusted for emerging markets risk factors. These results reinforce our earlier 
results that correlations between return factors in frontier markets, developed and emerging 
markets are generally low.38  
                                                          
37 We have also analyzed US-based factors from the online data library of Kenneth French. The results 
are qualitatively the same, see Appendix 2.C. We also show in Appendix 2.C that our results cannot 
be explained by the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and non-traded liquidity 
factors of Sadka (2006). 
38 The conclusions do not change when we regress net excess returns of our investment strategies on 
the same risk factors, see Appendix 2.D.  
The cross-section of stock returns in frontier emerging markets 41 
 
T
A
B
L
E
 2
.6
. 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s 
o
f 
fr
o
n
ti
er
 m
a
rk
et
s 
ex
ce
ss
 r
et
u
rn
s 
o
n
 g
lo
b
a
l 
ri
sk
 f
a
ct
o
rs
 
T
h
e 
ta
b
le
 p
re
se
n
ts
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
es
ti
m
at
es
 a
n
d
 t
-v
al
u
es
 o
f 
th
e 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
 e
q
u
at
io
n
: 
𝑅
𝑇
𝑀
𝐼,
𝑡
𝑒
=
𝛼
+
𝛽
𝑀
𝑅
𝑀
,𝑡
𝑒
+
𝛽 𝑆
𝑀
𝐵
𝑅
𝑆
𝑀
𝐵
,𝑡
𝑒
+
𝛽
𝐻
𝑀
𝐿
𝑅
𝐻
𝑀
𝐿
,𝑡
𝑒
+
𝛽
𝑈
𝑀
𝐷
𝑅
𝑈
𝑀
𝐷
,𝑡
𝑒
+
𝜀 𝑡
, 
w
h
er
e 
𝑅
𝑇
𝑀
𝐼,
𝑡
𝑒
 i
s 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 i
n
 m
o
n
th
 t
 o
f 
th
e 
to
p
-m
in
u
s-
in
d
ex
 p
o
rt
fo
li
o
 o
f 
a 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
st
ra
te
g
y
, 
𝑅
𝑀
,𝑡
𝑒
 t
h
e 
ex
ce
ss
 r
et
u
rn
 o
f 
th
e 
eq
u
al
ly
-w
ei
g
h
te
d
 e
q
u
it
y
 m
ar
k
et
s 
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
 i
n
 U
S
 d
o
ll
ar
s 
m
in
u
s 
th
e 
1
-m
o
n
th
 U
S
 T
-b
il
l 
re
tu
rn
 i
n
 m
o
n
th
 t
. 
𝑅
𝑆
𝑀
𝐵
,𝑡
𝑒
 (
sm
al
l-
m
in
u
s-
b
ig
),
 𝑅
𝐻
𝑀
𝐿
,𝑡
𝑒
 (
h
ig
h
-m
in
u
s-
lo
w
),
 a
n
d
  
𝑅
𝑈
𝑀
𝐷
,𝑡
𝑒
 (
u
p
-m
in
u
s-
d
o
w
n
) 
ar
e 
T
o
p
 m
in
u
s 
B
o
tt
o
m
 r
et
u
rn
s 
o
n
 s
iz
e,
 b
o
o
k
-t
o
-m
ar
k
et
, 
an
d
 6
-m
o
n
th
 m
o
m
en
tu
m
 f
ac
to
r 
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
. 
A
ll
 p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s 
ar
e 
fo
rm
ed
 a
s 
d
es
cr
ib
ed
 i
n
 
T
ab
le
 2
.2
. 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 n
eu
tr
al
it
y
 i
s 
o
n
ly
 a
p
p
li
ed
 t
o
 t
h
e 
si
ze
 p
o
rt
fo
li
o
. 
t(
.)
 i
s 
th
e 
t-
v
al
u
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
g
re
ss
io
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 a
n
d
 a
re
 c
o
rr
ec
te
d
 f
o
r 
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
as
ti
ci
ty
 
an
d
 a
u
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n
 u
si
n
g
 N
ew
ey
 a
n
d
 W
es
t 
(1
9
8
7
).
 P
an
el
 A
 t
ak
es
 a
s 
th
e 
se
t 
o
f 
b
as
e 
as
se
ts
 t
h
e 
fo
u
r 
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 g
lo
b
al
 d
ev
el
o
p
ed
 e
q
u
it
y
 m
ar
k
et
s 
an
d
 
P
an
el
 B
 c
o
n
ta
in
s 
re
su
lt
s 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 b
as
e 
as
se
ts
 f
ro
m
 g
lo
b
al
 e
m
er
g
in
g
 e
q
u
it
y
 m
ar
k
et
s.
  
 
 
 
T
M
I
t(
T
M
I)
α
t(
α
)
β
M
t(
β
M
)
β
H
M
L
t(
β
H
M
L
)
β
S
M
B
t(
β
S
M
B
)
β
U
M
D
t(
β
U
M
D
)
P
a
n
el
 A
: 
G
lo
b
a
l 
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
 m
a
rk
et
s
B
/M
0
.7
4
3
.0
5
0
.7
0
2
.8
7
-0
.0
4
-0
.7
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.1
5
0
.2
4
1
.8
4
0
.0
2
0
.2
5
E
/P
1
.2
6
5
.5
5
1
.2
3
5
.6
9
0
.0
5
1
.2
3
-0
.1
0
-1
.4
8
0
.1
7
1
.5
1
0
.0
4
0
.6
1
D
/P
0
.4
1
1
.7
2
0
.5
6
2
.5
4
-0
.0
9
-2
.1
7
-0
.0
6
-0
.8
8
-0
.1
7
-1
.8
8
-0
.1
1
-2
.2
6
M
O
M
3
0
.9
5
6
.5
2
0
.8
8
6
.1
8
-0
.0
1
-0
.1
5
-0
.0
1
-0
.3
6
0
.1
1
1
.4
4
0
.0
9
2
.6
3
M
O
M
6
0
.7
7
4
.0
2
0
.7
5
4
.2
6
0
.0
1
0
.2
1
-0
.0
5
-0
.8
2
0
.1
1
1
.3
1
0
.0
3
0
.5
9
M
O
M
1
2
0
.5
9
3
.0
8
0
.5
7
2
.8
0
0
.0
4
0
.7
3
0
.0
5
0
.8
7
-0
.0
4
-0
.4
4
-0
.0
1
-0
.2
0
S
iz
e
0
.4
7
2
.5
8
0
.5
2
3
.0
3
-0
.0
5
-1
.1
8
0
.0
5
0
.9
6
-0
.0
6
-0
.7
4
-0
.0
9
-1
.9
6
P
a
n
el
 B
: 
G
lo
b
a
l 
em
er
g
in
g
 m
a
rk
et
s
B
/M
0
.7
4
3
.0
5
0
.7
3
2
.7
3
-0
.0
1
-0
.2
7
0
.0
2
0
.3
3
0
.0
8
0
.8
3
-0
.0
3
-0
.5
4
E
/P
1
.2
6
5
.5
5
1
.2
6
5
.2
8
0
.0
4
1
.4
6
-0
.0
3
-0
.8
2
0
.1
1
1
.5
2
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
D
/P
0
.4
1
1
.7
2
0
.4
6
2
.0
6
-0
.0
7
-2
.7
8
0
.0
2
0
.5
4
-0
.1
1
-1
.7
9
-0
.0
2
-0
.5
9
M
O
M
3
0
.9
5
6
.5
2
0
.9
2
6
.0
0
-0
.0
2
-0
.7
5
0
.0
2
0
.6
7
0
.0
2
0
.4
4
0
.0
2
0
.6
8
M
O
M
6
0
.7
7
4
.0
2
0
.7
6
3
.7
3
0
.0
0
-0
.1
1
0
.0
1
0
.2
9
0
.0
0
-0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.3
5
M
O
M
1
2
0
.5
9
3
.0
8
0
.6
1
3
.1
8
0
.0
2
0
.4
8
0
.0
0
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
9
-1
.2
2
-0
.0
1
-0
.2
0
S
iz
e
0
.4
7
2
.5
8
0
.5
0
2
.9
3
0
.0
0
0
.0
6
-0
.0
3
-0
.7
7
0
.0
9
1
.2
2
-0
.0
3
-1
.0
2
42 Chapter 2 
Our analysis in Table 2.6 suggests that global risk factors cannot explain the excess 
returns in frontier markets. Our results are in line with the findings by Van der Hart, De 
Zwart, and Van Dijk (2005), who claim that value and momentum investment strategies in 
emerging markets are not exposed to global risk factors. Of course, our results do not rule 
out that local risk factors can explain these effects. Unfortunately, limited data availability 
in these markets (for example on earnings or earnings estimates) does not allow us to 
disentangle local risk factors from behavioral explanations. We think this is a fruitful area 
for further research once more reliable data becomes available. 
 
2.5.2. Downside risk  
 
Although the descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 show that the volatility of the aggregated 
frontier markets is not high, the factor returns might have more extreme observations in the 
sense of higher skewness and kurtosis than can be expected based on normality. Therefore, 
we calculate in addition to the average and standard deviation of portfolio returns also the 
skewness and kurtosis.39 We display these results in Table 2.7. The positive values show that 
excess kurtosis often exceeds the prediction derived from normally distributed returns. This 
indicates that there are more extreme returns than mean and variance can capture. 
Interestingly, the skewness for most of the factor returns (apart from 6-month momentum) 
is also positive, indicating that the deviation from normality is due to exceptionally large 
upward potential instead of increased downside risk.  
In order to examine downside risk in more detail, we compare empirical estimates 
of downside risk to the theoretical equivalent under the assumption of normality. More 
precisely, we calculate the 1% and 2.5% and 97.5% and 99% percentiles of the monthly 
returns and compare these to the parametric percentile derived from the normal distribution 
with the same mean and variance as our strategies. These results confirm our prediction 
based on the positive skewness and kurtosis, in the sense that it is the upward potential 
instead of the downside risk that causes deviations from normality. Based on the 1% 
percentile, we find that most strategies exhibit comparable or lower downside risk than 
would be expected based on a normal distribution. Only the 12-month momentum strategy 
exhibits substantially higher downside risk, as the empirical 1% percentile is -5.19% versus 
-4.67% based on the 1% theoretical percentile. Based on the 2.5% percentile we find that all 
                                                          
39 We also computed the Jarque-Bera test on the normality of portfolio returns. This test is based on 
the skewness and kurtosis. We frequently reject normality, but this is not so much due to increased 
downside risk, but due to higher upside. This is why we empirically determine the downside risk of 
our strategies and compare these to the risk measures following from a normal distribution. 
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strategies exhibit a lower downside risk than expected based on a normal distribution. 
Additionally, we find that many factor returns exhibit empirically higher upside potential 
that would be expected based on a normal distribution. For example, the B/M strategy's 99% 
percentile is 10.12%, whereas based on the normal distribution this would be 7.52%. In case 
the upside is less, the differences are small with the expected upside. Hence, we deem it 
unlikely that downside risk can explain the empirical results we document. 
 
TABLE 2.7. Downside risk 
The first four rows display average, volatility, skewness and excess kurtosis of the monthly top-minus-
index excess returns of frontier markets portfolios. The following rows compare the parametric 
percentile derived from the normal distribution to empirical estimates of tail risk calculated as 1%, 
2.5%, 97.5% and 99% percentiles of the monthly excess returns. All portfolios are formed as described 
in Table 2.2. Country neutrality is only applied to the size portfolio.  
 
 
2.5.3. Results for the crisis period 2008-2011 
 
The turmoil in financial markets after our research period 1997 to 2008 is an interesting out-
of-sample period to test whether the return factors we document are still present in our 
sample of frontier emerging markets. For the recent crisis period ranging from December 
2008 to December 2011 (37 months), we make use of the frontier market data sources to 
form portfolios in exactly the same fashion as done in our previous analyses.40 In November 
2008, the S&P Frontier BMI experienced major changes and has expanded from 24 to 35 
countries, including the five Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) country members. As our data 
provider is not able to cope with these GCC countries, because the trading days also include 
                                                          
40 We verify that the data is of high quality by calculating the index return from individual stock returns 
and market capitalisations and comparing the index return with the return published by S&P on the 
index. 
B/M E/P D/P MOM3 MOM6 MOM12 Size
Average 0.74% 1.26% 0.41% 0.95% 0.77% 0.59% 0.47%
Volatility 2.92% 2.35% 2.36% 1.59% 2.15% 2.26% 2.08%
Skewness 0.80 0.54 -0.07 0.61 -2.03 1.23 0.25
Kurtosis 2.52 0.44 1.98 0.68 15.58 6.85 0.72
Theoretical 1% -6.05% -4.22% -5.09% -2.75% -4.22% -4.67% -4.38%
Empirical 1% -6.12% -2.99% -5.13% -2.48% -2.92% -5.19% -4.19%
Theoretical 2.5% -4.98% -3.35% -4.22% -2.17% -3.44% -3.84% -3.61%
Empirical 2.5% -4.68% -2.65% -3.46% -1.50% -2.30% -2.90% -3.60%
Theoretical 97.5% 6.45% 5.87% 5.04% 4.07% 4.97% 5.02% 4.55%
Empirical 97.5% 7.00% 6.51% 4.80% 4.79% 4.75% 4.82% 4.73%
Theoretical 99% 7.52% 6.73% 5.91% 4.65% 5.76% 5.85% 5.31%
Empirical 99% 10.12% 7.23% 5.62% 5.23% 5.71% 6.44% 6.27%
44 Chapter 2 
(Western) weekends, we focus in this sub-section on the main analyses conducted on the 
dataset excluding these countries and use our original dataset for all further analyses.  
The out-of-sample results are presented in Table 2.8. Panel A shows the excess returns 
of the return factors over this period. We see that value and size effects have been strong 
over the past 37 months in the recent crisis period. Similar to developed and emerging 
markets, momentum effects have not been present in this period filled with turmoil. This is 
due to the market reversal, from down in 2008 to up in 2009 and down again in 2011. As 
indicated by Blitz, Huij, and Martens (2011), momentum strategies exhibit time-varying risk 
factors and hence are likely to underperform in markets with strong reversals. Note that the 
returns of the momentum strategies in frontier markets are still economically and statistically 
significant over the whole sample period from 1997 until 2011. Our results once more 
indicate that value and momentum show different return patterns implying that combining 
both types of strategies leads to diversification benefits.  
In Panel B of Table 2.8, we display the correlation between the factor returns in 
developed, emerging, and frontier markets for the out-of-sample period. We see that the 
correlation between developed and emerging markets has remained high at 0.90 at the 
market level, while frontier markets’ correlation with emerging and developed markets has 
increased to 0.76 and 0.78. For most other factors, the correlation of frontier markets with 
developed and emerging markets has increased to around 0.5. This indicates that the 
diversification benefits that we observed in our sample have become smaller in the out-of-
sample period. Nevertheless, the correlation with frontier markets factors remains 
substantially below the correlation between developed and emerging markets, indicating that 
investors could still reap diversification benefits by investing in the frontier market factors, 
although less than before. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
The new emerging equity markets, the so-called frontier emerging markets, are attracting 
increased attention from foreign investors. Research on these frontier markets is scarce and 
mostly conducted using the frontier market as a whole or at the country level. In this study, 
we dig one step deeper and analyze the cross-section of individual stock returns. Our 
research on individual stocks in frontier emerging markets makes use of a unique high-
quality and survivorship-bias free dataset. The use of individual stock characteristics data 
allows us to investigate the added value of investment strategies relative to strategies that 
only use aggregated data at the country level. We use data from more than 1,400 stocks from 
24 frontier markets over a 12-year period from 1997 to 2008. This previously untapped data  
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source provides excellent opportunities for out-of-sample research related to investment 
strategies that were previously analyzed in developed and emerging markets.  
 Our empirical results indicate that portfolios based on value and momentum in 
frontier markets generate economically and statistically significant excess returns of about 
5 to 15% per annum. The magnitude of these excess returns is at least as large as those found 
before in developed and emerging markets. We also find that there is a local size effect in 
frontier markets. These are striking empirical observations, as integration of frontier markets 
with developed and emerging markets is generally low. Our results are valuable out-of-
sample evidence of the cross-section of stock returns previously documented in developed 
markets. These results are robust as they still hold after performing a battery of robustness 
analyses, such as an analysis by geographical region and financial liberalization.   
 Investors who are interested to capture the value and momentum effect might be 
concerned with the transaction costs involved, as liquidity is typically lower than for more 
developed equity markets. We analyze the after transaction costs returns of value and 
momentum strategies using conservative estimates from Marshall et al. (2013) on a liquid 
sample of the largest 150 frontier market stocks including a one-month skip between ranking 
and implementation of the stocks in portfolio. Our results indicate that net excess returns are 
approximately 7% per annum for value and momentum strategies. These excess returns are 
both economically and statistically significant and therefore do not explain the existence of 
these factor returns. 
 We additionally investigate whether the factor returns in frontier markets can be 
explained by risk. First, our results are not driven by frontier market, country- or region 
exposures, as our results still hold when correcting for these exposures. Second, our results 
cannot be explained by exposure to global risk factors, such as market, value, momentum 
and size. Third, it is unlikely that downside risk can explain the empirical results. Hence, we 
believe it is unlikely that transaction costs or risk can explain the strong factor returns. 
Although we cannot rule out that exposures to other global risk factors or local risk might 
explain the returns of the strategies, future research could investigate to which extent 
behavioral biases might explain the value, momentum and size effect in frontier markets. 
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2.A. Globalization scores for frontier market countries over time 
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2.B. Individualism scores for frontier countries 
 
TABLE 2.B.1. Individualism scores for frontier countries 
Data on individualism obtained from www.geert-hofstede.com. The scores are displayed for the 
frontier countries for which the data is available. The group with low-individualism scores are all 
countries, except for Estonia, Jamaica, Lebanon, and Slovakia (in black), who have a score above the 
threshold of 32 that is the cut-off point of the bottom individualism group in Chui, Titman, and Wei 
(2010). 
 
  
Country Score Country Score
Bangladesh 20 Lebanon 38
Botswana - Lithuania -
Bulgaria 30 Mauritius -
Côte d'Ivoire - Namibia -
Croatia - Panama 11
Ecuador 8 Romania 30
Estonia 60 Slovakia 52
Ghana 20 Slovenia -
Jamaica 39 Trinidad & Tobago 16
Kazakhstan - Tunisia -
Kenya 27 Ukraine -
Latvia - Vietnam 20
Average frontier markets below treshhold 32 20
Average bottom individualism Chui et al (2010) 22
World average as reported by Hofstede (2001) 43
The cross-section of stock returns in frontier emerging markets 51 
 
2.C. Regressions of frontier markets excess returns on US risk factors  
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 3. Another look at trading costs and short-term reversal profits41 
 
Several studies report that abnormal returns associated with short-term reversal investment 
strategies diminish once trading costs are taken into account. We show that the impact of 
trading costs on the strategies’ profitability can largely be attributed to excessively trading 
in small-cap stocks. Limiting the stock universe to large-cap stocks significantly reduces 
trading costs. Applying a more sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm to lower 
turnover reduces trading costs even further. Our finding that reversal strategies generate 30 
to 50 basis points per week net of trading costs poses a serious challenge to standard rational 
asset pricing models. Our findings also have important implications for the understanding 
and practical implementation of reversal strategies.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
A growing body of literature argues that the short-term reversal anomaly (i.e., the 
phenomenon that stocks with relatively low (high) returns over the past month or week earn 
positive (negative) abnormal returns in the following month or week) documented by 
Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), Jegadeesh (1990), and Lehmann (1990) can be 
attributed to trading frictions in securities markets that weaken the arbitrage mechanism. 
Kaul and Nimalendran (1990), Ball, Kothari and Wasley (1995) and Conrad, Gultekin and 
Kaul (1997) report that most of short-term reversal profits fall within bid-ask bounds. And 
more recently, Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) evaluate the profitability of reversal 
investment strategies net of trading costs using the model of Keim and Madhavan (1997). 
They find that reversal strategies require frequent trading in disproportionately high-cost 
securities such that trading costs prevent profitable strategy execution. Based on these results 
one might conclude that the abnormal returns associated with reversal investment strategies 
that are documented in earlier studies create an illusion of profitable investment strategies 
when, in fact, none exist. The seemingly lack of profitability of reversal investment strategies 
is consistent with market efficiency.  
In this study we show that this argument is not necessarily true. We argue that the 
reported impact of trading costs on reversal profits can largely be attributed to excessively 
trading in small-cap stocks.  When stocks are ranked on past returns, stocks with the highest 
volatility have the greatest probability to end up in the extreme quantiles. These stocks are 
                                                          
41 This chapter is published as De Groot, W., Huij, J. and Zhou, W., 2012, Another look at trading 
costs and short-term reversal profits, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 371-382. 
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typically the stocks with the smallest market capitalizations. Therefore a portfolio that is 
long-short in the extreme quantiles is typically invested in the smallest stocks. However, 
these stocks are also the most expensive to trade and reversal profits may be fully diminished 
by the disproportionally higher trading costs. 
At the same time, the turnover of standard reversal strategies is excessively high. 
Reversal portfolios are typically constructed by taking a long position in loser stocks and 
short position in winner stocks based on past returns. Then, at a pre-specified interval the 
portfolios are rebalanced and stocks that are no longer losers are sold and replaced by newly 
bottom-ranked stocks. Vice versa, stocks that are no longer winners are bought back and 
replaced by newly top-ranked stocks. While this approach is standard in the stream of 
literature on empirical asset pricing to investigate stock market anomalies, it is suboptimal 
when the profitability of an investment strategy is evaluated and trading costs are 
incorporated. 
To investigate the impact of small-cap stocks and rebalancing rules on the 
profitability of reversal strategies, we design and test three hypotheses: first, we gauge the 
profitability of reversal strategies applied to various market cap segments of the U.S. stock 
market. Our hypothesis is that the reported impact of trading costs on reversal profits can 
largely be attributed to excessively trading in small-cap stocks and that limiting the stock 
universe to large-cap stocks significantly reduces trading costs. Our second hypothesis is 
that trading costs can be reduced even further without giving up too much of the gross 
reversal profits when a slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm is 
applied. Third, we extend our analyses of reversal profits within different segments of the 
U.S. market with an analysis across different markets and evaluate the profitability of 
reversal strategies in European stocks markets. Our hypothesis is that trading costs have a 
larger impact on reversal profits in European markets since these markets are less liquid. For 
robustness, we also evaluate reversal profits across various market cap segments of the 
European stock markets. 
Throughout our study we use trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) model and estimates that were provided to us by Nomura Securities, one 
of world’s largest stock brokers. Consistent with Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) we 
find that the profits of a standard reversal strategy are smaller than the likely trading costs 
for a broad universe that includes small-cap stocks. At the same time we find that the impact 
of trading costs on short-term reversal profits becomes substantially lower once we exclude 
small-cap stocks that are the most expensive to trade. In fact, when we focus on the largest 
U.S. stocks we document significant reversal profits up to 30 basis points per week. 
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When we also apply a slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm 
and do not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers (winners) but wait until 
these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent of stocks based on past returns, 
the turnover and trading costs of the strategy more than halve and we find even larger 
reversal profits up to 50 basis points per week. This number is highly significant from both 
a statistical and an economical point of view. 
Additionally, we find that trading costs have a larger impact on reversal profits in 
European markets. While standard reversal strategies based on a broad universe of European 
stocks yield gross returns of 50 basis points per week, their returns net of trading costs are 
highly negative. Once we exclusively focus on the largest stocks and apply the “smart” 
portfolio construction rules, we document significantly positive net reversal profits up to 20 
basis points per week. 
In addition, we look at various other aspects of the reversal strategy to evaluate if 
the strategy can be applied in practice. Amongst others, we document that the reversal effect 
can be exploited by a sizable strategy with a trade size of one million USD per stock; and 
that the strategy also earned large positive net returns over the post-decimalization era of 
U.S. stock markets.  
We deem that our study contributes to the existing literature in at least two 
important ways. First of all, our finding that reversal strategies yield significant returns net 
of trading costs presents a serious challenge to standard rational asset pricing models. Our 
findings also have important implications for the practical implementation of reversal 
strategies. The key lesson is that investors striving to earn superior returns by engaging in 
reversal trading are more likely to realize their objectives by using portfolio construction 
rules that limit turnover and by trading in liquid stocks with relatively low trading costs. Our 
study adds to the vast amount of literature on short-term reversal or contrarian strategies 
[see, e.g., Fama (1965), Jegadeesh (1990), Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a,b), Chan (2003), Subrahmanyam (2005), and Gutierrez and 
Kelley (2008)]. Our work is also related and contributes to a recent strand in the literature 
that re-examines market anomalies after incorporating transaction costs [see, e.g., Lesmond, 
Schill and Zhou (2004), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004), Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) 
and Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka and Shivakumar (2009)].  
Our results also have important implications for several explanations that have been 
put forward in the literature to explain the reversal anomaly. In particular, our finding that 
net reversal profits are large and positive among large-cap stocks over the most recent decade 
in our sample, during which market liquidity dramatically increased, rules out the 
explanation that reversals are induced by inventory imbalances by market makers and that 
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the contrarian profits are a compensation for bearing inventory risks [see, e.g., Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1995b)]. Also, our finding that reversal profits are not convincingly larger for 
the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks than for the 500 and even 100 largest stocks is inconsistent with 
the notion that nonsynchronous trading contributes to contrarian profits [see, e.g., Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994)] as this explanation 
predicts a size-related lead-lag-effect in stock returns and higher reversal profits among 
small-cap stocks. 
Our second main contribution is that we not only employ the trading costs estimates 
from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model that are typically used in this stream of 
literature, but that we also use estimates that were provided to us by Nomura Securities. 
Despite the fact that most researchers now seem to acknowledge the importance of taking 
trading costs into account when evaluating the profitability of investment strategies, only 
very little is documented in the academic literature on how these costs should be modelled. 
Perhaps the most authoritative research in this field is the work of Keim and Madhavan who 
modelled market impact as well as commission costs for trading NYSE-AMEX stocks 
during 1991 to 1993. However, since markets have undergone important changes over time 
one may wonder if the parameter estimates of Keim and Madhavan can be used to estimate 
trading costs accurately also over more recent periods. Another concern with the Keim and 
Madhavan model relates to the functional form that is imposed on the relation between 
market capitalization and trading costs. Later in the chapter we provide some detailed 
examples which indicate that trading costs estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan 
model should be interpreted with caution in some cases because of these issues. For example, 
the model systematically yields negative cost estimates for a large group of stocks over the 
most recent period. We believe that our study makes a significant contribution to the 
literature on evaluating the profitability of investment strategies by providing a 
comprehensive overview of trading costs estimates from Nomura Securities for S&P1500 
and S&P500 stocks during the period 1990 to 2009. Moreover, the trading cost schemes we 
publish in this study are set up in such a way that other researchers can employ them in their 
studies as the schemes merely require readily-available volume data for their usage. 
An additional attractive feature of the trading cost model used by Nomura Securities 
is that it has also been calibrated using European trade data. This enables us to investigate 
trading costs and reversal profits in European equity markets as well. To our best knowledge, 
this study is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of trading costs and to investigate 
trading cost impact on reversal profits in European equity markets. 
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3.2. Stock data  
 
For our U.S. stock data we use return data for the 1,500 largest stocks that are constituents 
of the Citigroup U.S. Broad Market Index (BMI) during the period January 1990 and 
December 2009. We intentionally leave out micro-cap stocks from our sample that are 
sometimes included in other studies to ensure that our findings are not driven by market 
micro-structure concerns. For our European stock data we use return data for the 1,000 
largest stocks that were constituents of the Citigroup European Broad Market Index during 
the period January 1995 and December 2009. The reason why we start in 1995 instead of 
1990 as we do in our analysis using U.S. data is that the trading cost model of Nomura is not 
accurately calibrated to estimate trading costs for European stocks before 1995. Daily stock 
returns including dividends, market capitalizations and price volumes are obtained from the 
FactSet Global Prices database.42  
We visually inspect various measures of liquidity for both stock markets, including 
market capitalization, daily trading volumes, turnover, and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
measure.43 When we compare our U.S. sample to the one studied by Avramov, Chordia and 
Goyal (2006), our sample seems to be more liquid. For example, when we consider the 
stocks’ illiquidity in our sample we find a median illiquidity measure of 0.02 in 1990 that 
decreases to 0.001 in 2009. Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) report this figure to be 0.05 
for the most liquid group of stocks in their sample. For the least liquid group of stocks the 
authors even report average illiquidity of 10.8. This figure basically implies that the price 
impact resulting from trading one million USD in these stocks is roughly 10 percent. We do 
not observe such large numbers for illiquidity in our sample. We believe that the largest 
portion of the differences in liquidity between our sample and that of Avramov, Chordia and 
Goyal (2006) can be attributed to the fact that we investigate a more recent period of time 
during which markets were much more liquid. In addition, our sample does not include 
micro-cap stocks. 
 Next, we compare the liquidity of the European stock markets to that of the U.S. 
stock market. It appears that the European markets also have been liquid over our sample 
period, but that the illiquidity level is higher than for the U.S. market: the median illiquidity 
measure is 0.004 in 2009 for the European markets, while this figure is 0.001 for the U.S. 
stocks.  
 
                                                          
42 FactSet Global Prices is a hiqh-quality securities database offered by FactSet Research Systems Inc. 
43 For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in tabular form. 
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3.3. Trading cost estimates 
 
Consistent with most of the literature we use the trading cost model of Keim and Madhavan 
(1997) to estimate net reversal profits for our first analyses. These trading cost estimates 
include commissions paid as well as an estimate of the price impact of the trades. Keim and 
Madhavan regress total trading costs on several characteristics of the trade and the traded 
stock. Appendix 3.A provides a more detailed description of the Keim and Madhaven model. 
An important caveat that should be taken into account when using the Keim and Madhavan 
(1997) model is that its coefficients are estimated over the period January 1991 through 
March 1993. Since markets have undergone important changes over time one may wonder 
if estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model are also accurate over more recent 
periods. For example, after two centuries pricing in fractions, the NYSE and AMEX 
converted all of their stocks to decimal pricing in 2001 which led to a large decrease in bid-
ask spreads on both exchanges. Also, increasing trading volumes over time; more 
competition among stock brokers; and technological improvements may have had an 
important impact on bid-ask spreads, market impact costs and commissions. 
To cope with this issue, we asked one of world’s largest stock brokers, Nomura 
Securities, if they could provide us with trading cost estimates for stocks that are constituents 
of the S&P1500 index over our sample period January 1990 through December 2009. The 
Nomura trading cost model is calibrated in every quarter over the period 1995 to 2009. 
Appendix 3.B provides a detailed description of the Nomura model. As estimates for broker 
commissions a 5 basis points rate per trade is used during the 1990s and a 3 basis points rate 
over the most recent 10 years of our sample period.  
An important aspect that came to light in our conversations with the researchers 
from Nomura is that trading style may have a significant impact on trading costs. For 
example, technical traders that follow momentum-like strategies and have a great demand 
for immediacy typically experience large bid-ask costs since the market demand for the 
stocks they aim to buy is substantially larger than the supply, and vice versa for sell 
transactions. In their study, Keim and Madhavan (1997) also find that technical traders 
generally experience higher trading costs than traders whose strategies demand less 
immediacy like value traders or index managers. The researchers of Nomura told us that the 
trading costs that are associated with a reversal strategy are likely to be somewhat lower than 
the estimates they provided since a reversal strategy by nature buys (sells) stocks for which 
the market supply (demand) is larger than the demand (supply). However, they could not 
provide us with an exact number to correct for this feature of reversal strategies. To be 
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conservative we assume that there is no liquidity-provision premium involved with reversal 
trading. 
We asked the researchers of Nomura to provide us with aggregated data in the form 
of average trading costs for decile portfolios of S&P1500 stocks sorted on their dollar 
volumes in each quarter during the period January 1990 to December 2009.44 Trading cost 
estimates for an individual stock can now be derived using the stock’s volume rank at a 
particular point in time. An attractive feature of this approach is that it only requires readily-
available volume data, and not proprietary intraday data. The trading cost schemes we 
publish in this study also enable other researchers to employ the Nomura trading cost 
estimates in their studies. We also asked them to assume that the trades are closed within 
one day and the trade size is one million USD per stock by the end of 2009. The trade size 
is deflated back in time with 10 percent per annum. The assumption of such a large trade 
size ensures that any effects we document can be exploited by a sizable strategy. For 
example, a strategy that is long-short in the 20 percent losers and winners of the largest 1,500 
U.S. stocks and trades one million USD per stock employs a capital of USD 300 million by 
the end of 2009. We use the same trade sizes when using the Keim and Madhavan (1997) 
model to estimate trading costs.  
Table 3.1 presents an overview of the trading cost estimates we received from 
Nomura for S&P1500 stocks and also lists the estimates for our sample of the 1,500 largest 
U.S. stocks resulting from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model. The table presents the 
average single-trip costs of buy and sell transactions in basis points for each year in our 
sample for decile portfolios of stocks sorted on their three-month median dollar trading 
volume.  
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan (1997) model. The cost estimates for our sample of stocks during the period 1991 
to 1993 seem to be close to the estimates reported by Keim and Madhavan for the median 
stock (see Table 3 of their paper). However, there are also a few notable observations. We 
find negative cost estimates for the most liquid stocks with the largest trading volumes. The 
number of stocks with negative trading cost estimates also increases over time. In fact, the 
Keim and Madhavan model yields negative cost estimates for almost half of the stocks in 
our sample during 2007. Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the trading cost estimates that were 
provided to us by Nomura for S&P1500 stocks. Interestingly, Nomura’s cost estimates 
appear not only to be higher for the most liquid stocks with the highest trading volumes, but 
                                                          
44 Because the S&P1500 Index started in 1995, we asked the researchers of Nomura to backfill their 
series of trading cost estimates using the 1,500 largest stocks that are constituents of the Russell Index 
over the period January 1990 to December 1994.  
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also for the least liquid stocks with the lowest trading volumes. For these stocks the cost 
estimates of Nomura can be up to six times higher than those resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan model. 
 
TABLE 3.1. Transaction cost estimates for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks. 
This table presents an overview of the single-trip transaction cost estimates in basis points for volume 
deciles of our sample of the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model 
(Panel A) and the estimates for volume deciles of S&P1500 stocks we received from Nomura 
Securities (Panel B). Volume deciles are based on stocks' three-month median trading volumes. It is 
assumed that the trades are closed within one day and the trade size is one million per stock by the end 
of 2009. The trade size is deflated back in time with 10 percent per annum. 
 
Once we focus on the 500 largest stocks in our sample, the differences between the 
trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model and the Nomura 
model become even more extreme. Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the cost estimates resulting 
from the Keim and Madhavan model and Panel B the cost estimates that were provided to 
us by Nomura. We immediately observe that the cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhaven model for our sample of large-cap stocks are very low and even negative in a lot 
of cases. In fact, for a large number of years in our sample, trading cost estimates are negative 
for basically all stocks. In addition, for all deciles, Nomura’s cost estimates are substantially 
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Panel A. Keim-Madhaven average buy and sell
D1 (bottom) 71 78 47 28 29 27 21 12 13 18 21 26 30 29 13 12 10 11 38 63 30
D2 82 74 53 32 33 30 20 10 14 20 27 29 38 36 15 13 9 8 37 66 32
D3 64 72 51 32 30 25 18 11 15 19 24 24 39 35 19 10 7 7 40 61 30
D4 56 53 38 30 32 25 15 12 14 18 21 29 42 32 19 15 6 8 34 58 28
D5 48 39 32 30 25 22 15 9 11 17 15 27 43 38 15 16 6 4 24 37 24
D6 38 29 23 22 20 14 10 8 8 11 15 23 41 26 14 11 6 1 16 34 18
D7 24 20 18 13 14 8 6 1 4 5 6 15 26 22 8 2 2 -6 15 28 11
D8 16 11 9 8 4 4 1 -3 -5 -6 0 13 14 10 2 -6 -11 -14 7 21 4
D9 0 -3 -5 -5 -2 -6 -6 -11 -12 -13 -10 0 3 0 -9 -17 -16 -21 -5 8 -7
D10 (top) -20 -20 -19 -19 -17 -19 -22 -26 -28 -31 -25 -14 -5 -11 -17 -25 -26 -31 -21 -15 -20
Panel B. Nomura buy or sell
D1 (bottom) 86 77 83 75 73 54 52 66 53 76 65 88 80 76 76 65 53 41 51 70 68
D2 72 60 60 55 51 34 27 35 31 65 67 61 56 50 41 30 24 20 25 50 46
D3 58 50 45 41 38 23 19 22 23 47 47 37 30 24 20 17 15 14 17 33 31
D4 48 41 36 30 30 17 12 18 18 30 28 23 20 17 14 13 12 11 13 23 23
D5 41 34 30 26 25 15 14 14 17 21 19 16 15 13 12 11 10 9 11 17 19
D6 33 26 22 21 20 13 13 12 14 16 14 13 12 11 10 9 9 8 9 14 15
D7 26 23 21 18 17 11 17 11 11 13 11 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 8 11 13
D8 22 20 18 16 14 10 17 13 10 11 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 9 11
D9 17 15 14 13 13 9 11 11 10 9 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 6 7 9
D10 (top) 13 14 14 13 13 10 9 8 8 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 8
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higher than the estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model. Based on the Keim 
and Madhavan model, the average single-trip transaction costs for the 10 percent most 
expensive stocks to trade are 4 basis points. This figure is substantially lower than the 6 basis 
points trading costs that result from the Nomura model for the 10 percent cheapest stocks.  
 
TABLE 3.2. Transaction cost estimates for the 500 largest U.S. stocks. 
This table presents an overview of the single-trip transaction cost estimates in basis points for volume 
deciles of our sample of the 500 largest U.S. stocks resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model 
(Panel A) and the estimates for volume deciles of S&P500 stocks we received from Nomura Securities 
(Panel B). Volume deciles are based on stocks' three-month median trading volumes. It is assumed 
that the trades are closed within one day and the trade size is one million USD per stock by the end of 
2009. The trade size is deflated back in time with 10 percent per annum. 
 
We offer the following explanations for these notable differences. First, the 
differences may be caused by the fact that the model of Nomura imposes a quadratic relation 
between trading volume and transaction costs while the Keim and Madhaven (1997) model 
imposes a logarithmic relation. While the economic intuition behind both approaches is that 
they try to mimic the shape of the limit order book that is deep in the front (at the best 
bid/offer price) and gets increasingly shallower as prices move away from the current price 
by imposing a convex relation between cost and volume [see, e.g., Roşu (2009)], an 
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Panel A. Keim-Madhaven average buy and sell
D1 (bottom) 14 6 2 1 8 8 2 -4 0 6 9 8 4 3 -4 -9 -11 -16 -5 51 4
D2 14 10 3 1 3 0 -1 -8 -8 -5 -4 -3 5 7 -3 -9 -12 -16 -4 46 1
D3 12 6 5 1 1 -2 -8 -11 -10 -8 -6 -3 3 -1 -8 -13 -16 -19 -2 40 -2
D4 8 7 3 0 0 -2 -7 -11 -12 -11 -11 -6 2 -1 -11 -15 -19 -19 -6 39 -4
D5 9 5 1 -2 -2 -3 -10 -12 -14 -15 -12 -10 0 -1 -11 -16 -21 -21 -10 28 -6
D6 6 1 -4 -7 -3 -7 -11 -15 -16 -16 -17 -11 2 -3 -14 -21 -18 -23 -7 26 -8
D7 1 -5 -6 -8 -5 -10 -12 -17 -17 -16 -20 -8 1 -2 -15 -16 -18 -22 -11 15 -10
D8 -7 -10 -9 -10 -9 -12 -15 -17 -19 -24 -21 -9 0 0 -14 -16 -21 -28 -8 16 -12
D9 -12 -10 -13 -15 -14 -17 -21 -25 -27 -30 -29 -16 -9 -12 -14 -24 -22 -27 -17 2 -18
D10 (top) -24 -25 -27 -24 -24 -27 -29 -34 -38 -39 -38 -19 -4 -22 -27 -30 -32 -34 -24 -16 -27
Panel B. Nomura buy or sell
D1 (bottom) 23 15 13 15 22 31 25 24 23 23 34 36 34 38 40 28 19 15 13 21 25
D2 12 11 10 12 16 22 13 14 16 27 26 20 17 17 14 11 10 9 10 14 15
D3 11 10 9 11 14 14 11 17 14 16 16 13 12 12 10 9 9 8 8 12 12
D4 10 9 9 11 12 12 12 12 12 13 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 7 7 11 10
D5 9 9 8 10 11 12 12 11 10 11 10 9 9 9 8 7 7 6 7 9 9
D6 8 8 8 9 10 13 12 11 10 10 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 6 9 9
D7 8 8 8 9 9 11 11 10 9 11 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 8 8
D8 8 8 7 8 9 11 11 10 10 9 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 5 6 7 8
D9 7 7 7 7 9 10 9 9 9 8 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 7
D10 (top) 7 7 6 7 8 10 9 8 8 7 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 6
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attractive feature of the quadratic relation over the logarithmic relation is that cost estimates 
cannot become negative for the most liquid stocks. When a logarithmic relation is imposed 
trading cost estimates can become negative. Second, the Keim and Madhavan model uses a 
constant negative coefficient for market capitalization. Because the average market 
capitalization increased significantly in our sample, cost estimates become lower over time. 
It should be stressed here that we did not apply scaling techniques on the coefficient 
estimates in the Keim and Madhavan model as is typically done in this stream of literature 
to inflate trading costs back in time [see, e.g., Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) and Avramov, 
Chordia and Goyal (2006)]. If we would have applied these scaling techniques, the resulting 
cost estimates would be even lower. The Nomura model can adjust to changing market 
conditions in our sample because it is periodically recalibrated. 
The observation that trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan 
(1997) model are substantially lower than the Nomura cost estimates (and even negative in 
many cases) makes us believe that the trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and 
Madhavan model should be interpreted with caution in some of our analyses. Of course, it 
should be acknowledged that the Keim and Madhavan model was originally developed to 
describe the in-sample relation between trading costs and stock characteristics, and not to 
predict stocks' out-of-sample trading costs for evaluating trading strategies. Imposing a 
quadratic instead of a logarithmic relation between market capitalization and trading costs 
would probably not increase the in-sample explanatory power of the model. The Keim and 
Madhavan model is therefore probably optimally specified for the purpose it was originally 
developed for. 
An additional attractive feature of the trading cost model we obtained from Nomura 
Securities is that it has also been calibrated using European trade data over the period 1995 
to 2009 which enables us to investigate trading costs and reversal profits in these markets. 
To our best knowledge, this study is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of trading 
costs and to investigate trading cost impact on reversal profits in European equity markets. 
The lower liquidity of the European markets makes us expect that trading costs in Europe 
are higher than in the U.S. For comparison, we list the trading costs estimates we obtained 
from Nomura Securities for the largest 1,000 and 600 European stocks in Table 3.3. We 
asked the researchers of Nomura to use the same settings to compute trading costs in Europe 
as they used to compute trading costs in the U.S. 
When we compare the trading costs estimates for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks to 
those for the 1,000 largest European stocks in Panel A of Table 3.3, it appears that trading 
costs are indeed higher in Europe. For example, the trading costs of the 10 percent least 
liquid stocks are 76 basis points for European stocks, while the costs are 64 basis points for 
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U.S. stocks. The differences become larger when we move to the more liquid segment of the 
market. For the 10 percent most liquid stocks, trading costs are even three times higher in 
Europe compared to the U.S. When we consider trading cost estimates for the 600 largest 
European stocks in Panel B of Table 3.3, we observe a very similar pattern in the sense that 
the most liquid U.S. stocks are significantly less expensive to trade. 
 
TABLE 3.3. Transaction cost estimates for the 1,000 and 600 largest European stocks. 
This table presents an overview of the single-trip transaction cost estimates in basis points for volume 
deciles of our sample of the 1,000 (Panel A) and 600 (Panel B) largest European stocks resulting from 
the estimates for volume deciles we received from Nomura Securities. Volume deciles are based on 
stocks' three-month median trading volumes. It is assumed that the trades are closed within one day 
and the trade size is one million per stock by the end of 2009. The trade size is deflated back in time 
with 10 percent per annum. 
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Panel A. 1,000 largest European stocks
D1 (bottom) 75 75 77 77 77 71 75 77 79 72 74 76 71 79 88 76
D2 64 64 57 62 68 64 71 74 75 68 62 53 48 71 82 66
D3 46 46 43 48 51 54 60 63 63 48 48 39 35 56 75 52
D4 38 37 35 41 41 46 50 53 52 38 42 32 30 46 66 43
D5 33 31 31 34 35 40 44 43 43 31 35 27 26 38 56 37
D6 27 28 27 28 31 34 35 36 33 27 30 24 24 32 46 31
D7 24 24 24 25 26 27 28 29 27 23 25 22 23 28 40 26
D8 22 22 22 23 23 22 23 23 23 21 22 20 20 25 31 23
D9 22 21 20 21 21 19 20 20 20 19 20 19 19 21 25 20
D10 (top) 21 20 20 20 19 17 19 19 19 18 19 18 18 20 22 19
Panel B. 600 largest European stocks
D1 (bottom) 72 72 69 68 75 64 71 72 72 66 63 57 50 66 80 68
D2 54 51 44 50 53 55 61 62 62 48 46 33 30 48 67 51
D3 36 36 34 38 39 44 45 49 47 31 36 27 25 35 51 38
D4 30 29 29 30 32 34 36 35 39 27 29 25 24 30 42 31
D5 26 26 26 27 28 29 30 30 32 23 26 23 22 27 39 28
D6 23 24 24 25 25 24 25 26 26 21 23 21 22 26 34 25
D7 22 22 22 22 23 22 22 22 23 20 21 20 20 23 28 22
D8 22 21 21 22 21 19 20 20 21 19 20 19 18 21 25 21
D9 21 20 19 20 20 18 19 19 20 19 19 19 18 20 23 20
D10 (top) 21 20 18 19 18 16 19 19 19 18 18 18 17 19 21 19
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3.4. Main empirical results 
 
3.4.1. Reversal profits across different market cap segments 
 
In our first analysis we evaluate reversal profits for the 1,500, 500, and 100 largest U.S. 
stocks. Our hypothesis is that the reported impact of trading costs on reversal profits can 
largely be attributed to excessively trading in small-cap stocks and that limiting the stock 
universe to large-cap stocks significantly reduces trading costs. 
Reversal portfolios are constructed by daily sorting all available stocks into 
mutually exclusive quintile portfolios based on their past-week returns (i.e., five trading 
days). We assign equal weights to the stocks in each quintile. The reversal strategy is long 
(short) in the 20 percent of stocks with the lowest (highest) returns over the past week. To 
control for the bid-ask bounces, we skip one day after each ranking before we construct 
portfolios. Portfolios are rebalanced at a daily frequency. We compute the gross and net 
returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the long-short portfolio in excess of the 
equally-weighted return of all stocks in the cross-section. In addition, we compute the long-
short portfolios’ turnover per week. We compute net returns for each stock at each point in 
time by taking the trading cost estimates listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. We impose that the 
minimum trading cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model are 
zero to be conservative.  
We first consider the results for a standard reversal strategy using the 1,500 largest 
U.S. stocks in Panel A of Table 3.4. Consistent with most of the literature we find that this 
strategy yields extremely large gross returns. More specifically, a reversal investment 
strategy that is long in the 20 percent stocks with the lowest one-week returns and short in 
the 20 percent with the highest returns earns a gross return of 61.7 basis points per week. 
However, at the same time the reversal strategy has an extremely high portfolio 
turnover of 677 percent per week.45 We find that the average holding period of a stock is 
less than three days. Once trading costs are taken into account the profitability of the reversal 
strategy completely diminishes. When we take Keim and Madhavan (1997) trading cost 
estimates, we document a net return of minus 66.1 basis points per week. And when we use 
the Nomura cost estimates, we even find a return of minus 103.7 basis points per week. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006). 
 
                                                          
45 The maximum turnover of a long-short portfolio is 400 percent per day. 
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TABLE 3.4. Profitability of standard reversal investment strategies for the 1,500, 500 and 100 
largest U.S. stocks. 
This table presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio based on reversal quintiles for the 1,500 (Panel A), 500 (Panel B) and 100 (Panel 
C) largest U.S. stocks relative to the equally weighted average return of the stock universe. In addition, 
the table presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. Net returns for each stock are computed at 
each point in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using 
the schemes based on the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model and the transaction cost model of Nomura 
Securities listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. A minimum of zero is imposed for the transaction cost estimates 
resulting from the Keim and Madhavan model. 
 
 One of the most notable observations in the previous section was that there is a 
highly non-linear relation between market capitalization/trading volume and trading costs 
such that the smallest and least liquid stocks are disproportionally expensive to trade. 
Especially since these stocks generally have the highest volatility and therefore have the 
greatest probability to end up in the extreme quantiles when stocks are ranked on past 
returns, a long-short reversal portfolio is typically invested in the stocks that are the most 
expensive to trade. While some studies report that stock anomalies are typically stronger 
among small-cap stocks, one may wonder if the potentially higher returns of small-cap 
stocks compensate for the higher trading costs of these stocks. 
 To investigate the impact of including small-cap stocks, we consider the results for 
the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks in Panels B and C of Table 3.4, respectively. 
Interestingly, the reversal strategies for the largest 500 and 100 stocks earn slightly higher 
returns than the reversal strategy for the largest 1,500 stocks. Moreover, it appears that the 
impact of trading costs on the profitability of the strategy is much lower for our samples of 
large-cap stocks. Given the large number of negative cost estimates we found using the Keim 
Return 
long (bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return 
long-short 
(bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Standard reversal strategy for 1,500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 29.9 -31.6 61.7 8.7 677
Net return using KM estimates -35.3 31.1 -66.1 -9.2 "
Net return using Nomura estimates -54.6 49.6 -103.7 -14.5 "
Panel B. Standard reversal strategy for 500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 35.3 -36.4 71.9 9.1 688
Net return using KM estimates 32.5 -33.6 66.4 8.4 "
Net return using Nomura estimates -2.7 0.3 -3.0 -0.4 "
Panel C. Standard reversal strategy for 100 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 43.7 -40.3 84.2 9.8 711
Net return using KM estimates 42.8 -39.4 82.5 9.6 "
Net return using Nomura estimates 17.1 -14.4 31.5 3.7 "
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and Madhavan (1997) model for the largest 500 stocks, it is not surprising to see that the net 
return of the reversal strategy computed using these cost estimates are very close to the 
strategy’s gross return since we impose minimum trading costs of zero. However, also when 
we use the trading cost estimates of Nomura, it appears that trading costs have a much 
smaller impact on reversal profits once small-cap stocks are excluded. The net return of 
minus 3.0 basis points per week of the strategy for the 500 largest stocks indicates that 
trading costs consume roughly 75 basis points of the strategy’s gross return. For the 100 
largest stocks this figure is 53 basis points. For our sample of the 1,500 largest stocks trading 
impact is more than three times larger at 165 basis points.  
 The results from this analysis indicate that reversal profits are also observed among 
the largest stocks. In fact, reversal profits appear to be the highest among this group of 
stocks. Our finding that reversal strategies can yield a significant return of more than 30 
basis points per week net of trading costs presents a serious challenge to standard rational 
asset pricing model and has important implications for the practical implementation of 
reversal investment strategies. The key lesson is that investors striving to earn superior 
returns by engaging in reversal trading are more likely to realize their objectives by trading 
in liquid stocks with relatively low transaction costs. 
 
3.4.2. Reducing reversal strategies’ turnover by “smart” portfolio construction 
 
Another important reason why trading costs have such a large impact on reversal profits has 
to do with the way the reversal portfolios are typically constructed. Reversal portfolios are 
constructed by taking a long position in losers and a short position in winners. Then, at a 
pre-specified interval the portfolio is rebalanced and stocks that are no longer losers are sold 
and replaced by newly bottom-ranked stocks. And vice versa, stocks that are no longer 
winners are bought back and replaced by newly top-ranked stocks. While this portfolio 
construction approach is standard in the academic literature to investigate stock market 
anomalies, it is suboptimal when a real-live investment strategy is evaluated and trading 
costs are taken into account. Namely, replacing stocks that are no longer losers (winners) by 
newly bottom (top)-ranked stocks only increases the profitability of reversal strategies if the 
difference in expected return between the stocks is larger than the costs associated with the 
transactions. 
In many cases, however, the costs of the rebalances will be larger than the 
incremental return that is earned by the stock replacements. For example, for our universe 
of the 1,500 largest stocks we found that past loser stocks on average earn a gross excess 
return of roughly 6 basis points over the subsequent day while stocks in the next quintile 
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earn 1 basis point. On average, loser (winner) stocks remain ranked in the top (bottom) 
quintile for a period of three days. Consequently, replacing a stock that moved from the top 
quintile to the second quintile only increases the profitability of the reversal strategy if the 
costs of the buy and sell transactions are less than 15 [= (6 - 1) * 3] basis points together.  
When we consider the trading cost estimates in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, however, we see that 
single-trip costs are larger than 7.5 basis points in many cases. Therefore a portfolio 
construction approach that directly sells (buys back) stocks that are no longer losers 
(winners) is likely to generate excessive turnover and unnecessarily high transaction costs. 
A naive approach to cope with this problem would be to lower the rebalancing 
frequency. However, with this approach one runs the risk to hold stocks that have already 
reverted. Namely, a loser (winner) stock at a specific point in time might rank among the 
winner (loser) stocks within the interval at which the portfolio is rebalanced and might 
therefore have a negative (positive) expected return. In fact, the portfolio weights of loser 
stocks that have reverted become larger and thereby exacerbate this effect.  
We propose a slightly more sophisticated approach that waits to sell (buy back) 
stocks until they are ranked among the 50 percent of winner (loser) stocks ranked on past 
return. These stocks are then replaced by the stocks with the lowest (highest) past-week 
return at that time and not yet included in the portfolio. As a consequence, this "smart" 
approach has a substantially lower turnover than the standard approach to construct long-
short reversal portfolios. It is important to note that our “smart” approach holds the same 
number of stocks in the portfolio as the standard approach, but that the holding period with 
the “smart” approach is flexible for each stock with a minimum of one day and a maximum 
of theoretically infinity.  
 We now use the slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction approach 
outlined above to evaluate reversal profits for our samples of the 1,500, 500, and 100 largest 
U.S. stocks. Our hypothesis is that trading costs can significantly be reduced without giving 
up too much of the gross reversal profits when our slightly more sophisticated portfolio 
construction algorithm is applied. 
We first consider the results for our sample of the 1,500 largest stocks in Panel A 
of Table 3.5. Indeed, the “smart” portfolio construction approach appears to successfully 
reduce turnover and thereby the impact of trading costs on reversal profits. While the 
turnover of the standard reversal strategy for the 1,500 largest stocks is 677 percent per week, 
this figure is 325 percent for the “smart” approach. We find that the effective holding period 
of a stock on average is approximately six days for this strategy. And while trading costs, 
estimated using the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model, consume 128 basis points of reversal 
gross returns of the standard reversal strategy, this figure is 61 basis points for the “smart” 
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approach. We find a similar impact when we use the Nomura trading cost estimates. While 
trading costs consume 165 basis points for the standard reversal strategy, this figure is 77 
basis points for the “smart” approach. All in all, it appears that using a slightly more 
sophisticated portfolio construction approach when engaging in short-term reversal 
strategies can have a significant impact on trading costs. 
 
TABLE 3.5. Profitability of “smart” reversal investment strategies for the 1,500, 500 and 100 
largest U.S. stocks. 
This table presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio based on reversal portfolios containing 20 percent of the 1,500 (Panel A), 500 
(Panel B) and 100 (Panel C) largest U.S. stocks relative to the equally weighted average return of the 
stock universe. In addition, the table presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. The reversal 
portfolios are constructed using an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no 
longer losers (winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent of 
stocks. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the trading cost 
estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on the Keim and Madhavan 
(1997) model and the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. A 
minimum of zero is imposed for the transaction cost estimates resulting from the Keim and Madhavan 
model.  
 
 Next, we consider the results for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks in Panels B 
and C of Table 3.5. Also for these samples we see that the “smart” portfolio construction 
approach appears to successfully reduce turnover. More specifically, while the standard 
reversal strategies have turnovers of 688 and 711 percent per week, these figures are 326 
and 337 percent for the “smart” reversal strategies applied on the 500 and 100 largest stocks, 
respectively. Interestingly, the gross returns of the “smart” strategies are only marginally 
lower than the returns we observed earlier for the standard reversal strategies. When net 
Return 
long (bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return 
long-short t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 27.7 -31.9 59.8 8.8 325
Net return using KM estimates -2.9 -1.4 -1.5 -0.2 "
Net return using Nomura estimates -10.9 6.8 -17.6 -2.6 "
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 30.7 -34.0 65.0 8.7 326
Net return using KM estimates 29.4 -32.7 62.3 8.4 "
Net return using Nomura estimates 13.7 -16.8 30.5 4.1 "
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest  U.S. stocks
Gross return 40.9 -36.7 77.9 9.4 337
Net return using KM estimates 40.5 -36.3 77.1 9.3 "
Net return using Nomura estimates 28.6 -24.4 53.1 6.4 "
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returns are computed using the Nomura model we find that trading costs now consume only 
34 basis points of the strategy’s gross return for the 500 largest U.S. stocks. This figure is 
75 basis points for the standard reversal strategy. We observe a similar reduction for our 
sample of the 100 largest U.S. stocks. The resulting reversal profits range between 30 and 
50 basis points per week  and are highly significant from both a statistical as an economical 
point of view.  
 
3.4.3. Reversal profits in European markets 
 
Proceeding further we evaluate reversal profits in European stocks markets. Only a small 
number of studies have investigated short-term reversal strategies in non-US equity markets. 
Chang, McLeavey and Rhee (1995) find abnormal profits of short-term contrarian strategies 
in the Japanese stock market. Schiereck, DeBondt and Weber (1999) and Hameed and Ting 
(2000) find the same in the German and Malaysian stock markets, respectively. And Griffin, 
Kelly and Nardari (2010) investigate reversal profits in 56 developed and emerging 
countries.  
Because European markets are less liquid than the U.S. market we expect the 
impact of trading costs on reversal profits to be larger in Europe. Using the methodology 
outlined in the previous section, we construct quintile portfolios for the 1,000, 600 and 100 
largest European stocks to compute the returns of long-short reversal portfolios. 
Additionally, we apply the “smart” portfolio construction for these stock samples. For all 
reversal strategies we compute gross returns, and returns net of trading costs using the 
estimates from the Nomura model listed in Table 3.3. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 3.6. 
It appears that gross reversal profits are also very large in Europe and in the same 
order of magnitude as in the U.S. However, as we expected, the impact of trading costs 
appears to be larger in Europe. For our universes of the 1,000 and 600 largest European 
stocks we do not find positive returns net of trading costs. Only when we exclusively focus 
on the 100 largest stocks and apply the “smart” portfolio construction, we document 
significantly positive net reversal profits up to 20 basis points per week. 
All in all, the European results exhibit the same features as our U.S. results: once 
we move more towards the large-cap segment of the market and limit turnover by “smart” 
portfolio construction, reversal strategies yield significant returns net of trading costs. At the 
same time, trading costs have a larger impact on reversal profits in Europe than in the U.S. 
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TABLE 3.6. Profitability of reversal investment strategies for the 1,000, 600 and 100 largest 
European stocks. 
This table presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio based on reversal strategies for the 1,000, 600 and 100 largest European stocks 
relative to the equally weighted average return of the stock universe. In addition, the table presents the 
turnover of the long-short portfolio. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by 
taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on 
the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Table 3.3. Panels A, C and E present the 
results using a standard portfolio construction approach that is long (short) in the 20 percent of stocks 
with the lowest (highest) returns over the past week. Panels B, D and E show the results for a slightly 
more sophisticated portfolio construction approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that 
are no longer losers (winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 
percent of stocks. 
 
 
Return 
long (bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return 
long-short 
(bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Standard reversal strategy for 1,000 largest European stocks
Gross return 24.6 -25.3 50.0 7.7 672
Net return using Nomura estimates -113.4 106.5 -217.5 -33.4 "
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 1,000 largest European stocks
Gross return 28.2 -27.6 56.0 9.0 319
Net return using Nomura estimates -36.0 36.4 -72.1 -11.6 "
Panel C. Standard reversal strategy for 600 largest European stocks
Gross return 34.3 -34.6 69.2 9.6 683
Net return using Nomura estimates -81.3 76.8 -156.9 -21.8 "
Panel D. Smart reversal strategy for 600 largest European stocks
Gross return 35.0 -34.2 69.5 10.0 323
Net return using Nomura estimates -18.6 19.8 -38.3 -5.5 "
Panel E. Standard reversal strategy for 100 largest European stocks
Gross return 48.0 -48.1 96.5 9.8 700
Net return using Nomura estimates -24.9 22.9 -47.7 -4.9 "
Panel F. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest European stocks
Gross return 46.3 -43.8 90.5 9.5 332
Net return using Nomura estimates 11.9 -9.7 21.6 2.3 "
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3.5. Follow-up empirical analyses 
 
3.5.1. Weekly rebalancing 
 
In our first follow-up empirical analysis we evaluate a naive portfolio construction approach 
that reduces the turnover of reversal strategies by decreasing the rebalancing frequency to 
five days. All the other settings are exactly the same as with the standard approach. As 
mentioned earlier, the main disadvantage of this approach compared to the "smart" portfolio 
construction approach described in the previous section is that one runs the risk to hold 
stocks that have already reverted. We evaluate this portfolio construction approach for our 
samples of the largest 1,500, 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks. The results are in Table 3.7. 
 
TABLE 3.7. Profitability of reversal investment strategies using a five-day rebalancing 
frequency. 
This table presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio based on reversal quintiles using a five-day rebalancing frequency for the 1,500 
(Panel A), 500 (Panel B) and 100 (Panel C) largest U.S. stocks. In addition, the table presents the 
turnover of the long-short portfolio. Net returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by 
taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on 
the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Tables 3.1 (for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks) 
and 3.2 (for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks).  
 
It appears that using a five-day rebalancing frequency indeed substantially lowers 
portfolio turnover. For example, the turnover of the standard reversal strategy for the 1,500 
largest stocks is 677 percent per week. This figure is 306 percent per week using a five-day 
rebalancing frequency. Also for our samples of the largest 500 and 100 stocks, the turnover 
Return 
long (bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return 
long-short 
(bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Standard reversal strategy for 1,500 largest U.S. stocks with a 5-day rebalancing frequency
Gross return 18.6 -22.5 41.2 7.3 306
Net return using Nomura estimates -17.6 13.9 -31.4 -5.6 "
Panel B. Standard reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. stocks with a 5-day rebalancing frequency
Gross return 20.2 -23.7 44.0 7.1 310
Net return using Nomura estimates 3.5 -7.1 10.6 1.7 "
Panel C. Standard reversal strategy for 100 largest U.S. stocks with a 5-day rebalancing frequency
Gross return 25.3 -26.7 52.2 7.9 315
Net return using Nomura estimates 13.7 -15.3 29.0 4.4 "
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of reversal strategies that use a five-day rebalancing frequency is less than half of the 
turnover of strategies that rebalance at a daily frequency. As a consequence, the impact of 
trading costs is substantially lower for these strategies. Nonetheless, the net returns of the 
weekly reversal strategy for the 1,500 largest stocks are significantly negative because the 
gross returns of the strategy are also much lower than for the daily strategy. While the daily 
strategy yields a gross return of 61.7 basis points per week, the weekly strategy yields only 
41.2 basis points. For our samples of the largest 500 and 100 stocks we observe similar 
effects: trading costs become substantially lower when the rebalancing frequency is 
decreased to five days, but so do gross returns. The effects seem to offset each other such 
that net reversal profits remain in the same order of magnitude. 
 
3.5.2. Subperiod analyses 
 
We continue our empirical analysis by performing two subperiod analyses. First, we 
investigate reversal profits over the most recent decade in our sample (i.e., January 2000 to 
December 2009). We conjecture that it might well be the case that the decimalization of the 
quotation systems and the increase in stock trading volumes have affected the profitability 
of reversal profits. Additionally, the Adaptive Market Hypothesis of Lo (2004) states that 
the public dissemination of an anomaly may affect its profitability. We conjecture that it 
could well be the case that increased investment activities by professional investors such as 
hedge funds have arbitraged away a large portion of the anomalous profits of reversal 
strategies after publications on the reversal effect in the 1990s. The results of this analysis 
are presented in Panels A, B and C in Table 3.8. 
It appears that the net profitability of our “smart” reversal investment strategy is 
quite constant over our sample period. For the 1,500 largest stocks, the “smart” reversal 
strategy yields a negative net return of minus 27.9 basis points per week in the most recent 
decade. For our sample of the 500 largest stocks, the net return decreased from 30.5 to 22.1 
basis points per week. And for our sample of the largest 100 stocks, the net return slightly 
increased from 53.1 basis points to 59.0 basis points per week. 
In our second subperiod analysis we evaluate reversal profits when leaving out the 
dotcom bubble years (i.e., January 1999 to December 2001) and the credit crisis (i.e., January 
2008 to December 2009) from our sample. Our concern is that the trading cost models we 
employ underestimate costs during crises periods and reversal profits are exacerbated. The 
results of this analysis are reported in Panels D, E, and F of Table 3.8. Observing net reversal 
profits of minus 17.8, 23.2 and 34.8 basis points per week for the 1,500, 500 and 100 largest 
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U.S. stocks, respectively, we conclude that the reversal profits are constant over time and 
also highly profitable during non-crises periods.  
 
TABLE 3.8. Profitability of reversal investment strategies over subperiods 
This table presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio based on a reversal strategy over the period January 2000 to December 2009 
(Panels A, B and C) and over our full sample period excluding the dot-com bubble from January 1999 
to December 2001 and the credit crisis from January 2008 to December 2009 (Panels D, E and F). In 
addition, the table presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. The reversal portfolios are 
constructed using an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers 
(winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent of stocks. Net 
returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated 
with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on the transaction cost model of Nomura 
Securities listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  
 
3.5.3.  “Smart” portfolio construction using alternative trade rules 
 
Next we examine the sensitivity of our findings to alternate portfolio construction rule 
choices. More specifically, we evaluate reversal profits for the 500 largest U.S. stocks that 
Return 
long (bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return 
long-short 
(bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest  U.S. stocks over the period 2000 to 2009
Gross return 10.5 -22.6 33.2 2.7 317
Net return using Nomura estimates -19.4 8.5 -27.9 -2.3 "
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest  U.S. stocks over the period 2000 to 2009
Gross return 22.2 -30.7 53.0 4.0 320
Net return using Nomura estimates 7.1 -14.9 22.1 1.7 "
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest  U.S. stocks over the period 2000 to 2009
Gross return 40.0 -38.3 78.6 5.5 329
Net return using Nomura estimates 30.3 -28.5 59.0 4.1 "
Panel D. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest U.S. stocks during non-crises periods
Gross return 29.1 -31.8 61.1 12.1 325
Net return using Nomura estimates -10.4 7.4 -17.8 -3.5 ''
Panel E. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. stocks during non-crises periods
Gross return 27.5 -29.6 57.3 10.6 326
Net return using Nomura estimates 10.6 -12.6 23.2 4.3 ''
Panel F. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest U.S. stocks during non-crises periods
Gross return 31.9 -28.4 60.4 9.6 337
Net return using Nomura estimates 19.1 -15.7 34.8 5.5 ''
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sell (buy back) stocks once their rank on past-week return is above (below) the 30th (70th) 
percentile; the 40th (60th) percentile; the 60th (40th) percentile; the 70th (30th) percentile; 
and the 80th (20th) percentile.  
 
TABLE 3.9. “Smart” portfolio construction using alternative trade rules. 
This table presents the weekly gross and net returns of the long portfolio, the short portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolio based on reversal strategies relative to the equally weighted average return of the 
stock universe. In addition, the table presents the turnover of the long-short portfolio. The reversal 
portfolios are constructed using an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no 
longer losers (winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked above (below) the 30th (70th) percentile 
(Panel A); the 40th (60th) percentile (Panel B); the 60th (40th) percentile (Panel C); the 70th (30th) 
percentile (Panel D); and the 80th (20th) percentile (Panel E). Net returns for each stock are computed 
at each point in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated with the stock’s volume rank using 
the schemes based on the transaction cost model of Nomura Securities listed in Table 3.2. 
 
The results in Panel A of Table 3.9 point out that reducing portfolio turnover has a 
large impact on net reversal profits. Once we require loser (winner) stocks with a rank above 
(below) the 30th (70th) percentile to be sold (bought back), net reversal profits become 
highly significant at 20.1 basis points per week. This compares to minus 3 basis points per 
week for the standard reversal strategy (see Table 3.4). While gross returns become 
somewhat lower when turnover is reduced, the impact of trading costs on performance 
Return 
long (bps)
Return 
short (bps)
Return 
long-short 
(bps) t-stat
Turnover 
(%)
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 30/70 trade rule
Gross return 34.0 -37.2 71.5 9.1 479
Net return using Nomura estimates 8.1 -11.9 20.1 2.6 "
Panel B.Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 40/60 trade rule
Gross return 32.1 -35.8 68.2 8.9 387
Net return using Nomura estimates 11.5 -15.4 27.0 3.5 "
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 60/40 trade rule
Gross return 30.9 -33.0 64.1 8.9 275
Net return using Nomura estimates 16.7 -18.5 35.2 4.9 "
Panel D.Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 70/30 trade rule
Gross return 28.1 -30.5 58.7 8.6 225
Net return using Nomura estimates 16.7 -18.6 35.3 5.2 "
Panel E. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. U.S. stocks using 80/20 trade rule
Gross return 24.3 -27.3 51.7 8.2 170
Net return using Nomura estimates 15.8 -18.3 34.2 5.4 "
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becomes substantially smaller at the same time. The optimum in terms of net return is 
reached using a trade rule that sells (buys back) stocks once their rank on past-week return 
is above (below) the 70th (30th) percentile. Interestingly, it appears that reversal profits are 
both statistically and economically highly significant for all trade rules, ranging from 20.1 
to 35.3 basis points per week. We can therefore safely conclude that our findings are robust 
to our choice of trade rule. 
 
3.5.4. Fama-French regressions 
 
To investigate to which extent reversal profits can be attributed to exposures to common risk 
factors we regress gross and net returns of the “smart” long-short reversal portfolios for the 
largest 1,500, 500 and 100 U.S. stocks on the Fama-French risk factors (French, 2010) for 
market, size and value [see, e.g., Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996)]: 
(3.1)  iitttti HMLbSMBbsRMRFbar ,321,  , 
where tir ,  is the return on reversal strategy i in month t, tRMRF , tSMB  and tHML  are the 
returns on factor-mimicking portfolios for the market, size and value in month t, 
respectively, a , 1b , 2b  and 3b  are parameters to be estimated, and ti,  is the residual 
return of strategy i in month t. The coefficient estimates and adjusted R-squared values from 
these regressions are listed in Table 3.10. 
Panel A presents the results for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks, Panel B presents the 
results for the 500 largest U.S. stocks, and Panel C presents the results for the 100 largest 
U.S. stocks. In all cases the explanatory power of the Fama-French risk factors is very small. 
The highest adjusted R-squared value we observe is 5 percent. We conclude that reversal 
profits are unrelated to exposures to common risk factors. 
 
3.6. Implications for explanations for reversal effects 
 
Our findings have important implications for explanations that have been put forward in the 
literature to explain the reversal anomaly. Short-term stock reversals are sometimes regarded 
as evidence that the market lacks sufficient liquidity to offset price effects caused by 
unexpected buying and selling pressure and that market makers set prices in part to control 
their inventories. Grossman and Miller (1988) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) argue that 
the reversals are induced by inventory imbalances by market makers and the contrarian 
profits are a compensation for bearing inventory risks. Related to this stream of literature, 
Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), Hansch, Naik and 
Viswanathan (1998), and Hendershott and Seasholes (2006) find that prices quoted by 
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dealers are inversely related to their inventory supporting the notion that dealers actively 
manage their inventories. This liquidity explanation projects that reversals should have 
become smaller over time since market liquidity dramatically increased. It also predicts that 
reversals are stronger for small-cap stocks than large-cap stocks that typically have lower 
turnover. In fact, under the liquidity hypothesis reversals may even not be present among 
large-cap stocks at all. However, our findings that net reversal profits are large and positive 
for the 500 and 100 largest U.S. stocks and did not diminish over the second decade in our 
sample rules out this explanation.  
 
TABLE 3.10. Fama-French regressions. 
This table presents the coefficient estimates and adjusted R-squared values of Fama-French regressions 
of weekly gross and net returns of the long-short portfolio based on reversal portfolios containing 20 
percent of the 1,500 (Panel A), 500 (Panel B) and 100 (Panel C) largest U.S. stocks on the Fama-
French risk factors (French, 2010) for market, size and value [see, e.g., Fama and French (1993, 1995, 
1996)]: 
(3.1)  iitttti HMLbSMBbsRMRFbar ,321,  , 
where ri,t is the return on reversal strategy i in month t, RMRFt, SMBt and HMLt are the returns on 
factor-mimicking portfolios for the market, size and value in month t, respectively, a, b1, b2 and b3 are 
parameters to be estimated, and εi,t is the residual return of strategy i in month t. The reversal portfolios 
are constructed using an approach that does not directly sell (buy back) stocks that are no longer losers 
(winners), but waits until these stocks are ranked among the top (bottom) 50 percent of stocks. Net 
returns for each stock are computed at each point in time by taking the trading cost estimates associated 
with the stock’s volume rank using the schemes based on the transaction cost model of Nomura 
Securities listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  
 
Another explanation for reversal effects that has been put forward in the literature 
is from Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) who 
note that nonsynchronous trading contributes to contrarian profits. This explanation assumes 
information diffuses gradually in financial markets and that large-cap stocks react more 
quickly to information than small-cap stocks that are covered by fewer analysts. As a 
Alpha 
(bps) t-stat RMRF SMB HML Adj.Rsq
Panel A. Smart reversal strategy for 1,500 largest U.S. stocks
Gross return 60.9 9.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 5%
Net return using Nomura estimates -16.3 -2.5 0.1 -0.2 0.0 5%
Panel B. Smart reversal strategy for 500 largest U.S. stocks
Gross return 66.8 9.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 3%
Net return using Nomura estimates 32.6 4.4 0.1 -0.2 0.0 3%
Panel C. Smart reversal strategy for 100 largest U.S. stocks
Gross return 80.7 9.9 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 2%
Net return using Nomura estimates 56.1 6.8 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 2%
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consequence of this, the returns of large-cap stocks might lead the returns of small-cap 
stocks. However, our finding that reversal profits are smaller for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks 
than for the 500 and 100 largest stocks is inconsistent with this explanation since 
nonsynchronous trading predicts a size-related lead-lag-effect in stock returns and higher 
reversal profits among small-cap stocks. 
 The only explanation that has been put forward in the literature whose projections 
are not inconsistent with our findings is the behavioral explanation that market prices tend 
to overreact to information in the short run [see, e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a)]. It 
should be stressed that our study does not provide any direct evidence supporting this 
behavioral hypothesis. Of course, it is not our goal to explain the reversal effect in this study; 
our main point is to show that reversal profits are present after trading costs. Nonetheless, 
we believe that our results help to better understand the reversal anomaly since it rules out 
several competing explanations that have been put forward in the literature.  
 
3.7. Summary and concluding comments 
 
This study shows that the finding that trading costs prevent profitable execution of reversal 
investment strategies can largely be attributed to excessively trading in small-cap stocks. 
Excluding small-cap stocks and applying a slightly more sophisticated portfolio construction 
approach to reduce turnover when engaging in reversal trading has a tremendous impact on 
the returns that reversal investment strategies deliver net of transaction costs. Our finding 
that reversal strategies generate 30 to 50 basis points per week net of transaction costs poses 
a serious challenge to standard rational asset pricing models and has important implications 
for the practical implementation of reversal investment strategies. Our results also have 
important implications for several explanations that have been put forward in the literature 
to explain the reversal anomaly.  
Another important issue that came to light in this study is that trading cost estimates 
of the Keim and Madhavan (1997) model that are typically used in this stream of literature 
to evaluate the profitability of trading strategies net of transaction costs should be interpreted 
with caution in some cases. More specifically, it seems that cost estimates of this model are 
systematically biased downwards and can even become negative. The comprehensive 
overview presented in this study on trading costs estimates resulting from the proprietary 
transaction cost model of Nomura Securities provides opportunities for future research to re-
evaluate the profitability of investment strategies based on well-documented anomalies. 
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3.A. Keim and Madhavan (1997) model 
 
As Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) do in their study, we employ the regression results 
of Keim and Madhavan to estimate the transaction costs involved with reversal investment 
strategies. Using the results in Table 5 of Keim and Madhavan (1997) we obtain our 
estimates of buyer and seller trading costs: 
 
(3.2)
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where i
BuyCˆ  and i
SellCˆ  are the estimated total trading costs for stock i in percent for either 
a buyer-initiated or seller-initiated order, respectively. i
NASDAQD  is equal to one if stock i is 
a NASDAQ-traded stock and zero if stock i is traded on NYSE or AMEX, imcap is the 
market value outstanding of stock i, iTrsize  is the trade size of stock i, and iP  is the price 
per share of stock i. For our long portfolios we use i
BuyCˆ  to open the positions in the 
component stocks and i
SellCˆ  to close the positions, vice versa for the short portfolios. Keim 
and Madhavan estimate the trading costs for 21 institutions from January 1991 through 
March 1993 using 62,333 trades.  
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3.B. Nomura model for trading costs 
 
The variables that are assumed to determine trading costs in the model developed by Nomura 
are spread, trade size, volume and volatility: 
(4) iii
i
ii volatilitybTrsize
volume
bspreadbaC  3221
1ˆ  
where ispread  is the average bid-ask spread of stock i over the trading day, ivolume  is the 
total executed volume for stock i over the trading day, iTrsize  is the trade size of stock i, 
and ivolatility  the intra-day return volatility of stock i over the trading day. The Nomura 
trading cost model is calibrated in every quarter over the period 1995 to 2009. For each 
calibration, actual order flows in the previous 12 months for approximately 500,000 
executed trades per time are used from the trading platform formerly owned by Lehman 
Brothers. Consistent with the approach of Keim and Madhavan (1997), the model of Nomura 
also adjusts for the relevant exchange by estimating the model coefficients per region and 
exchange [Tse and Devos (2004) and Gajewskia and Gresse (2007) report differences in 
trading costs between exchanges].  
 The model developed by Nomura estimates transaction costs by decomposing them 
into three components. The first component is the instantaneous impact due to crossing the 
bid-ask spread. The second component is the permanent impact which is the change in 
market equilibrium price due to executing a trade. Finally, the third component is the 
temporary impact which refers to a temporary movement of price away from equilibrium 
price because of short-term imbalances in supply and demand. The model does not take 
opportunity costs into account that result from unfilled trades.  
  
  
 4. Are the Fama-French factors really compensation for distress 
risk?46  
 
In this study, we revisit the question whether the Fama-French factors are manifestation of 
distress risk premiums. To this end, we develop new tests specifically aimed at dissecting 
the Fama-French factor returns from a distress risk premium. While we find that value and 
small-cap exposures are typically associated with distress risk, our results also indicate that 
distress risk is not priced and that the small-cap and value premiums are priced beyond 
distress risk. Moreover, the distress risk exposures of common small-cap and value factors 
do not have explanatory power in asset pricing tests. Our results are robust to international 
out-of-sample analyses and have important implications for investors engaging in small-cap 
and value strategies. 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
While numerous studies document that value and small-cap stocks earn abnormal positive 
returns, the interpretation why they do so is more controversial. The main goal of this 
research is to provide insight into the existence of an interaction between distress risk and 
the value and small-cap premiums. In other words, are these premiums compensation for 
distress risk? 
To investigate this research question we start with setting up a comprehensive data 
set of different proxies for firms’ distress risk for the 1,500 largest U.S. firms over the period 
September 1991 to December 2012. From accounting data, we measure a firm’s default risk 
by its financial leverage. Probabilities of default are also obtained using the structural model 
of Merton (1974). Given the results of Anginer and Yıldızhan (2017) that credit spreads are 
a good proxy for financial distress, we additionally consider the difference between the bond 
yield and the corresponding maturity-matched treasury rate as a measure for firms’ distress 
risk. Finally, we consider credit ratings that have been used by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova 
and Philipov (2007, 2009, 2013) to proxy for distress risk. We merge our distress risk data 
with monthly equity price data. 
In our first empirical analysis we evaluate the predictive power of the variables for 
firms’ financial distress using Moody’s (2000) Accuracy Profiles. While we do find some 
differences between the variables, it appears that all variables have predictive power for 
                                                          
46 This chapter is based on De Groot, W., and Huij, J., 2017, Are the Fama-French factors really 
compensation for distress risk, resubmitted to the Journal of International Money and Finance. 
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firms’ financial distress. We find that structural models and credit ratings do a better job in 
predicting financial distress than accounting measures, and that credit spreads have some 
predictive value over estimates resulting from structural models and credit ratings. Although 
stock rankings based on these measures are positively correlated, the correlations are not 
very high. This result indicates that our different risk measures capture distinct dimensions 
of financial distress. 
To investigate the interaction between the value premium and distress risk we 
construct rank portfolios of stocks ranked on their book-to-market ratios and distress risk to 
explore the relation between our measures of distress risk, valuation, and stock returns. We 
find no evidence supporting the pricing of distress risk, and no evidence of a positive relation 
between default risk and the value premium. These results hold irrespective of which 
measure we use for distress risk. 
Also when we employ alternative methodological frameworks to investigate the 
interaction between the value premium and distress, we find no positive relation. When using 
the framework a la Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) we take the NBER’s Business 
Cycle indicators for economic expansions and recessions as measures for good and bad 
states of the world, respectively. Using this setup, we find that value stocks outperform 
growth stocks both during expansions and recessions. At the same time, we generally find 
that high-risk stocks based on our different distress measures exhibit large underperformance 
during recessions corroborating our finding that our distress proxies have predictive power 
for financial distress. And when we use cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions at the individual stock level to estimate if there is a value premium above and 
beyond distress risk effects, our results consistently indicate a substantial value premium 
and no positive relation between stock returns and distress risk exposures. 
For the small-cap anomaly we also find no evidence supporting a distress risk-based 
explanation. While small-cap stocks do have a substantially higher probability to get into 
financial distress, it is not the case that small-cap stocks only yield positive abnormal returns 
if they run higher levels of distress risk. In fact, it seems that the size premium is concentrated 
in low-risk small-cap stocks. It also appears that there is a large positive small-cap premium 
during recessions. This is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation that projects that small 
caps must underperform large-cap stocks in the bad states of the world. In addition, the cross-
sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions at the individual stock level show a strong 
size premium once corrected for distress risk. Another interesting finding of our analyses is 
that our results help to understand the discrepancy in the literature that several studies do not 
find a significant size premium after the early 1980s. We show that once distress risk is taken 
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into account in the analyses a significant small-cap premium can be observed even after the 
early 1980s. 
We also investigate if the large empirical explanatory power of the Fama-French 
(1993) SMB (Small-Minus-Big) and HML (High-Minus-Low) factors for the size and value 
effects can be attributed to these factors being exposed to distress risk. The typical approach 
in the stream of literature on empirical asset pricing to correct for the size and value effects 
is using the Fama-French (1993) three factor model that augments the one-factor market 
model with the SMB (Small-Minus-Big) and HML (High-Minus-Low) factors. Perhaps the 
most important reason why many researchers adopted the use of the SMB and HML factors 
is because of the factors’ large empirical explanatory power for differences in the cross-
section of stock returns. Because of the way the SMB and HML factors are constructed, we 
may expect the factors to be prone to distress risk. To investigate this issue we construct 
distress-risk neutral SMB and HML factors. We observe that the premiums of the factors do 
not decrease when distress-risk neutrality is imposed. At the same time, the distress-risk-
neutral factors exhibit lower risk levels. Furthermore, we do not observe a deterioration of 
the explanatory power of the distress-risk-neutral factors for the variation in returns of the 
decile portfolios sorted on dividend yield and the 25 portfolios sorted on market 
capitalization and book-to-price from the webpage of Kenneth French. 
Finally, when we expand our analyses to an international context and reperform all 
our tests for all stocks in the FTSE World Index, we come to exactly the same conclusions 
and find no relationship between distress risk and the value and size premiums. Overall, 
based on our results we conclude that there is no strong evidence supporting a distress risk-
based explanation for the Fama-French factor premiums. Our results call for further research 
on the development and testing of theories that potentially provide an explanation for the 
small-cap and value effects. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a literature 
overview. Section 4.3 describes the construction of our data set. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present 
our empirical results for tests that examine if there is a relation between distress risk and the 
value and small-cap effects, respectively. Section 4.6 presents results for analyses that 
investigate if the empirical explanatory power of the SMB and HML factors can be attributed 
to their exposures to distress risk. Section 4.7 presents the results using the CRSP Stocks 
Database over the pre-1991 period. Section 4.8 presents the results for international stock 
markets. In Section 4.9 we expand our analyses to the profitability and investment effects 
recently documented by Fama and French (2015) and show that these effects can also not be 
attributed to distress risk. Section 4.10 presents the results of all stocks in the U.S. BMI 
index. Finally, Section 4.11 highlights the contributions of our study to the extant literature. 
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4.2. Literature review 
 
A large group of academics and practitioners believe that the value and small-cap premiums 
are compensation for distress risk. Berk (1995) relates the effects to systematic risk that is 
unmeasured by conventional asset pricing models. Fama and French (1992) postulate that 
their small-cap and value factors proxy for the relative distress factor of Chan and Chen 
(1991), and Fama and French (1998) find that a factor model that incorporates a risk factor 
for relative distress captures the value premium in international equity returns. A large 
number of important studies in the field of empirical finance also consider the SMB (Small-
Minus-Big) and HML (High-Minus-Low) factors of Fama and French (1993) to be priced 
risk factors [see, e.g., Zhang (2005)]. And several asset management companies point out 
that the higher returns they expect to earn for their investors through engaging in small-cap 
and value strategies stem from taking increased levels of risk.  
However, empirical evidence does not appear to unambiguously indicate that the 
small-cap and value anomalies are related to financial distress. In addition, the literature 
reports inconsistent conclusions on whether distress risk is a systematic risk factor that is 
priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemon (2002) 
employ accounting models to estimate corporate bankruptcy risk and find a negative relation 
between distress risk and equity returns. The authors show that stocks with higher levels of 
distress risk as measured by Altman’s model (1968) and Ohlson’s model (1980) earn 
anomalously low returns and conclude that distress risk is therefore unlikely to account for 
the book-to-market effect. Also, Piotroski (2000) reports that financially healthy, high book-
to-market firms generate higher returns than firms that have less healthy financial 
statements. And recently, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) use a comprehensive set 
of accounting and equity market variables to measure distress risk and find that stocks with 
high risk of default deliver abnormal low returns and that returns of growth and value stocks 
are significantly negatively related to default risk.47  
On the other hand, Ferguson and Shockley (2003) investigate the explanatory 
power of firms’ leverage and distress risk (measured through Altman’s (1968) model) and 
report that these factors subsume the explanatory power of the HML factor in explaining 
cross-sectional returns. Vassalou and Xing (2004) also investigate the relation between 
distress risk and the small-cap and value premiums and employ a structural approach to 
measure distress risk and use Merton’s (1974) structural credit risk model based on option 
                                                          
47 The negative relation between stock returns and distress risk documented by Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi (2008) is only observed when returns are adjusted for the three Fama and French (1992, 1993, 
1996) factors. 
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pricing theory to compute individual firms’ default probabilities. When the authors assess 
the effect of distress risk on equity returns, they conclude that default risk is positively priced 
in the stock market and that the small-cap effect is a default effect and that a large portion 
of the book-to-price effect can also be attributed to default risk. Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010) also use Merton’s (1974) model to measure distress risk and investigate its relation 
with equity returns back to the early 1950s. They find that the underperformance of 
distressed stocks reported by Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemon (2002), and Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) is specific to the 1980s. Once they exclude this decade from 
their sample, the underperformance of high-risk stocks disappears. They do not investigate 
if the small-cap or value anomalies are related to distress risk. More recently, Avramov, 
Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2013) asses distress risk through credit downgrades and 
argue that value strategies derive their profitability from taking long positions in high credit 
risk firms that are prone to distress risk. And Kapadia (2011) reports that HML predicts 
firms’ future failure rates. 
The inconsistent conclusions that are drawn by the above mentioned studies with 
respect to the relation of the value premium and distress risk may be attributed to the 
different methods that are used to investigate the interaction between the Fama-French 
factors and distress risk and the different measures that are used to proxy for distress.48 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) express their concerns about the use of accounting models in 
estimating the default risk of equities. They argue that accounting models use backward-
looking information from financial statements, while the Merton (1974) model they use in 
their study contains forward-looking information that is better suited for calculating the 
likelihood that a firm may default. More recently, Anginer and Yıldızhan (2017) criticise the 
use of estimated probabilities of default to proxy for distress risk as done in Dichev (1998), 
Griffin and Lemon (2002), and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). They argue that 
accounting models implicitly assume that stocks with high probabilities of distress also have 
high exposures to systematic distress risk. The estimated probabilities of default, however, 
do not take into account that some portion of the distress risk may be diversified away by 
investors and therefore may not be priced. In addition, George and Hwang (2009) point out 
that a firm’s estimated probability of default does not necessarily reflect the firm’s exposure 
to the costs of financial distress, which is a better candidate for assessing the relevance of 
financial distress risk to security pricing. The authors argue that firms choose less leverage 
if their operations expose them to high financial distress costs.  
                                                          
48 In this chapter we discuss the value and small-cap premiums which are constructed in the spirit of 
Fama and French (1992), henceforth called Fama-French factors. 
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Anginer and Yıldızhan (2017) not only criticize the use of accounting models to 
predict firm defaults, but also the use of structural models. According to the authors, 
structural models make simplified assumptions about the capital structure of a firm. And just 
like the estimated probabilities of default derived from accounting models, the probabilities 
resulting from structural models not necessarily capture the systematic component of distress 
risk; the only type of risk that should be rewarded with a premium. The authors propose 
corporate credit spreads to proxy for distress risk as these reflect the market consensus view 
of the credit worthiness of the underlying firm and contain a risk-premium for systematic 
risk. And although Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) find that credit spreads cannot 
fully be explained by expected default losses, Anginer and Yıldızhan (2017) provide 
evidence that bond spreads contain default information above and beyond the measures 
commonly used in the literature. Using credit spreads, they find neither a positive, nor a 
negative significant relation between distress risk and equity returns. The authors, however, 
do not investigate the relation between the value premium and distress risk measured by 
credit spreads. It is currently unclear what relation will be found if credit spreads are used to 
proxy for financial distress. 
Moreover, there are different approaches available to investigate the interaction 
between the Fama-French factor returns and distress risk. Vassalou and Xing (2004) employ 
double-sorted portfolios. An alternative approach would be to use cross-sectional Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions at the individual stock level to estimate if there are small-cap 
and value premiums above and beyond distress risk effects. A third method that can be used 
is a conditional time series analysis in the spirit of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
With this approach it is investigated if small-cap (value) stocks are riskier than large-cap 
(growth) stocks by testing if small-cap (value) stocks underperform large-cap (growth) 
stocks in the bad states of the world.  
 To summarize, it seems that there is no consensus in the literature on which 
measure best proxies distress risk and that the findings regarding the pricing of default risk 
are sensitive to the used risk measure. In addition, the literature is also inconclusive as to 
whether the small-cap and value premiums are compensation for financial distress.  
 
4.3. Data and distress risk proxies 
 
In this section we describe the data we use in our study and the measures we employ to proxy 
for distress risk. We also test the extent to which these proxies actually predict financial 
distress. 
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4.3.1. Data 
 
Our sample covers the 1,500 largest stocks of the Citigroup US Broad Market Index (BMI) 
over the period September 1991 until December 2012. This universe roughly corresponds to 
the CRSP universe excluding the 25 percent of stocks with the smallest market capitalization 
over this time period and covers more than 95 percent of the total U.S. equity market 
capitalization. Our sample starts in 1991 because we could not obtain high-quality credit 
spread data before this date. We intentionally leave out micro-cap stocks from our sample 
to ensure that our findings are not prone to market micro-structure concerns.  
 
4.3.2. Distress risk proxies 
 
The first proxy we consider for distress risk to obtain a firm’s probability of default is based 
on accounting data and measures risk through financial leverage, i.e., the firm’s debt-to-
assets ratio. A firm’s debt-to-equity ratio is the most important component of related distress 
risk measures like Altman’s (1968) Z-score and Ohlson’s (1980) O-score used by, for 
example, Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemon (2002). We use quarterly Compustat data 
to construct the debt-to-assets ratio, where debt is defined as total debt including both short- 
and long-term debt. In case Compustat data are not available, we use annual data from 
Worldscope. 
Our second proxy for distress risk is a firm’s probability to default derived from a 
structural model. This probability is based on the distance-to-default measure, which we 
compute using a similar approach as Moody’s KMV [see, e.g., Crosbie and Bohn (2003)] 
based on Merton’s (1974) option pricing model. The input data we need to compute a firm’s 
distance-to-default are the firm’s market value of equity, its equity volatility and its book 
value of debt. Data on equity market values and equity returns to estimate volatilities are 
obtained from FactSet Prices. More specific, we define a firm’s distance-to-default (DD) as 
follows: 
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where Va is the market value of a firm’s assets, K its default point (or the book value of the 
debt for which we use total debt), σa the volatility of assets,  is the excess drift in the 
underlying asset value which we proxy with 0.06 in line with Campbell, Hilscher and 
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Szilagyi (2008), rf is the risk-free rate and we assume T to be one year. The distance-to-
default measures how many standard deviations the firm is away from default. The smaller 
the difference between the asset value Va and the default point K, the larger the probability 
on default.   
As the market value of assets and the volatility of assets are not directly observable, 
we model these using Merton’s (1974) option pricing model. In this model, the equity value 
of a firm is viewed as a European call option on the firm’s assets where the strike price of 
the call option is the book value of the firm’s debt. As a result, we obtain: 
 
(4.2) )()( 21 dNKedNVV
Tr
ae
f    
.
)5.0()ln(
12
2
1
Tdd
T
Tr
K
V
d
a
a
af
a





  
 
where Ve is the market value of equity and N is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. As this equation has two unknowns, we use an iterative process 
similar to that of KMV to obtain the market value of assets Va and the volatility of assets a. 
First, we set the initial value for the volatility of assets equal to the standard deviation of the 
past 250 daily stock returns. Next, we back out the market value of assets using Equation 
4.2 and compute monthly asset value returns. We can then obtain a new estimate for a by 
calculating the standard deviation of the past twelve asset value returns, which is used for 
the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until the difference between two subsequent 
estimates for a is less than 10E-4. With the resulting estimated a and Va, we compute the 
DD using Equation 4.1.  
Our third measure for distress risk are credit spread data which we obtained from 
Barclays Capital (formally Lehman Brothers). The data cover debt issues that are 
constituents in the Barclays Capital Investment Grade Corporate and High Yield bond 
indexes. For each firm at each point in time we take the spread of the firm’s debt issue with 
the largest amount outstanding in the Barclays indexes. Our distress proxy based on credit 
spread is defined as the difference between the option-adjusted bond yield and the 
corresponding maturity-matched treasury rate.  
For our fourth proxy of distress risk, we use credit ratings issued by S&P. We merge 
the data of the four proxies for distress risk with monthly stock returns and book-to-market 
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ratios. Quarterly book values are obtained from Compustat. In case Compustat data are not 
available, we use annual data from Worldscope. 
 
4.3.3. Predictive power of distress risk proxies 
 
In this subsection we test the extent to which our proxies actually predict financial distress. 
We consider a firm to be in financial distress if it receives a CCC credit rating or worse.49 
Under this definition, roughly 0.35 percent of the firms in our sample get into financial 
distress each year. This figure varies over time and peaks to 1.16 percent in 2001 and 1.62 
percent in 2008 during the collapse of the IT bubble and the credit crisis, respectively. The 
percentage of firms that gets into financial distress in our sample seems to be somewhat 
lower than the failure rates reported by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). This is not 
unexpected since our study includes fewer small-cap stocks that have been reported to run 
higher risks to default than large-cap stocks. 
To investigate the predictive power of our measures of distress risk, we employ so-
called Cumulative Accuracy Profiles [see, e.g., Moody’s (2000)]. To generate the Accuracy 
Profiles we monthly compute what percentage of the firms that gets into financial distress 
in the subsequent 12 months is ranked in the top x percent of stocks on their probabilities to 
default estimated using our four proxies for distress risk. Here, x ranges from 1 to 100. Figure 
4.1 shows the time-series averages of these percentages for our four proxies for distress risk. 
The Accuracy Profile of a measure that has no predictive power for financial distress follows 
a line from the origin of the graph and has a slope of one. The Accuracy Profile of a measure 
that does have predictive power for financial distress also departs from the origin, but shows 
a concave pattern indicating that firms are more likely to get into financial distress if their 
estimated probabilities of default are relatively high according to this measure.  
When we consider the Accuracy Profiles of the four measures we use in this study, 
it appears that all of them have significant predictive power for financial distress. Roughly 
50 percent of the firms that get into financial distress are ranked in the top quintile of firms 
based on financial leverage. The other measures even do a somewhat better job in predicting 
financial distress than accounting measures, since around 65 percent of the firms that get 
into financial distress are ranked in the top quintile on their credit ratings. This figure is close 
to 90 percent when firms are ranked based on their estimated probabilities of default derived 
                                                          
49 We also investigate the predictive power of our distress risk proxies where we consider a firm to be 
in financial distress if it receives a D rating. The results of these tests are virtually identical to those 
resulting from tests where we consider a firm to be in financial distress if it receives a CCC rating or 
worse. For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in tabular form. 
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from their credit spread and the structural model, indicating that these measures appear to 
have the highest predictive value.  
 
FIGURE 4.1. Cumulative Accuracy Profiles. 
This figure presents the Cumulative Accuracy Profiles of the book-to-market ratio (B/M), debt-to-
assets ratio, distance-to-default, credit spread and credit rating. We monthly compute what percentage 
of the firms that gets into financial distress in the subsequent 12 month is ranked in the top x percent 
of stocks on their probabilities to default estimated using our four proxies for distress risk, with x 
ranging from 1 to 100. The curves show the time-series averages.  
 
 
We also investigate the extent to which a firm’s book-to-market value proxies for 
distress risk. To this end, we additionally compute the Accuracy Profile for this measure. 
The results of this analysis are also presented in Figure 4.1. It appears that a firm’s book-to-
market value has predictive power for financial distress. About 60 percent of the firms that 
get into financial distress are ranked in the top quintile of firms based on book-to-market. 
This result is consistent with findings of Kapadia (2011) that HML exposure predicts firms’ 
future failure rates. However, at the same time, the convex shape of the Accuracy Profile at 
the bottom end of the book-to-market spectrum (top right in Figure 4.1) indicates that growth 
stocks with a low book-to-market ratio also have a higher probability to get into financial 
distress. Almost 20 percent of the firms that get into financial distress are ranked in the 
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bottom decile based on book-to-market. So even though high book-to-market ratios seem to 
pick up some form of distress risk, it seems unlikely that value stocks earn higher returns 
than growth stocks because value stocks are exposed to higher levels of distress risk. 
Finally, we consider the average rank correlations for stock rankings on the different 
distress risk measures. While all measures are positively correlated, the correlations are not 
very high ranging between 0.31 and 0.78. Financial leverage yields the lowest correlations 
with the other risk measures (i.e., 0.31 to 0.49). Distance-to-default, credit spread and credit 
rating show correlations ranging between 0.60 and 0.78. All in all, our results indicate that 
our risk measures capture distinct dimensions of financial distress. 
 
4.4. The value premium and distress risk 
 
In the following empirical analyses we investigate the relation between distress risk and the  
value and small-cap premiums. Given that the value premium is both economically and 
statistically more significant than the small-cap premium, we first consider the relation 
between distress risk and the value premium. 
 
4.4.1. Distress risk characteristics of value stocks 
 
We start our empirical analysis by investigating the distress risk characteristics of value 
versus growth stocks. To this end, we monthly sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on 
their book-to-market ratio and evaluate the portfolios’ equally-weighted returns over the 
subsequent month, as well as their median market capitalizations, debt-to-assets ratios, 
distances-to-default, credit spreads and credit ratings. The results of our analysis are 
presented in Table 4.1. We first consider the return differential between value and growth 
stocks that are ranked in the first and fifth quintile portfolio, respectively. Consistent with 
most studies we observe a monotonically decreasing return pattern from the top to the bottom 
quintile portfolio and document a large value premium of 5.3 percent per annum. 
We next consider the quintile portfolios’ distress risk characteristics. Irrespective 
of the risk measure, it appears that value stocks are more exposed to distress risk than the 
average stock. The median debt-to-assets ratio of a value stock is 0.31 compared to 0.24 for 
the average stock in our sample. Value stocks are 1.8 (= 6.9 minus 5.1) standard deviations 
closer to their estimated point of default than the average stocks. Also, the credit spreads of 
firms with high book-to-market ratios are 63 (= 220 minus 157) basis points higher than 
those of the average stock. And firms with high book-to-market ratios generally have less 
favourably credit ratings, with a median rating corresponding to BBB versus an average 
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rating of BBB+ in our sample. Additionally we observe that value stocks with a high book-
to-market ratio are smaller than the average stock. We again conclude that high book-to-
market ratios are related to distress risk. This finding is consistent with the results of 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2013) and Kapadia (2011) who document that 
value stocks are exposed to distress risk. 
 
TABLE 4.1. Risk characteristics of portfolios sorted on the book-to-market ratio. 
This table presents the annualized returns of quintile portfolios based on the book-to-market ratio 
(B/M) for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks from September 1991 until December 2012. Portfolios are 
formed monthly and their returns are computed by equally weighting the firms. In addition, the table 
presents the following median firm characteristics of these portfolios: book-to-market ratio (B/M), 
debt-to-assets ratio, distance-to-default, credit spread, credit rating, and market capitalization (in 
billion U.S dollars).  
 
However, the observation that value stocks have relatively higher probabilities to 
default is not a sufficient condition to attribute the value premium to distress disk. If the 
value premium indeed is a compensation for distress risk, growth stocks should have lower 
probabilities to default to justify their below-average returns. But when we consider the 
results in Table 4.1, we find that growth stocks are not substantially less exposed to distress 
risk compared to the average stock. In fact, growth stocks appear to be more risky than stocks 
ranked in the fourth quintile portfolio, as they have higher credit spreads (160 versus 138 
basis points); and less favorable credit ratings (BBB versus BBB+), while they have similar 
debt-to-assets ratios and a similar distance-to-default. These results corroborate our previous 
finding that both stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios have higher probabilities 
to get into financial distress and indicate that a risk-based explanation of the value premium 
is unlikely to be true. 
 
High B/M 2 3 4 Low B/M High-Low
Return (annualized) 14.1% 11.6% 10.1% 8.9% 8.4% 5.3%
Excess return 2.9% 0.7% -0.6% -1.8% -2.2% 5.3%
t -statistic 1.62 0.60 -0.90 -1.87 -0.98 1.35
B/M 0.84 0.57 0.41 0.28 0.13 0.71
Debt-to-assets 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.12
Distance-to-default 5.1 6.3 6.9 7.9 7.9 -2.8
Credit spread 220 171 157 138 160 60
Credit rating BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB -
Market capitalization 1353 1528 1726 2115 2160 -807
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4.4.2. The value premium and distress risk 
 
To investigate the relation between distress risk, valuation, and stock returns we construct 
triple-sorted portfolios of stocks ranked on their market capitalization, book-to-market ratios 
and each of our four measures of distress risk. More specifically, every month we sort stocks 
into terciles based on their market capitalization. Then, for each size portfolio we sort stocks 
into terciles based on their debt-to-assets ratio, distance-to-default, credit spread or rating. 
Next, we merge the small-, mid- and large-cap portfolios of high-risk stocks. We also merge 
the three market cap portfolios of low- and mid-risk stocks. Finally, for each aggregated 
tercile portfolio we sort stocks further into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratios. 
This triple sort ensures that the three resulting risk portfolios exhibit only minor differences 
in their market capitalizations and is in spirit similar to the approach used by Fama and 
French (1993) to construct the HML (High-Minus-Low) factor orthogonal to the size factor. 
We compute the equally-weighted returns over the subsequent month of the 15 portfolios. 
The results are listed in Table 4.2. 
When we consider the results in Table 4.2 we find no evidence that default risk is 
a priced factor in the cross-section of equity returns: stock returns even appear to be 
negatively related to distress risk as we observe negative returns for most of the high-minus-
low portfolios. Only the high-risk portfolio based on the debt-to-assets ratio (i.e., stocks in 
the “high risk/all” portfolio) earns higher returns than its low-risk counterpart. The 
differences between the returns of the other high- and low-risk stock portfolios range from  
-1.9 percent per annum when distressed risk is measured using our distance-to-default 
estimates to -2.5 percent using credit ratings as a measure for distress risk. Our finding that 
there is no positive relation between distress risk and stock returns is consistent with several 
other studies that look at the interaction between these variables [see, e.g., Dichev (1998), 
Griffin and Lemon (2002), Piotroski (2000) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008)]. 
To answer the question if there is a relation between the value premium and distress 
risk we investigate if the value premium is concentrated in high-risk stocks.50 This research 
question is perhaps even more interesting than our first research question, since only very 
few studies have looked at this relation. Note that although there is no strong positive relation 
between distress risk and returns on average, it could still be the case that value stocks with  
                                                          
50 We believe it is more relevant to consider the return differential between high- and low-risk value 
stocks than the return differential between value and growth stocks within different risk segments of 
the market as is done in some studies. Underlying reason is that a high value-minus-growth return 
spread within the high-risk segment of the market is not necessarily consistent with a risk-based 
interpretation to the value premium, because under a risk-based interpretation the low returns of growth 
stocks should be concentrated in the low-risk segment of the market. 
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TABLE 4.2. Value effect controlled by distress risk and size 
This table reports annualized returns of triple-sorted portfolios of stocks ranked on their market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratios and distress risk for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks from September 
1991 until December 2012. Each month, stocks are sorted into terciles based on their market 
capitalization. Then, for each size portfolio, stocks are sorted into terciles based on their distress risk 
as measured by debt-to-assets ratio, distance-to-default, credit spread or credit rating. Next, the small-, 
mid- and large-cap portfolios with similar risk are merged. Finally, for each tercile portfolio stocks are 
further sorted into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratio (B/M). Portfolio returns are computed 
by weighting equally the firms.  
 
a high distress risk earn the highest returns. Interestingly, when we consider the results in 
Table 4.2, we do not observe a consistent pattern that the high returns of value stocks are 
concentrated in the high-default-risk segment. For three of our measures we observe that 
high-risk value stocks earn a higher return than low-risk value stocks. Only when debt-to-
High B/M 2 3 4 Low B/M All
Panel A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 11.4% 9.9% 8.9% 6.1% 7.1% 9.0%
Mid 15.0% 11.2% 10.8% 9.1% 9.2% 11.2%
High risk 11.6% 10.7% 10.6% 8.8% 10.1% 10.6%
High-Low 0.2% 0.7% 1.6% 2.6% 2.9% 1.5%
t (High-Low) 0.05 0.21 0.47 0.81 0.79 0.49
Panel B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 13.6% 11.8% 11.3% 10.4% 10.0% 11.6%
Mid 15.5% 11.7% 11.5% 9.1% 10.6% 11.8%
High risk 11.5% 10.5% 9.2% 7.7% 6.7% 9.4%
High-Low -1.8% -1.2% -1.9% -2.5% -3.0% -1.9%
t (High-Low) -0.49 -0.48 -0.79 -1.03 -0.97 -0.80
Panel C. Credit spread
Low risk 15.5% 12.2% 10.4% 12.1% 10.2% 12.2%
Mid 12.9% 14.8% 12.5% 9.7% 9.2% 12.0%
High risk 11.2% 9.3% 9.2% 8.0% 7.9% 9.6%
High-Low -3.7% -2.6% -1.0% -3.6% -2.1% -2.3%
t (High-Low) -0.89 -0.97 -0.44 -1.50 -0.61 -0.98
Panel D. Credit rating
Low risk 14.6% 14.3% 11.0% 12.0% 9.6% 12.5%
Mid 15.5% 14.7% 12.2% 10.8% 9.0% 12.6%
High risk 12.4% 8.8% 8.5% 7.9% 9.1% 9.6%
High-Low -1.9% -4.8% -2.3% -3.7% -0.5% -2.5%
t (High-Low) -0.60 -1.82 -0.89 -1.36 -0.14 -1.04
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assets is used as measure for distress risk, it appears that high-risk value stocks earn slightly 
higher returns of 0.2 per cent per annum than low-risk value stocks. Furthermore, low-risk 
growth stocks do not earn the lowest return. In fact, for three out of our four risk measures 
we find up to -3.0 percent lower returns for the high-risk growth stocks compared to low-
risk growth stocks. So there seems only little evidence that the value premium is the highest 
for high-risk stocks, as these results are weak and only observable when the debt-to-assets 
ratio is used to proxy for distress risk. All in all, we conclude that no evidence is found that 
the value premium can be attributed to distress risk related to default.51 
 
4.4.3. The value premium and distress risk during bad states of the world 
 
So far, we constructed triple-sorted portfolios to investigate the interaction of book-to-price 
ratios and distress risk characteristics with stock returns. When we consider the literature on 
the economic origin of the value anomaly we see that several other frameworks have been 
employed. In the following sub-sections we investigate if the different conclusions drawn 
regarding the relation between the value premium and distress risk can be attributed to the 
use of different methodologies. 
 We start our analyses with a methodological setup in the spirit of Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994). This setup relies on the premise that value stocks must 
underperform growth stocks in the bad states of the world when the marginal utility of wealth 
is high if value stocks are indeed fundamentally riskier than growth stocks. As a measure for 
good and bad states of the world we take the NBER’s Business Cycle indicators for 
economic expansions and recessions, respectively.52 This measure indicates two recessions 
during our sample period: the first one from March to November 2001 and the second one 
from December 2007 to June 2009. We evaluate the relation between distress risk and equity 
returns for size-neutral risk portfolios that are constructed using the procedure outlined in 
                                                          
51 We also perform a follow-up empirical analysis in which we compute value-weighted (i.e., market 
capitalization-weighted) portfolio returns. For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results in 
tabular form. The main difference with the equally-weighted results is that returns on average are 
somewhat lower. However, the return patterns across the portfolios remain nearly unchanged. 
52  In unreported robustness tests we use the Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti (2009, ADS) Business 
Conditions Index as an alternative measure to distinguish between good and bad states of the world. 
(www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index/). When the 
index has a value lower than the threshold of -0.8 we indicate the economy to be in a recession, 
consistent with Berge and Jordà (2010). According to this index there were three recessions during our 
sample period: from January to November 2001, August 2005, and from January 2008 to June 2009. 
The results of this test are qualitatively very similar to the results using the NBER’s Business Cycle 
indicators. 
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the previous section. For all portfolios we compute their returns during expansions and 
recessions. The results are listed in Table 4.3. 
 
TABLE 4.3. Value effect during different states of the business cycle 
This table reports return characteristics of stocks during economic expansions (Panel 1) and recessions 
(Panel 2) based on the NBER’s Business Cycle indicator. The size-neutral risk portfolios are 
constructed using the procedure outlined in Table 4.2. Portfolio returns are computed by weighting 
equally the firms.  
 
High B/M 2 3 4 Low B/M All
Panel 1. Expansions
Panel 1A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 15.1% 12.7% 11.8% 9.9% 11.9% 12.6%
Mid 18.8% 14.7% 14.6% 13.1% 12.6% 14.9%
High risk 15.0% 14.3% 14.2% 13.0% 13.8% 14.3%
High-Low -0.1% 1.5% 2.1% 2.9% 1.7% 1.5%
t (High-Low) -0.03 0.41 0.61 0.82 0.43 0.47
Panel 1B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 16.5% 14.7% 14.6% 13.9% 13.8% 14.9%
Mid 18.0% 14.9% 14.9% 13.0% 13.3% 15.0%
High risk 15.6% 15.0% 14.2% 12.3% 12.3% 14.2%
High-Low -0.7% 0.3% -0.4% -1.4% -1.3% -0.6%
t (High-Low) -0.22 0.16 -0.17 -0.61 -0.43 -0.28
Panel 1C. Credit spread
Low risk 18.3% 15.8% 14.0% 16.1% 13.3% 15.6%
Mid 18.1% 17.9% 17.1% 13.2% 13.4% 16.1%
High risk 15.3% 13.8% 14.7% 14.0% 13.9% 14.7%
High-Low -2.5% -1.7% 0.5% -1.8% 0.6% -0.8%
t (High-Low) -0.72 -0.68 0.25 -0.77 0.16 -0.36
Panel 1D. Credit rating
Low risk 18.9% 17.6% 14.2% 16.2% 12.6% 16.0%
Mid 19.6% 18.1% 16.4% 14.7% 12.8% 18.9%
High risk 16.7% 13.8% 13.4% 13.0% 14.6% 14.6%
High-Low -1.9% -3.2% -0.7% -2.8% 1.8% -1.2%
t (High-Low) -0.68 -1.33 -0.30 -1.00 0.51 -0.54
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TABLE 4.3 (Continued). Value effect during different states of the business cycle 
 
When we consider the portfolio returns during expansions and recessions in Panels 
1 and 2 of Table 4.3, respectively, it appears that stock returns are highly positive on average 
during expansions and negative during contractions. This result clearly indicates that the 
NBER’s Business Cycle indicators differentiate between good and bad states of the 
economy. When consider the return differential between value and growth stocks during 
expansions and recessions, it appears that value stocks outperform growth stocks during 
High B/M 2 3 4 Low B/M All
Panel 2. Recessions
Panel 2A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk -14.9% -10.3% -12.3% -20.2% -24.9% -16.4%
Mid -11.1% -13.1% -15.8% -18.6% -15.0% -14.5%
High risk -13.0% -14.7% -14.9% -19.7% -15.3% -15.1%
High-Low 2.2% -4.9% -2.9% 0.6% 12.8% 1.6%
t (High-Low) 0.13 -0.35 -0.25 0.07 1.42 0.15
Panel 2B. Distance-to-default
Low risk -7.2% -9.0% -12.1% -13.8% -16.6% -11.7%
Mid -2.7% -10.9% -12.7% -17.9% -9.1% -10.7%
High risk -16.7% -20.4% -23.8% -23.3% -29.8% -22.5%
High-Low -10.2% -12.5% -13.3% -10.9% -15.8% -12.2%
t (High-Low) -0.46 -0.88 -0.97 -0.92 -1.10 -0.86
Panel 2C. Credit spread
Low risk -5.2% -13.0% -15.3% -15.9% -11.6% -12.1%
Mid -21.7% -7.1% -18.9% -15.1% -19.0% -16.1%
High risk -17.1% -21.4% -26.3% -30.3% -30.4% -24.2%
High-Low -12.6% -9.6% -13.0% -17.1% -21.2% -13.8%
t (High-Low) -0.51 -0.69 -1.03 -1.66 -1.98 -1.15
Panel 2D. Credit rating
Low risk -15.3% -8.9% -11.6% -17.0% -11.6% -12.4%
Mid -13.2% -9.3% -16.4% -16.2% -17.2% -14.1%
High risk -16.6% -24.2% -24.2% -26.0% -26.8% -23.3%
High-Low -1.6% -16.8% -14.3% -10.9% -17.2% -12.5%
t (High-Low) -0.09 -1.20 -1.16 -1.05 -1.30 -1.04
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expansions, irrespective of which distress risk measure is used to construct the portfolios. 
The average return in expansions of value stocks with median distress risk compared to 
growth stocks with median distress risk ranges from 4.7 percent per annum in case distance-
to-default (= 18.0 – 13.3 percent) and credit spread (= 18.1 – 13.4 percent) are used to 
construct the portfolios to 6.8 (19.6 – 12.8) percent in case debt-to-assets is used. Value 
stocks, however, also show a better performance than growth stocks during recessions. In 
fact, in three out of four cases (for sorts using debt-to assets, distance-to-default and credits 
ratings in Panels 2A, 2B and 2D, respectively) there is a large positive value premium during 
recessions. These results are in line with the findings of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) and very difficult to reconcile with the risk-based explanation for the value premium 
that predicts the opposite. 
At the same time, we do not observe a particular return pattern for stocks with 
different distress risk characteristics during expansions. High-risk stocks with a relatively 
high debt-to-assets ratio earn somewhat higher returns than stocks with a low debt-to-assets 
ratio, but for our other risk measures we do not observe such a pattern. Interestingly, we 
observe a clear return pattern for stocks with different levels of distress risk during economic 
recessions in Panel 2 of Table 4.3. When distance-to-default, credit spreads and ratings are 
used as risk measures, we see that the return differentials between high- and low-risk stocks 
are over 10 percent per annum. These results indicate that our risk measures capture some 
form of distress risk. 
 
4.4.4. The value premium analyzed using Fama-MacBeth regressions 
 
To investigate if the magnitude of the estimated value premium is affected by including 
stock exposures to distress risk in the regressions we use cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth 
regressions [see Fama and MacBeth (1973)] for individual stock returns. The primary 
attractive feature of Fama-MacBeth regressions compared to the rank portfolio approaches 
we employed in our previous analyses is that Fama-MacBeth regressions enable us to control 
for multiple other effects that might affect the relation between stock returns, valuation and 
distress risk. For example, in our earlier analyses we only control for size when investigating 
the relation between value and distress risk. This requires us to construct triple-sorted 
portfolios. It would not be feasible to correct for an additional factor and construct 
quadruple-sorted portfolios because the number of stocks ending up in the resulting 
portfolios would become too small. With the Fama-MacBeth regressions on the other hand, 
we can easily include multiple factors when estimating the value premium. 
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In our first analysis we monthly regress stock returns on book-to-price ratios while 
controlling for market beta, intermediate-term return momentum, short-term return reversal 
and industries: 
 
(4.3) tiittittittittittittti ZREVbMOMbBETAbMCAPbBMbar ,,,,,,, 54321    
where ri,t is the return of stock i in month t, BMi,t is the normalized book-to-market ratio of 
stock i in month t, MCAPi,t is the normalized logarithm of the market capitalization of stock 
i in month t, BETAi,t is the normalized market beta of stock i in month t estimated using a 
three-year rolling window using weekly returns and the BMI index as proxy for the market 
return, MOMi,t is the normalized 11-month one-month lagged past return of stock i in month 
t, REVi,t is the normalized return of stock i over the past month in month t, and Zi is a vector 
containing industry dummies for stock i based on the MSCI/S&P GICS level 1 classification 
of ten industries.53 Our main reason to control for the short-term reversal effect is the recent 
finding of Da and Gao (2010) that the distress risk premium documented by Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) can largely be attributed to a short-term liquidity-induced price reversal caused 
by mutual funds decreasing their holdings of shares after firms experiencing sharp rises in 
their default likelihood measures. By controlling for short-term reversals, we can assure that 
we capture effects distinct from those documented by Da and Gao (2010). 
We augment our base case regression in Equation 4.3 with the normalized 
probabilities of our four alternative proxies for distress risk and rerun the regressions. Table 
4.4 presents the average coefficient estimates of the different regression models together 
with their t-values computed using Fama-MacBeth standard errors. In addition, the table 
shows the average adjusted R-squared values of the regressions. 
When we consider the resulting coefficient estimates of our base case regression in column 
(1), we observe a substantial value premium: the coefficient estimate of 0.06 percent for BM 
indicates that stocks earn an additional return of 0.06 percent per month for a one-standard 
deviation increase in their book-to-price ratio. The large negative coefficient estimate for 
REV indicates a negative autocorrelation in stock returns. We find only weak evidence 
supporting an intermediate-term momentum effect in stock returns using the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. Columns (2) to (5) of Table 4.4 show the coefficient estimates when we augment 
our base case regression model with our normalized measures of distress risk. If the value 
premium can be attributed to distress risk, we should observe that augmenting the cross- 
                                                          
53 We normalize the explanatory variables in the Fama-MacBeth regressions by subtracting the cross-
sectional median from each observation and by dividing this difference by the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the observations in each month. In addition, we winsorize the resulting normalized 
variables by imposing a maximum of 3 and a minimum of -3. 
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TABLE 4.4. Fama-MacBeth regression results for the relation value effect and distress risk 
characteristics 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth regression results of stock returns regressed on book-to-market ratios 
while controlling for market capitalization, market beta, intermediate-term return momentum, short-
term return reversal and industries for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks from September 1991 until 
December 2012. Each month the following regression is performed:   
(4.3) tiittittittittittittti ZREVbMOMbBETAbMCAPbBMbar ,,,,,,, 54321     
where ri,t is the return of stock i in month t, BMi,t is the normalized book-to-market ratio of stock i in 
month t, MCAPi,t is the normalized logarithm of market capitalization of stock i in month t, BETAi,t is 
the normalized market beta of stock i in month t estimated using a three-year rolling window using 
weekly returns and the BMI index as proxy for the market return, MOMi,t is the normalized 11-month 
one-month lagged past return of stock i in month t, REVi,t is the normalized return of stock i over the 
past month in month t, and Zi is a vector containing industry dummies for stock i based on the 
MSCI/S&P GICS level 1 classification of ten industries. The base case regression in Equation 4.3 is 
augmented with our four alternative proxies for distress risk. The table presents the average coefficient 
estimates of the different regression models together with their t-values computed using Fama-
MacBeth standard errors. In addition, the table shows the average adjusted R-squared values of the 
regressions.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.02% 1.02% 1.02% 1.02% 1.02%
3.40 3.40 3.40 3.40 3.39
BM 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
1.57 1.49 1.73 1.57 1.62
MCAP -0.05% -0.06% -0.07% -0.09% -0.10%
-1.14 -1.53 -1.75 -2.33 -2.38
BETA -0.06% -0.07% -0.05% -0.04% -0.04%
-0.73 -0.82 -0.69 -0.59 -0.52
MOM 0.09% 0.09% 0.08% 0.09% 0.10%
1.21 1.22 1.17 1.19 1.34
REV -0.12% -0.12% -0.13% -0.13% -0.12%
-2.42 -2.37 -2.69 -2.55 -2.48
Z yes yes yes yes yes
Debt-to-assets -0.05%
-1.41
Distance-to-default -0.04%
-0.97
Credit spread -0.08%
-1.65
Credit rating -0.09%
-2.06
Adj. R2 8.20% 8.63% 8.60% 8.61% 8.63%
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sectional regressions of stock returns on book-to-price ratios with our measures of distress 
risk should lead to a significant decrease of the estimated value premium. At the same time 
the measures for distress risk should encompass the explanatory power of stocks’ book-to-
price ratios and their coefficient estimates should become positive and significant. However, 
in all cases we observe that the coefficient estimate for BM remains nearly unchanged. 
Moreover, none of the coefficient estimates for our distress risk measures turns out 
significantly positive. Consistent with Anginer and Yıldızhan (2017) we find an insignificant 
negative relation between stock returns and credit spread. In fact, for all our measures of 
distress risk we observe a negative coefficient estimate for distress risk. These results are 
consistent with our earlier findings that there is no distress risk premium and that the value 
anomaly cannot be attributed to distress risk. 
Overall, the results of our Fama-MacBeth regression analysis are consistent with our 
results based on rank portfolios and conditional time series analyses. It appears that the 
results we documented in the previous sections are not affected by market beta, momentum, 
reversal and industry effects and that our finding that the value premium is unrelated to 
distress risk is robust to the method that is used to investigate the relation between the two 
variables.  
 
4.5. The size premium and distress risk 
 
Just like for the value premium, it seems that the literature is not conclusive about the 
explanations for the existence of the size anomaly. On the one hand, a strand of literature 
attributes the size effect to a common risk factor. Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985), Chan and 
Chen (1991), Petkova (2006), and Hwang, Min, McDonald, Kim, and Kim (2010) examine 
the correlation between the return differential between small- and large-cap stocks and 
several risk factors over time. Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) find evidence that the default 
spread and other factors that are related to changes in the economic environment are 
positively related to the small-cap premium. Chan and Chen (1991) find that small-cap 
portfolios contain a disproportional large amount of marginal firms with low production 
efficiency and high financial leverage. Petkova (2006), and Hwang, Min, McDonald, Kim, 
and Kim (2010) find that the SMB (Small-Minus-Big) factor of Fama and French (1993) is 
positively correlated with innovations in variables that describe investment opportunities, 
such as the default spread. And Vassalou and Xing (2004) employ a cross-sectional approach 
to investigate the relation between size and distress risk and show that the small-cap 
premium is fully concentrated in high-risk stocks. On the other hand, there are also several 
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papers that argue that the size effect is unrelated to risk [see, e.g., Daniel and Titman (1997), 
Knez and Ready (1997), Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin (1999), Berk (2000)]. 
 In this section we employ the framework used earlier to investigate the relation 
between distress risk and the value premium, to test if there is empirical evidence supporting 
a distress risk-based explanation of the small-cap effect. 
  
4.5.1. The small-cap premium and distress risk 
 
We start our analysis by investigating the size effect in our sample of the largest 1,500 U.S. 
stocks by monthly ranking the stocks on their market capitalization, sorting them into 
quintile portfolios and computing the equally-weighted returns over the subsequent month. 
Our results show that the 20 percent smallest stocks outperform the 20 percent largest stocks 
with an insignificant 1.7 percent per annum over the period September 1991 to December 
2012. Consistent with evidence in the academic literature, the size premium is of significant 
smaller magnitude than the value premium we found in our sample of 5.3 percent per annum. 
In fact, several studies even suggest that the size effect disappeared after the early 1980s 
[e.g. Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2000), Horowitz, 
Loughran and Savin (2000), and Hirshleifer (2001)].  
To investigate if the higher returns of small-cap stocks are indeed concentrated in 
stocks with high distress risk, we construct portfolios of stocks ranked on their market 
capitalization and each of our four measures of distress risk. Since high-risk stocks typically 
have a smaller market capitalization than low-risk stocks, we form triple-sorted portfolios 
of stocks to ensure that the market capitalizations of the high- and low-risk portfolios are in 
the same order of magnitude and that any return differences between portfolios in the same 
size segment cannot be attributed to differences in market capitalization. More specifically, 
every month we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on their market capitalization. 
Then, within each size portfolio we further sort stocks into terciles based on their market 
capitalization. Then, for each size sub-portfolio we sort stocks into terciles based on their 
debt-to-assets ratio, distance-to-default, credit spread and credit rating. Finally, we merge 
the small-, mid- and large-cap sub-portfolios of high-risk stocks within each size quintile 
portfolio. We also merge the three market cap sub-portfolios of mid- and low-risk stocks 
within each size sub-portfolio. We compute the equally-weighted returns over the 
subsequent month for the resulting 15 portfolios, as well as the portfolios’ median distress 
risk characteristics. The results are listed in Table 4.5.  
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TABLE 4.5. Size effect controlled by distress risk 
This table reports annualized returns of triple-sorted portfolios of stocks ranked on their market 
capitalization and each of our four measures of distress risk for the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks from 
September 1991 until December 2012. Each month, stocks are sorted into quintiles based on their 
market capitalization. Then, for each size portfolio, stocks are further sorted into terciles based on their 
market capitalization. Then, for each size sub-portfolio stocks are sorted into terciles based on their 
debt-to-assets ratio, distance-to-default, credit spread or credit rating. Finally, the small-, mid- and 
large-cap portfolios with similar risk are merged. Portfolio returns are computed by weighting equally 
the firms.  
 
When we consider the portfolio’s returns in Table 4.5 we indeed observe a size 
effect in the sense that the small-cap portfolios earn higher returns than the large-cap 
portfolios. If small-cap stocks earn higher returns because they have more distress risk, we 
should observe a positive relation between default risk and returns of small-cap stocks. 
Small 2 3 4 Large All
Panel A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 8.8% 6.1% 8.8% 11.6% 9.3% 9.0%
Mid 11.4% 11.8% 11.7% 11.4% 9.3% 11.2%
High risk 10.9% 12.6% 10.0% 9.3% 8.8% 10.6%
High-Low 1.9% 6.1% 1.1% -2.0% -0.5% 1.5%
t (High-Low) 0.53 1.72 0.36 -0.70 -0.16 0.49
Panel B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 13.8% 10.2% 11.4% 11.4% 10.1% 11.6%
Mid 13.1% 12.7% 12.4% 12.6% 9.5% 11.8%
High risk 9.0% 12.0% 8.1% 9.0% 7.2% 9.4%
High-Low -4.2% 1.6% -3.0% -2.2% -2.6% -2.0%
t (High-Low) -1.46 0.59 -1.07 -0.83 -1.16 -0.82
Panel C. Credit spread
Low risk 14.3% 13.9% 14.1% 11.9% 8.7% 12.1%
Mid 14.2% 13.7% 11.0% 12.1% 8.9% 12.1%
High risk 7.4% 8.5% 8.5% 11.1% 7.8% 9.6%
High-Low -6.0% -4.7% -4.9% -0.7% -0.8% -2.3%
t (High-Low) -1.61 -1.65 -1.90 -0.28 -0.37 -0.96
Panel D. Credit rating
Low risk 15.5% 12.5% 12.8% 12.2% 10.0% 12.5%
Mid 13.4% 14.9% 11.1% 12.7% 10.5% 12.5%
High risk 11.6% 6.9% 10.6% 7.8% 8.2% 9.7%
High-Low -3.3% -5.0% -2.0% -4.0% -1.7% -2.5%
t (High-Low) -0.93 -1.69 -0.68 -1.58 -0.70 -1.02
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However, for three out of our four distress risk measures, we do not observe that the high 
returns of small-cap stocks are concentrated in the high-default-risk segment. In fact, when 
distance-to-default, credit spread and credit rating are used as measures for distress risk, it 
appears that high-risk small-cap stocks earn up to 6.0 percent lower returns than low-risk 
small-cap stocks. Additionally, if the small-cap premium is a compensation for distress risk, 
large-cap stocks earn lower returns because they have less distress risk and we should also 
observe a positive relation between default risk and returns of large-cap stocks. Conversely, 
we find that for all four distress risk measures the low returns of large-cap stocks are 
concentrated in the high-default-risk segment. Therefore, it seems unlikely that distress-risk 
drives the small-cap premium.  
 
4.5.2. The small-cap premium and distress risk during bad states of the world 
 
We also evaluate the performance differential between small- and large-cap stocks over 
different states of the business cycle. If small-cap stocks run more distress risk than large-
cap stocks, they must underperform large-cap stocks in the bad states of the world. As with 
our business cycle analysis in the previous section, we take the NBER’s Business Cycle 
indicators for economic expansions and recessions and evaluate the relation between distress 
risk and equity returns for our triple-sorted portfolios on market capitalization and distress 
risk. For all portfolios we compute their returns during expansions and recessions.  
For the sake of brevity these results are not presented in tabular form. When we 
consider the portfolio returns during expansions and recessions it appears that stock returns 
are highly positive on average during expansions and negative during recessions. Using 
distance-to-default, credit spread and credit ratings as measures for distress risk, we observe 
that high-risk stocks earn lower returns than low-risk stocks during recessions with return 
differentials between high- and low-risk stocks of more than 10 percent per annum. At the 
same time, however, it appears that small-cap stocks do not only outperform large-cap stocks 
during expansions, but also during recessions. In fact, for three out of the four different risk 
measures we find a large positive size effect during recessions. These results corroborate our 
earlier result that it seems unlikely that the size effect can be attributed to distress risk.  
 
4.5.3. The small-cap premium analyzed using Fama-MacBeth regressions 
 
Finally, we turn back to our regression results in the previous section to analyze the relation 
between the size effect and distress risk using cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions. If 
a portion of the size effect is related to distress risk, we should observe that the coefficient 
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estimate for MCAP of Table 4.4 should become less significant once the regression model 
is augmented with our distress risk variables. However, in all four cases it appears that the 
coefficient estimate for MCAP becomes more negative once our distress risk variables are 
added to the model. In fact, we find an insignificant size premium which becomes significant 
once distress risk is included in the regression. These results indicate that small-cap stocks 
with high distress risk earn lower returns than small-cap stocks with a more healthy financial 
status and are again inconsistent with the notion that small-cap stocks earns higher returns 
because of increased distress risk. 
It is also noteworthy to mention here that our results might help to understand why 
several studies do not find a significant size premium after the early 1980s: apparently, over 
the past decades the size effect has been concentrated in low-distress risk stocks, and if this 
interaction is not taken into account in the analyses, the high-risk discount may effectively 
offset the small-cap premium. We contribute to this stream of literature by showing that the 
small-cap premium is present after the early 1980s once distress risk is taken into account in 
the analyses. 
 
4.6. The Fama-French (1993) SMB and HML factors and distress risk 
 
The typical approach in the stream of literature on empirical asset pricing to correct for the 
size and value effects is using the Fama-French (1993) three factor model that augments the 
one-factor market model with the SMB (Small-Minus-Big) and HML (High-Minus-Low) 
factors. Perhaps the most important reason why many researchers adopted the use of the 
SMB and HML factors is because of the factors’ large empirical explanatory power for 
differences in the cross-section of stock returns. Because of the way the SMB and HML 
factors are constructed, we may expect the factors to be prone to distress risk (we refer to 
the webpage of Kenneth French for a detailed documentation on the construction of the SMB 
and HML factors and to the recent work of Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2011) for an 
in-depth analysis of the impact of small-cap stocks on the returns of the SMB and HML 
factors).  
In this section we investigate if the large empirical explanatory power of the Fama-
French (1993) factors can be attributed to these factors being exposed to distress risk. More 
specifically, we investigate if the empirical explanatory power of the SMB and HML factors 
is negatively affected when distress-risk neutrality is imposed when the factors are 
constructed.  
To conduct our analysis we use the decile portfolios sorted on dividend yield and 
the 5x5 double-sorted portfolios on market capitalization and book-to-price from the 
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webpage of Kenneth French as test assets. Pricing errors are estimated using the three-factor 
Fama-French model 
 
(4.4) titttti hHMLsSMBbRMRFar ,,  . 
In these equations, tir ,  is the return of portfolio i at time t in excess of the risk-free rate. 
RMRFt, SMBt, and HMLt are the returns on Fama and French (1993) factors for market, size, 
and value, respectively, at time t. Return data for the risk-free rate and the market factor are 
from the webpage of Kenneth French. We construct the SMB and HML factors using our 
sample covering the 1,500 largest stocks of the Citigroup US Broad Market Index (BMI) 
over the period September 1991 until December 2012 and the methodology as outlined on 
the webpage of Kenneth French. More specifically, following Fama and French (1993) we 
first construct six value-weighted portfolios on market capitalization and book-to-price. 
These portfolios, which are constructed at the end of each month, are the intersections of 
two portfolios formed on market capitalization, and three portfolios formed on book-to-
price. The size breakpoint for month t is the median market capitalization at the end of month 
t. The book-to-price for month t is the book equity for the most recent fiscal quarter divided 
by market capitalization at the end of month t. The book-to-price breakpoints are the 33th 
and 66th percentiles for month t. SMB is the average value-weighted return on the three 
small portfolios minus the average value-weighted return on the three big portfolios,   
 
(4.5) 
Growth) Big  Neutral Big  Value (Big 1/3 -
 Growth) Small  Neutral Small  Value (Small 1/3  SMB


 
 
and HML is the average value-weighted return on the two value portfolios minus the average 
value-weighted return on the two growth portfolios,   
 
(4.6) Growth) Big Growth  (Small 1/2 - Value) Big  Value (Small 1/2  HML  . 
Additionally, we construct return series for SMB and HML imposing distress-risk 
neutrality. To impose distress-risk neutrality we perform a triple sort where we first sort 
stocks into distress risk terciles and next perform the double sort on market capitalization 
and book-to-price as outlined above. The six base portfolios that are used to construct the 
SMB and HML factors are now the average value-weighted return series for the distress risk 
terciles. For example, Small Value is now the average of the return series for the Low 
Risk/Small Value, Mid Risk/Small Value, and High Risk/Small Value portfolios. And Big  
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Growth, for example, is the average of the return series for the Low Risk/Big Growth, Mid 
Risk/Big Growth, and High Risk/Big Growth portfolios. The distress risk breakpoints are 
the 33th and 66th percentiles for month t. We construct distress-risk neutral SMB and HML 
factors using our four measures for distress risk. 
Before testing the empirical explanatory power of the SMB and HML factors with 
and without distress-risk neutrality imposed, we first consider the summary statistics and 
investigate the distress risk exposures of the SMB and HML factors, the differential 
premiums after neutralization, the factors’ risks, and their correlations. Panel A of Table 4.6 
shows the summary risk and return statistics of the market factor and the SMB and HML 
factors with and without distress-risk neutrality imposed. When we consider the last four 
rows in Panel A, we observe that the SMB factor is exposed to distress risk as the negative 
distance-to-default and the credit spread of 159 basis points indicate that small caps are more 
exposed to distress risk than large caps. Also the BB+ rating for small caps is worse than the 
BBB+ rating for large caps. Only based on debt-to-assets small caps do not seem to be more 
risky than large caps. These findings are consistent with our earlier results. When we 
consider the exposures of the HML factor, we observe that the factor is only marginally 
exposed to distress risk as the credit spreads and credit ratings are almost equal for stocks 
with a high and low book-to-market ratio. Only based on debt-to-assets ratios and the 
distance-to-default measure we observe that value stocks are more risky than growth stocks. 
These results already indicate that it is unlikely that the HML factor picks up distress risk 
and the factor's explanatory power is driven by distress risk exposure. Furthermore, we 
observe that the distress-risk neutral SMB and HML factors are, by construction, generally 
less exposed to distress risk than the standard SMB and HML factors. The distress-risk 
neutral SMB factors have distances-to-default and credit spreads closer to zero and a smaller 
difference in credit rating between small and large caps. And also the distress-risk neutral 
HML factor has distances-to-default closer to zero.  
Interestingly, we observe that the premiums of the SMB and HML factor are still 
present when distress-risk neutrality is imposed. The risk premiums of the SMB and HML 
distress-risk neutral factors range from 1.61 to 3.52 percent and from 1.16 to 2.71 percent 
per annum, respectively, compared to a 2.17 percent SMB premium and a 2.29 percent HML 
premium without neutrality being imposed. When we consider the risks of the factors, we 
Are the Fama-French factors really compensation for distress risk? 109 
 
find in almost all cases that the distress-risk neutral factors exhibit substantially lower levels 
of risk as measured by lower return standard deviations and lower extreme negative returns 
(i.e., 5th and 25th percentile returns). The same return levels together with the lower risk 
levels result in higher Sharpe ratios for most of our distress-risk neutral factors. These results 
indicate that distress risk is not driving the premiums of the SMB and HML factors. We 
additionally estimate correlations between the return series which are presented in Panel B 
of Table 4.6. Correlations between the Fama and French SMB factor and the distress-risk 
neutral SMB factors range between 0.46 and 0.97. For the Fama and French HML factor the 
correlations range between 0.85 and 0.93. Although the correlations are high as expected, 
the results indicate that the regressions in Equation 4.4 might result in different outcomes. 
This raises the question which factors are better able to explain the variability in returns of 
our test assets. 
To assess the empirical explanatory power of the alternative SMB and HML factors 
we estimate pricing errors for the CAPM and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model 
using the SMB and HML factors with and without distress-risk neutrality. We consider 
average and median pricing errors and adjusted R-squared values of the regressions to 
measure the descriptive power of the factors. In addition, we compute the Gibbons-Ross-
Shanken (1989) statistic as: 
 
(4.7)    KNTNF
N






 
 ,~ˆˆ'ˆˆˆ'ˆ1
K-N-T
GRS 1
11   
where T is the number of observations in the time series, N is the number of test asset 
portfolios (thus 10 in case of the decile portfolios sorted on dividend yield and 25 in case of 
the 5x5 double-sorted portfolios on market capitalization and book-to-price), K is the 
number of factors that we use in the factor model (thus K = 1 for the CAPM and K = 3 for 
the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model), ˆ  is a N by 1 vector of estimated alphas, ˆ  
is an N by N matrix that holds the unbiased estimate of the residual variance-covariance 
matrix, ˆ is a K by 1 vector of sample means of the test asset portfolios' excess returns, and 
ˆ  is a K by K matrix that holds the unbiased estimate of the test asset portfolios’ covariance 
matrix. Assuming that the residuals are independently and normally distributed, and 
uncorrelated with the returns on the model’s factors, the GRS statistic follows a F-
distribution with N degrees of freedom in the numerator and T-N-K degrees in the 
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denominator under the null of zero alphas. Apart from the GRS statistic, we also compute 
the following test statistic to find out if all alphas are jointly equal to zero: 
 
(4.8)   2111 ~ˆˆ'ˆˆˆ'ˆ1 NT  
   
This test statistic does not require normality of the error terms. Assuming homoscedasticity 
this test statistic obeys an asymptotic 2 -distribution with N degrees of freedom under the 
null of zero alphas. The results for the decile portfolios sorted on dividend yield are presented 
in Table 4.7. For each of the 10 portfolios, the table presents annualized returns, annualized 
constants (a) and associated t-values, and the adjusted R-squared values of the different 
regression models. In addition, the table shows the average and median pricing errors of the 
models for the 10 portfolios based on the absolute values of the constants and t-values and 
their GRS and 2  test statistics. 
If distress risk is effective in explaining cross-sectional return differences, then 
neutralizing this risk in the SMB and HML factors should lead to an increase in pricing 
errors. However, we observe that in most cases the average and median pricing errors 
become smaller when distress risk neutrality is imposed indicating that distress risk-
exposure is not the driving force behind the large empirical explanatory power of the SMB 
and HML factors. In fact, irrespective of which distress-risk neutral factors are used in the 
three-factor model, in all cases we observe an improvement in both the GRS and chi-squared 
test statistics when it comes to explaining the test asset portfolios’ returns. These findings 
have significant implications for the stream of literature that attributes a large portion of the 
explanatory power of the Fama-French factors to distress risk. 
The results for the 5x5 double-sorted portfolios on market capitalization and book-
to-price are presented in Table 4.8. For the sake of brevity Table 4.8 only shows the average 
and median pricing errors of the models for the 25 portfolios based on the absolute values 
of the constants and t-values and their GRS and χ2 test statistics. When we consider the 
empirical explanatory power of the three-factor Fama-French model, we observe an average 
adjusted R-squared value of 86 percent and average and median pricing errors of 1.85 and 
1.22 percent, respectively. The GRS and chi-squared test statistics indicate that the null 
hypothesis of zero alphas is clearly rejected. 
If the large empirical explanatory power of the Fama-French (1993) factors can be 
attributed to the factors being exposed to distress risk we should observe an increase in 
pricing error when the returns of the test assets are evaluated using the SMB and HML 
factors that are constructed imposing distress-risk neutrality. However, we do not observe 
deterioration in explaining the variation in returns of the 25 portfolios. In fact, in three out  
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of four cases the average pricing errors decrease when imposing distress risk neutrality. And 
in all four cases the median absolute pricing error decreases. More specifically, the average 
(median) pricing error of the Fama-French model is 1.85 (1.22) percent and ranges between 
1.51 (0.73) percent and 2.27 (1.61) percent for the risk-neutral models. In addition, we do 
not observe that the GRS and chi-squared test statistics become substantially higher. In fact, 
for the SMB and HML factors that are neutral on credit spread and rating we even observe 
more favourable test statistics. These results corroborate our previous finding that it is not 
necessary to be exposed to distress-risk to be able to explain the differences in returns of the 
25 Fama-French portfolios.    
 
4.7. Results using the CRSP stock database over the pre-1991 period 
 
Because (almost) no reliable data are available on credit spreads and ratings before 1991, 
the main results of our study are based on the post-1991 period. To investigate if our main 
result that the value and size premiums are unrelated to distress risk is robust over the pre-
1991 period, we perform out-of-sample analyses using a subset of the distress risk measures 
we have used in the study. 
More specifically, for our pre-1991 analyses we measure distress risk through firms’ 
debt-to-assets and distance-to-default measures. Data on firms’ book values on debt and 
equity are obtained from the Compustat database. Since Compustat data are available as 
from 1963, we can perform our out-of-sample analysis over the January 1963 to August 
1991 period. (Our main analyses using credit rating and spread data documented in the 
previous sections start in September 1991). Our stock return data are obtained from the 
monthly CRSP Stock database. We select common U.S. stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX 
and Nasdaq markets that have a market capitalization above the NYSE median and a stock 
price above $5. We exclude closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), unit 
trusts, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), and foreign stocks from our analysis. Similar 
to our previous analyses we sort stocks into tercile portfolios based on their measures of 
distress risk and then subdivide each tercile into quintiles based on the stocks’ book-to-price 
ratios and compute equal-weighted returns. The results of the analysis are presented in Panel 
1 of Table 4.9. 
Consistent with our earlier analyses we find no evidence supporting a distress-risk- 
based explanation of the value premium. It does not seem to be the case that high-risk stocks 
earn higher returns than low-risk stocks for this analysis. We do observe that high-risk value 
stocks seem to earn positive excess returns, but the patterns is not consistent: low-risk growth  
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TABLE 4.9. Results using the CRSP stocks database over the pre-1991 period 
This table reports statistics of double-sorted portfolios of stocks ranked on their book-to-market ratios, 
market capitalization, and distress risk for all common U.S. stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and 
Nasdaq markets that have a market capitalization above the NYSE median and a stock price above $5 
over the January 1963 to August 1991 period. We exclude closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs), unit trusts, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), and foreign stocks from our 
analysis. Each month, stocks are sorted into terciles based on their distress risk as measured by debt-
to-assets ratio and distance-to-default. Next, for each tercile portfolio stocks are further sorted into 
quintiles based on their book-to-market ratio (B/M) or market capitalization. Portfolio returns are 
computed by weighting equally the firms. Panel 1 reports the results for double sorts using book-to-
market ratio and Panel 2 reports the results for double sorts using market capitalization. 
 
High/Small 2 3 4 Low/Large All
Panel 1. Sorts on book-to-price ratios
Panel 1A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 13.9% 13.1% 12.3% 12.8% 10.9% 12.6%
Mid 16.8% 15.2% 14.0% 11.2% 10.1% 13.4%
High risk 17.2% 12.7% 10.6% 10.1% 8.5% 11.8%
High-Low 3.3% -0.3% -1.6% -2.7% -2.4% -0.8%
Panel 1B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 15.1% 12.9% 12.0% 13.7% 12.2% 13.2%
Mid 14.5% 11.6% 12.1% 11.5% 9.2% 11.8%
High risk 17.6% 16.4% 13.1% 12.0% 9.9% 13.8%
High-Low 2.6% 3.5% 1.1% -1.7% -2.3% 0.6%
Panel 2. Sorts on market capitalization
Panel 2A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 13.7% 14.0% 11.9% 12.8% 11.3% 12.7%
Mid 15.6% 14.8% 14.1% 12.9% 11.3% 13.7%
High risk 13.3% 12.5% 14.2% 11.7% 9.6% 12.3%
High-Low -0.4% -1.6% 2.3% -1.1% -1.6% -0.5%
Panel 2B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 15.3% 14.1% 13.2% 12.8% 11.6% 13.4%
Mid 14.0% 13.5% 12.7% 10.5% 10.2% 12.2%
High risk 15.7% 14.8% 15.3% 14.1% 10.1% 14.0%
High-Low 0.4% 0.7% 2.1% 1.3% -1.5% 0.6%
Are the Fama-French factors really compensation for distress risk? 115 
 
stocks do not earn negative excess returns. Our results for the pre-1991 sample period thus 
corroborate our previous findings. 
Proceeding further, we investigate the pre-1991 relationship between the small-cap 
premium and distress risk. Again we sort stocks into tercile portfolios based on their 
measures of distress risk and then subdivide each tercile into quintiles based on the stocks’ 
market capitalizations and compute equal-weighted returns. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Panel 2 of Table 4.9. Also this analysis yields consistent results: it does not 
appear to be the case that the higher returns for small-cap stocks are concentrated in the high-
risk segment of the market. For sorts on debt-to-assets we even find that the return of the 
low-risk small-cap portfolio is higher than the return of the high-risk small-cap portfolio. So 
also for our pre-1991 sample period we find that it is unlikely that the size premium can be 
attributed to distress risk. 
Finally, we perform a pre-1991 robustness test for our analysis of the value premium 
conditional on the state of the economy. To this end we compute the return on the Fama-
French HML factor during NBER expansions and recessions. The data for this analysis are 
available as of July 1926. When we perform the analysis we find that the results corroborate 
our previous finding that value stocks outperform growth stocks particularly during 
recessions: during expansions we observe an annualized return of 5.5 percent, while we 
observe a return of 2.7 percent during recessions. We therefore conclude that the results of 
our analysis of the value premium conditional on the state of the economy are also robust to 
an extended sample period. 
 
4.8. International results 
 
In this section we investigate the relation between the value and size premiums and distress 
risk in an international context. For our analysis we use data on the stocks in the FTSE World 
index, which are on average 1,870 stocks from developed market countries over our sample 
period from September 1991 until December 2012. 
We start by investigating the value premium from an international perspective. 
Again, we observe a large value premium of 5.2 percent per annum, which is similar in size 
compared to the value premium we have documented for US stocks. We next analyze the 
relation between distress risk and returns for size-neutral distress risk portfolios. The results 
are presented in Table 4.10, Panel 1. We observe a negative relation between distress risk 
and return for all our measures of distress risk, as the returns of high-minus-low-risk stocks 
range between -0.8 percent when distance-to-default is used as a measure for distress risk 
up to -2.6 percent for the credit rating measure. Consistent with our US results we find a  
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TABLE 4.10. International results 
This table reports statistics of triple-sorted portfolios of stocks ranked on their book-to-market ratios, 
market capitalization, and distress risk for the constituents of the FTSE World index over the period 
September 1991 until December 2012. Portfolio returns are computed by weighting equally the firms. 
Presented returns are annualized. 
 
 
High B/M 2 3 4 Low B/M All
Panel 1. Sorts on book-to-price ratios
Panel 1A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 12.0% 8.1% 7.0% 6.9% 7.5% 8.5%
Mid 14.4% 8.6% 7.9% 7.4% 6.8% 9.1%
High risk 11.2% 8.8% 5.7% 5.5% 4.7% 7.4%
High-Low -0.7% 0.6% -1.2% -1.3% -2.6% -1.0%
t (High-Low) -0.32 0.37 -0.72 -0.73 -1.24 -0.72
Panel 1B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 9.3% 8.2% 7.6% 9.0% 9.2% 8.8%
Mid 12.4% 8.1% 8.2% 6.1% 5.4% 8.1%
High risk 14.6% 10.4% 6.0% 4.8% 2.9% 7.9%
High-Low 4.8% 2.0% -1.5% -3.9% -5.8% -0.8%
t (High-Low) 1.20 0.78 -0.68 -1.68 -2.20 -0.32
Panel 1C. Credit spread
Low risk 14.2% 12.4% 9.5% 10.0% 9.3% 11.2%
Mid 12.2% 11.8% 10.0% 10.2% 10.5% 11.1%
High risk 7.7% 10.0% 7.3% 9.2% 8.9% 9.1%
High-Low -5.7% -2.1% -2.0% -0.7% -0.4% -1.9%
t (High-Low) -1.45 -0.86 -0.96 -0.37 -0.15 -0.96
Panel 1D. Credit rating
Low risk 13.3% 12.9% 12.8% 10.2% 10.2% 12.1%
Mid 13.8% 15.6% 10.5% 12.1% 9.7% 12.6%
High risk 12.2% 9.4% 6.9% 8.4% 7.6% 9.3%
High-Low -0.9% -3.1% -5.3% -1.7% -2.3% -2.6%
t (High-Low) -0.23 -1.26 -2.21 -0.62 -0.64 -1.07
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TABLE 4.10 (Continued). International results 
 
negative relation between the value premium and distress risk. More specifically, only when 
distance-to-default is used as a measure for distress risk, we observe that high-risk value 
stocks earn a higher return than low-risk value stocks. The differences between the returns 
of the other high-minus-low-risk value portfolios range between -0.7 percent when distress 
risk is measured using the debt-to-assets ratio to -5.7 percent when credit spread is used as 
a measure for distress risk. 
Small 2 3 4 Large All
Panel 2. Sorts on market capitalization
Panel 2A. Debt-to-assets
Low risk 9.4% 7.2% 8.8% 7.9% 7.7% 8.5%
Mid 10.7% 10.9% 8.9% 8.6% 7.7% 9.0%
High risk 9.5% 6.6% 6.1% 6.6% 5.8% 7.4%
High-Low 0.0% -0.6% -2.5% -1.2% -1.8% -1.0%
t (High-Low) 0.02 -0.33 -1.46 -0.64 -1.03 -0.69
Panel 2B. Distance-to-default
Low risk 9.2% 7.9% 9.4% 9.3% 8.7% 8.8%
Mid 9.1% 7.3% 7.1% 7.8% 7.9% 8.1%
High risk 11.6% 9.5% 6.9% 6.1% 4.5% 7.9%
High-Low 2.2% 1.5% -2.2% -2.9% -3.8% -0.8%
t (High-Low) 0.67 0.55 -0.88 -1.27 -1.67 -0.33
Panel 2C. Credit spread
Low risk 13.6% 12.2% 11.9% 8.5% 9.3% 11.1%
Mid 15.6% 13.4% 11.1% 11.5% 7.5% 11.2%
High risk 8.2% 7.9% 9.8% 6.6% 7.4% 9.1%
High-Low -4.8% -3.9% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8% -1.8%
t (High-Low) -1.44 -1.56 -0.87 -0.92 -0.83 -0.89
Panel 2D. Credit rating
Low risk 16.5% 13.5% 11.7% 10.6% 9.0% 12.1%
Mid 15.7% 12.6% 12.9% 11.7% 9.6% 12.7%
High risk 11.2% 7.5% 9.8% 8.1% 6.6% 9.2%
High-Low -4.6% -5.2% -1.7% -2.3% -2.2% -2.6%
t (High-Low) -1.08 -1.79 -0.72 -1.07 -0.75 -1.09
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 We next analyze the relation between the small-cap premium and distress risk from 
an international perspective. We observe an international small-cap premium of 1.7 percent 
per annum, similar in size as the US small-cap premium. However, we do not observe that 
the higher returns of small-cap stocks are concentrated in the high-risk segment. Results are 
presented in Panel 2. Actually, we observe that the return of high-risk small-cap stocks is 
equal to the return of low-risk small-cap stocks when debt-to-assets is used as a measure of 
distress risk, and we find a return differential of -4.8 percent and -4.6 percent between high- 
and low-risk small-cap stocks when credit spread and credit rating are respectively used to 
measure distress risk. In addition, if the small-cap premium is a compensation for distress 
risk we should simultaneously observe that the lower return of large-cap stocks is 
concentrated in the low-risk segment. However, in all four cases we observe that high-risk 
large-cap stocks earn returns down to -3.8 percent lower compared to low-risk large-cap 
stocks. To conclude, also in an international context, we find no relationship between distress 
risk and the value and size premiums. 
 
4.9. Profitability and investment effects 
 
In a recent paper Fama and French (2015) document that stock returns are not only related 
to the market, market capitalization, and valuation, but that returns are also driven by 
profitability and investment patterns. More specifically, Fama and French report that a firm’s 
operating profitability is positively related to stock returns, and that a firm’s change in asset 
growth is negatively related to returns. In this section we investigate if these factors that are 
more recently documented by Fama and French in some way are related to distress risk. To 
this end we perform analyses similar to the triple sorts we conducted earlier. However, we 
now sort stocks on their operating profitability and their change in assets. For the sake of 
brevity, these results are not presented in tabular form. 
We first consider the results for sorts on profitability. When we consider the return 
patterns for the triple sorted portfolios, our first observation is that stocks of firms with high 
profitability generally outperform stocks of firms with lower profitability. At the same time, 
however, we find no evidence that stocks of firms with high profitability are more risky. 
Irrespective of which measure we use for risk, it does not appear to be the case that the high 
profitability portfolios are associated with relatively higher debt-to-assets ratios, smaller 
distances-to-default, higher spreads, or lower credit ratings. Also, when we consider the 
returns of the portfolios it does not appear to be the case that the higher returns of the high 
profitability portfolios are concentrated in the high risk dimension. All in all, these results 
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are inconsistent with the interpretation that the profitability premium is attributable to 
distress risk. 
For the investments effect we find similar results: it does not appear to be the case that 
stocks of firms with small or negative change in assets have a larger debt-to-equity ratio, 
lower distance-to-default, higher credit spread, or lower credit rating. Also, it does not 
appear to be the case that the higher returns are systematically concentrated in the portfolios 
with the higher risk profiles. These results are also inconsistent with the notion that the 
investments premium is attributable to distress risk. 
 
4.10. Results for all stocks in U.S. Broad Market Index 
 
All the analyses in our study are based on the 1,500 largest stocks of the Citigroup U.S. BMI. 
To ensure that our findings are not prone to market micro-structure concerns we have 
intentionally left out micro-cap stocks from our sample. In this section we examine the 
sensitivity of our results for our choice of eliminating micro-caps by investigating the 
relation between the value and size premium and distress risk on all stocks in the Citigroup 
U.S. BMI. This universe contains on average 2,900 stocks during our sample period. 
 We start by sorting all stocks into quintile portfolios based on their book-to-market 
ratio. We observe a large value premium of 7.1 percent per annum, which is larger than the 
5.3 percent we observed for the 1,500 largest stocks. To investigate the relation between the 
value premium and distress risk, we construct size-neutral triple-sorted risk portfolios, as in 
Table 4.2. We first investigate if high-distress-risk stocks earn higher returns than low-
distress-risk stocks. Interestingly, for all four measures of distress risk we find a weaker 
relation compared to our earlier results on the 1,500 largest stocks. Specifically, only for the 
debt-to-assets ratio we observe a positive return spread of 0.4 percent between high-risk 
stocks and low-risk stocks. For the other measures of distress risk as proxied by the distance-
to-default, credit spread and credit rating we observe a 3.8, 5.6, and 3.6 percent lower return, 
respectively, for high-risk compared to low-risk stocks. We next examine the relation 
between the value premium and distress risk. We observe that by including micro-caps in 
our universe, the high-minus-low-risk return spread of value stocks becomes considerably 
more negative. For the debt-to-assets ratio this spread turns negative from 0.2 percent to -4.4 
percent. For the distance-to-default, credit spread and credit rating this difference decreases 
from -1.8, -3.7 and -1.9 percent to -8.6, -12.4 and -5.7 percent, respectively.  
 When we include micro-caps in our universe we observe a negative size premium 
of 2.15 percent. Compared to our earlier results in Table 4.6 for the 1,500 largest stocks, we 
observe that the relation between the small-cap premium and distress risk becomes even 
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more negative. The return between high- and low-risk small-cap stocks ranges from -5.7 
percent for the debt-to-assets ratio to -20.1 percent for the credit spread. We therefore 
conclude that also when we include micro-caps in our universe that distress risk is unlikely 
to explain the value and small-cap premiums. 
 
4.11. Concluding comments 
 
Following the work of Fama and French (1992, 1993), a large stream of literature has been 
developed on the small-cap and value anomalies and numerous attempts have been made to 
better understand the economic origin of these anomalies. In particular, several papers 
attribute the small-cap and value anomalies to a common risk factor and contend that the 
premiums are compensation for investors bearing distress risk. Notably, there are also some 
papers that dispute this assertion and document that it is unlikely that the small-cap and value 
premiums can be attributed to distress risk. One potential reason that the results in the 
literature seem to conflict is that different measures and methodologies are used in the 
studies. This study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. 
 First of all, we contribute to the existing literature by drawing a unified conclusion 
regarding the pricing of distress risk in the cross-section of stock returns. We show that no 
positive relation can be found between risk and returns. 
Second, we show that both the small-cap and the value premiums are not 
concentrated in distressed stocks. Irrespective of whether we measure stocks’ probabilities 
on financial distress using accounting models, structural models, credit spreads or credit 
ratings, we find that the premiums cannot be absorbed by distress risk. The results are also 
robust to the method that is used to investigate the relation between the two variables. 
Irrespective of whether we use rank portfolios, business cycle analyses à la Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994), or cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, we find 
no positive relation between the small-cap and value premiums and distress risk. Our results 
also help to understand the results of several studies that report that the small-cap premium 
is no longer present after the early 1980s. 
Finally, our results indicate that the empirical explanatory power of the Fama-
French (1993) SMB and HML factors cannot be attributed to these factors being exposed to 
distress risk. We construct new factors that disentangle the size and value effects from 
distress risk. 
Overall, our results are difficult to reconcile with a risk-based interpretation of the 
value anomaly and call for further research on the development and testing of theories that 
potentially provide an explanation for the size and value effects.
 5. The low-risk anomaly and mutual fund tournaments54 
 
I examine the relationship between tournament behavior of mutual fund managers and the 
low-risk anomaly. Based on a general equilibrium model, I show that tournament behavior 
causes the returns of low-risk (high-risk) assets to be larger (smaller) than expected from the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. Using data on mutual funds and prices of individual assets 
from twelve different asset categories, I find a positive and significant relation between 
tournament behavior and the low-risk premium. The results indicate that not only is the low-
risk effect more prominent in a period following stronger tournament behavior, but the 
anomaly is also larger in asset categories where more tournament behavior is observed. As 
a consequence, these insights are important for investors aiming to capture the low-risk 
premium.  
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The prevalence of delegated asset management has increased substantially over the past 5 
decades. Whereas 50 years ago the vast majority of US corporate equity was held by 
individual investors, intermediaries currently hold over half of assets. As a consequence, the 
incentives of such intermediaries can potentially impact the way assets in the economy are 
priced. In this study I explore the influence on asset prices of one robustly documented 
phenomenon in the asset management industry: tournament behavior between fund 
managers. I show that tournament behavior can go a long way towards explaining an asset-
pricing anomaly that is receiving increasing attention: the low-risk anomaly. 
Intuitively, assets with high systematic risk provide higher average returns than 
low-risk assets, proportional to their risk levels. Theoretically, this intuition is reflected by 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which describes the relation between risk, as 
measured by beta, and expected return. However, empirically there is ample evidence that 
this relation is flatter than expected [e.g. Black et al. (1972)]55, also known as the low-risk 
anomaly.  
                                                          
54 This chapter is based on De Groot, W., 2017, The low-risk anomaly and mutual fund tournaments, 
working paper. 
55 Black et al. (1972) and Haugen and Heins (1975) have already documented the low-risk anomaly 
within US equities. Also Fama and French (1992) found that the relationship between risk and return 
was flat. Blitz and Van Vliet (2007) have extended this to Europe and Japan and show that stocks with 
a low volatility generate higher risk-adjusted returns than stocks with a high volatility. Recently, 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) find that also for Treasury bonds, corporate bonds and futures, low-beta 
securities earn higher alphas than high-beta securities. 
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 Not all CAPM assumptions might hold for fund managers who invest for others 
(clients and/or employers). According to the CAPM, an investor requires a higher return on 
more risky assets as measured by beta. An important assumption of the model is that 
investors are averse to risk and that they are only interested in maximizing the expected 
utility of their end-of-period wealth. However, one well-documented form of fund 
manager’s behavior not captured by the CAPM is tournament behavior, which implies that 
it is not (only) the objective of investors to maximize the client’s wealth.  
Tournament behavior refers to the behavior where fund managers aim to win the 
‘tournament’ (i.e. achieve the highest returns compared to peers). This could be because the 
size of their remuneration might depend on their performance relative to other participants, 
but also because of other reasons, such as competitive behavior of fund managers. A fund 
manager belonging to the mid-term loser funds where funds are ranked on performance, can 
increase chances of ending higher on the ranking at the end of the term by taking more risk. 
Brown et al. (1996) were one of the first who demonstrated the existence of tournament 
behavior for US mutual funds during 1980 to 1991 by showing that mid-year loser funds 
more often increase their risk in the second half of the year than mid-year winner funds. 
Many follow-up studies confirmed the existence of tournament behavior.  
Hence, tournament behavior implies that fund managers of loser funds increase 
their portfolio risk. If leverage is unrestricted and cheap, taking more leverage is a way to 
increase risk. However, if leverage is restricted and/or costly, which is the case for most 
mutual fund managers, high-risk securities become more attractive and fund managers are 
prepared to pay a premium that decreases the return on these high-risk securities. An 
intuitive implication of tournament behavior among mutual fund managers is therefore the 
existence of the low-risk anomaly. The objective of this study is to theoretically investigate 
the impact of this behavior on the prices of high- and low-risk assets and empirically 
establish whether there is a relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk anomaly.  
An advantage of investigating tournament behavior as a measure to explain the 
low-risk anomaly is that it is asset class specific in the sense that whether tournament 
behavior is present and how strong it is can differ among asset classes and time. The same 
might hold for the low-risk premium. It could well be the case that the periods that low-risk 
securities outperform high-risk securities differs across asset classes, in other words, that the 
low-risk premium between asset classes is not highly correlated. If this holds, then it is 
logical to use a measure which is asset-class specific when explaining the low-risk anomaly. 
However, several studies have used global factors that are not asset-class specific, such as 
TED-spread and inflation which are used by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Cohen et al. 
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(2005), respectively. In the following section I give an overview of the existing literature in 
this field.   
I develop a simple general equilibrium model to investigate the impact of 
tournament behavior across mutual fund managers on prices of high- and low-risk assets. 
The base model is a one-period equilibrium model with two agents who maximize their 
growth in wealth and two dividend-paying assets: a high- and low-risk asset. I next expand 
this base model by including tournament behavior. That means that the agents not only 
maximize their wealth growth, but also maximize the return of their own portfolio compared 
to that of their peers. The model predicts that tournament behavior causes the returns of low-
risk (high-risk) assets to be larger (smaller) than expected according to the CAPM. Based 
on this model, the following testable hypotheses are defined:  
1) The low-risk effect in a particular asset category is stronger in a period following 
stronger tournament behavior. 
2) The low-risk effect is stronger in asset categories where tournament behavior is 
stronger. 
I empirically analyze these predictions within and across asset categories.  
To measure tournament behavior, this study makes use of the Morningstar mutual 
fund database with monthly data from January 1990 to December 2013. The study covers 
12 different asset categories, consisting of bond classes, regional equity classes and style 
sub-classes within US equities. To measure tournament behavior, I use a test statistic in line 
with Brown et al. (1996) as commonly used in academic literature. I investigate whether 
mid-year losers take substantially more risk than mid-year winners in the second half of the 
year. In addition, for each of the asset categories I construct leveraged low-minus-high risk 
portfolios based on the past year volatility of individual securities.56   
 In the first analysis I find that tournament behavior is generally present, in line with 
Brown et al. (1996). However, this behavior is time-varying and not present every year 
within each asset category. It is therefore important to take the time dimension into account 
when analyzing the relationship between tournament behavior and the low-risk anomaly.   
Next, I show that the low-risk anomaly is present in almost all asset categories, 
consistent with Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). There is a low correlation among the low-risk 
return series of different asset categories. Due to this finding, it is unlikely that a global risk 
factor, which is non-asset class specific such as TED-spread and inflation, can fully explain 
the low-risk anomaly, as used by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Cohen et al. (2005), 
respectively.  
                                                          
56 For government bonds I construct low-minus-high risk portfolios based on the maturity of bonds.  
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To investigate whether, for a particular asset category, the low-risk effect is 
stronger in a period following stronger tournament behavior, I apply pooled OLS 
regressions. We observe a positive and significant relation between tournament behavior and 
the low-risk premium. In addition, we observe that when the sample is split into two sub-
periods, the relation is positive and significant in both sample periods. It is thus evident that 
there is a positive relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium over 
time. 
Next, I examine whether the low-risk effect is stronger in asset categories where 
tournament behavior is stronger. Therefore, for each year in the sample, I sort the asset 
categories in three terciles based on tournament behavior that year and compute the low-risk 
returns of the three portfolios in the following year. I observe that the tercile portfolio with 
the highest tournament behavior performs significantly better than the portfolio with the 
lowest tournament behavior, on average around 5% per annum. The conclusions do not 
change or even become somewhat stronger when corrected for loadings on general market 
returns or structural positions.  
 To conclude the main empirical analyses, I investigate the impact of tournament 
behavior on the low-risk premium across asset categories with Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions. The advantage of this method is that other factors can easily be controlled, such 
as activeness of the market, market volatility and the risk-adjusted return of the markets. 
Consistent with the portfolio findings, a positive and significant relation between tournament 
behavior and the low-risk premium is apparent in most cases.  
 Finally, I provide several possibilities to extend the theoretical pricing model. One 
suggestion is that the amount of utility agents get from tournament behavior can be made 
dependent on the type of market (bull or bear), in line with the findings of Kempf et al. 
(2009). They show that tournament behavior exists when the first half-year is a bull market 
and not when it is a bear market. A 2x2 contingency table shows that most observations in 
the entire sample fall in the ‘high tournament behavior/high low-risk premium’ and ‘low 
tournament behavior/low low-risk premium’ segments. Interestingly, during bull markets 
most observations are in the ‘high tournament behavior/high low-risk premium’ segment 
and during bear markets in the ‘low tournament behavior/low low-risk premium’ segment. 
These findings are in line with the hypothesis that mutual fund manager’s incentives to 
perform well are strongest during bull markets. Some studies suggest that besides chasing 
returns cross-sectionally, mutual fund investors also chase returns through time [Warther 
(1995)], meaning that large cash inflows occur in a particular asset class just after the market 
has made an upward rally. Fund managers are therefore incentivized to outperform 
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especially during bull markets, strengthening the higher demand for high-beta stocks and 
reducing the expected returns of these stocks. 
 I conclude the empirical analyses by showing that tournaments have most impact 
on the prices of low- and high-risk asset in the year following the tournaments. When I 
increase the length of the period to compute the low-risk premium (i.e. the investment 
horizon), the results become weaker and insignificant. This could be caused by new 
tournaments that have started where the ‘newest’ high-risk stocks are being selected and for 
which the demand is higher than the ‘older’ high-risk stocks.  
 To summarize, I develop a theoretical model that describes that tournament 
behavior causes the expected return of low-risk assets to be higher than expected according 
to the CAPM. Irrespective of the method I use (pooled OLS-regressions, sorting portfolios, 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions and contingency tables) there is a positive relation 
between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium.  
 To my knowledge, this is the first study to examine the relation between tournament 
behavior and the low-risk anomaly, both theoretically and empirically across a broad range 
of asset categories. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the finding 
of a positive relationship between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium helps to 
explain the low-risk anomaly across a wide range of asset classes. I acknowledge that other 
explanations could also play a role. For example, leverage and shorting restrictions could 
strengthen the positive relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium.   
The insights of this study could also be valuable for investors in low-risk strategies, 
as the research potentially gives insight in which markets we can best exploit this anomaly 
and can therefore guide asset managers as to where to set-up low-risk products. In markets 
where tournament behavior is absent, the low-risk premiums are expected to be much 
smaller or not even present. Moreover, the research could give insight in how the anomaly 
can best be exploited. For example, as tournament behavior seems to be a dominant factor it 
is logical to capture the premium within universes of competitive funds instead of across 
universes (e.g. emerging markets and develop markets equities separately instead of an 
overall comparison). Also, the importance assigned to the low-risk factor when selecting 
stocks could potentially be adjusted when one predicts whether tournament behavior will be 
an important factor (e.g. in case of large cash inflows to the asset class).  
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. The next section gives an 
overview of the relevant literature on the low-risk anomaly and tournament behavior. 
Section 5.3 provides the theoretical model. Section 5.4 describes the construction of the data 
set and Section 5.5 presents the empirical results for analyses that examine if there is a 
126 Chapter 5 
relationship between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium. Section 5.6 discusses 
several possibilities to extend the theoretical model and Section 5.7 concludes.  
 
5.2. Literature 
 
5.2.1. The low-risk anomaly 
 
The literature on explaining the source for the low-risk premium is rather scarce and 
ambiguous.57 Only several studies attempt to identify the source of the low-risk premium. 
First, Black (1972) uses a theoretical model and argues that borrowing restrictions are the 
reason for the relatively high performance of low-beta stocks. The idea is that some market 
participants cannot use leverage to increase portfolio risk and therefore overweight high-
beta securities, leading to lower returns on these assets. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
provide empirical support for this hypothesis by using the TED-spread as a proxy for funding 
constraints. However, this factor only seems to relate (weakly) to the low-risk premium in 
equity markets. In most other asset classes (government bonds, credits, FX and 
commodities) the relation between TED-spread and the low-risk premium is opposite to 
what their hypothesis predicts. In relation to leverage constraints, the literature also discusses 
short-selling constraints, as a cause of the low-risk anomaly. For example, Hong and Sraer 
(2016) show that short-sales constraints in combination with investors’ disagreement about 
the future prospects of the stock market result in high beta stocks being overpriced. A second 
explanation is from Cohen et al. (2005) who argue that the risk-return relationship in the US 
stock market is flatter during high-inflation environments and relate this to the money-
illusion hypothesis. Third, Karceski (2002) developed an agency model where return-
chasing behavior by mutual fund investors causes beta not to be priced to the degree 
predicted by the standard CAPM. Other explanations are from Baker et al. (2011) and Bali 
et al. (2011) who suggest that behavioral biases, such as a preference for lotteries, are the 
cause of the low-risk anomaly. 
To conclude, the few existing empirical studies that attempt to explain the low-risk 
anomaly use global factors that are not asset-class specific, such as TED-spread and 
inflation. However, these measures will only be able to explain the low-risk effect across 
different asset classes in case of a relatively high correlation between the low-risk premiums 
of different asset classes. Moreover, although the theoretical model developed by Karceski 
                                                          
57 Blitz, Falkenstein and Van Vliet (2014) provide a literature overview of possible explanations for 
the low-risk effect.  
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(2002) on mutual fund investors’ behavior is compelling and can be asset-class specific, it 
is not empirically tested.  
 
5.2.2. Tournament behavior 
 
Although Brown et al. (1996) were one of the first who demonstrated the existence of 
tournament behavior for US mutual funds, many follow-up studies confirmed the existence 
of tournament behavior. For example Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), Hu, Kale, Pagani, 
and Subramaniam (2011) and Swarz (2012). Kempf et al. (2009) confirm that tournament 
behavior exists based on mutual fund holdings data, but argue it is dependent on the market 
return in the first half-year. 
One of the explanations given for tournament behavior is that mutual fund investors 
tend to chase returns over time and across funds. The main objective of a fund manager is 
to maximize the profits for the organization, because then she will receive the highest 
rewards. This implies that it is not (only) her objective to maximize the client’s wealth. In 
order to achieve high fund profits, she needs to increase the assets under management or, in 
other words, to maximize cash inflows.  
As mutual fund investors buy funds with the highest recent past returns, a ‘winner-
takes-it-all’ structure holds for many asset classes. This means that most of the cash inflows 
go to a few winners [see e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998) who show that this relation holds for 
US equity mutual funds and Brown et al. (2001) for hedge funds and CTAs]. As, in addition, 
cash is not easily withdrawn from loser funds with the lowest recent past returns, this is also 
called an asymmetric flow-performance relation. To belong to the winners, a loser fund 
could therefore take higher risk to win the tournament.  
 
5.3. Theoretical model 
 
In this section I present a general equilibrium model where tournament behavior causes high-
risk assets to have a lower return and low-risk assets to have a higher return than expected 
according to the CAPM.  
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5.3.1. Model without tournament behavior 
 
5.3.1.1. Technology 
Let us assume the model has two dates (t=0 and t=1). The economy I study consists of two 
agents A and B and two types of assets, a high-risk asset H and a low-risk asset L. The payoff 
(or dividend) of these assets (at t=1) are normally distributed58, 
 
(5.1)  𝐷𝐻1 = 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝐻
2) 
𝐷𝐿1 = 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝐿
2) 
 
where 𝐷𝐻1 is the payoff on the high-risk asset at the end of the period and 𝐷𝐿1 the payoff on 
the low-risk asset and 𝜎𝐻 > 𝜎𝐿. The advantage of assuming normally distributed returns is 
that later on, when solving the model, the solution has a closed form. The correlation 
between the payoffs is denoted by 𝜌. Both assets are in unit supply, so that expected returns 
in equilibrium are determined by aggregate demands. 
 
5.3.1.2. Preferences 
I denote the demand of agents A and B for assets H and L as 𝑞𝐴𝐻 , 𝑞𝐴𝐿 , 𝑞𝐵𝐻 , 𝑞𝐵𝐿 , respectively. 
The agents invest their wealth in the two assets with price 𝑃𝐻0 defined as the price of the 
high-risk asset at the beginning of the period (t=0) and 𝑃𝐿0 as the price of the low-risk asset. 
The wealth of the two agents at the beginning of the period is therefore defined by: 
 
(5.2)  𝑊𝐴0 = 𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0 
𝑊𝐵0 = 𝑞𝐵𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐵𝐿𝑃𝐿0 
 
And at the end of the period (t=1) by: 
 
(5.3)  𝑊𝐴1 = 𝑞𝐴𝐻𝐷𝐻1 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝐷𝐿1 
𝑊𝐵1 = 𝑞𝐵𝐻𝐷𝐻1 + 𝑞𝐵𝐿𝐷𝐿1 
  
Let us for now assume that tournament behavior does not exist. For simplicity reasons I 
assume that the two agents have the same utility function, defined as: 
 
                                                          
58 We assume equal expectations for the two assets. Assuming unequal expected pay-offs does not 
change the conclusions.  
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(5.4)  𝑈𝐴 =  −exp (−𝜃𝐴(𝑊𝐴1 − 𝑊𝐴0)) 
𝑈𝐵 =  −exp (−𝜃𝐵(𝑊𝐵1 − 𝑊𝐵0)), 
 
where 𝜃𝑖 > 0 for i={A,B} is the agent’s risk aversion coefficient. Assuming exponential 
utility functions is for ease of computation.  
 
5.3.1.3. Solving the model 
At t=0, the agents choose the weights of the high- and low-risk asset to maximize their 
expected utility. Let us continue from the perspective of agent A: 
 
(5.5) max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[ − exp (−𝜃𝐴(𝑊𝐴1 − 𝑊𝐴0))] 
= max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[ − exp (−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻(𝐷𝐻1 − 𝑃𝐻0) + 𝑞𝐴𝐿(𝐷𝐿1 − 𝑃𝐿0)})] 
 
Because of the normally distributed asset returns, the expectation operator in Equation 5.5 
can be rewritten as: 
 
(5.6) max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
−exp (−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿}𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0 +
1
2
𝜃𝐴
2{𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2 + 2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿})
 
 = max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
(𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿}𝜇 − 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 − 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0 −
1
2
𝜃𝐴
2{𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2 + 2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿})
 
 
This optimization problem can be solved by taking the first derivative with respect to 𝑞𝐴𝐻: 
 
(5.7)  𝜃𝐴𝜇 − 𝜃𝐴𝑃𝐻0 − 𝜃𝐴
2𝑞𝐴𝐻𝜎𝐻
2 − 𝜃𝐴
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿 = 0 
 
This leads to the following optimal solution for 𝑞𝐴𝐻: 
 
(5.8)  𝑞𝐴𝐻 =
𝜇−𝑃𝐻0−𝜃𝐴𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐴𝜎𝐻
2  
 
From Equation 5.8 it follows that agent A will allocate more to the high-risk asset in case 
the price at t=0 is lower. Also, the demand for the asset is decreasing in the standard 
deviation of the pay-off.  
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Solving the problem for 𝑞𝐴𝐿  as well and also taking the perspective of agent B, 
leads to the following set of equations combined with the unit supply constraints:  
 
(5.9)  𝑞𝐴𝐻 =
𝜇−𝑃𝐻0−𝜃𝐴𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐴𝜎𝐻
2  
 𝑞𝐴𝐿 =
𝜇−𝑃𝐿0−𝜃𝐴𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐴𝜎𝐿
2  
 𝑞𝐵𝐻 =
𝜇−𝑃𝐻0−𝜃𝐵𝜌𝑞𝐵𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐵𝜎𝐻
2  
 𝑞𝐵𝐿 =
𝜇−𝑃𝐿0−𝜃𝐵𝜌𝑞𝐵𝐻𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐵𝜎𝐿
2  
 𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐵𝐻 = 1 
 𝑞𝐴𝐿 + 𝑞𝐵𝐿 = 1 
 
5.3.1.4. Model analysis 
Let us have a look at the intuition behind the model with the help of an example. In the 
example, I assume that agent A and agent B both have a risk-aversion parameter of 𝜃𝐴 =
 𝜃𝐵 = 0.01. Further assuming that both assets have an expected payoff 𝜇 = 100 and that the 
correlation between the assets 𝜌 = 0.5. The volatility of the high-risk asset 𝜎𝐻 = 30 and the 
volatility of the low-risk asset 𝜎𝐿 = 20. The solution of the six equations with six unknowns 
is that both agents hold equal amounts of the high- and low-risk asset: 𝑞𝐴𝐻 = 𝑞𝐵𝐻 = 𝑞𝐴𝐿 =
𝑞𝐵𝐿 = 0.5. The price of the high-risk asset 𝑃𝐻0= 94 and the price of the low-risk asset 𝑃𝐿0= 
96.5. As the risk is higher for the high-risk asset, the expected risk premium is higher and 
the price is lower. The return of the high-risk asset is defined as: 
 
(5.10)  𝑅𝐻1 =
𝐷𝐻1
𝑃𝐻0
− 1 
 
The expected return of the high-risk asset is therefore:  
 
(5.11)  𝐸[𝑅𝐻1] =
𝐸[𝐷𝐻1]
𝑃𝐿0
− 1 =
𝜇
𝑃𝐻0
− 1 
 
When we fill in the numbers in the example, an expected return of 6.4% for the high-risk 
asset and 3.6% for the low-risk asset is found. The higher the risk of the high- versus the 
low-risk asset, the higher the expected risk premium and the lower the price of the high-risk 
asset versus the low-risk asset as visible from Figure 5.1.  
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FIGURE 5.1. Relation between price and volatility of the high- and low-risk asset in the model 
without tournament behavior 
The figure shows the price of the high- and low-risk asset (PH0 and PL0, respectively) for different 
volatility levels of the high-risk asset (σH). The volatility of the low-risk asset σL is kept at 20. Agent 
A and agent B have a risk-aversion parameter of 𝜃𝐴 =  𝜃𝐵 = 0.01. Both assets have an expected payoff 
𝜇 = 100 and the correlation between the assets is 𝜌 = 0.5.  
 
 
Let us now assume that agent B is more risk-averse than agent A. We then expect 
agent B to hold less of the assets compared to agent A. Figure 5.2 shows that this is indeed 
the case in our example.  
 
5.3.2. Model with tournament behavior 
 
In this sub-section I extend the model by including tournament behavior. The assets follow 
the same distribution as in the previous sub-section. However, the agent’s preferences are 
different.  
 
5.3.2.1. Preferences 
The agents now not only maximize their change in asset wealth, but also maximize the return 
of their own portfolio compared to that of their peers. The return of agent A is given by: 
 
(5.12) 𝑅𝐴 = 𝑤𝐴𝐻𝑅𝐻1 + 𝑤𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐿1,  
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FIGURE 5.2. Relation between the quantities the agents own of the assets and the risk-aversion 
of agent B compared to agent A in the model without tournament behavior  
The figure shows the quantities of the high- and low-risk asset (qH and qL, respectively) for different 
risk aversion parameter values of agent B (𝜃𝐵). The risk aversion parameter of agent A is kept at 0.01. 
The volatility of the high-risk asset 𝜎𝐻 = 30 and the volatility of the low-risk asset 𝜎𝐿 = 20. Both 
assets have an expected payoff 𝜇 = 100 and the correlation between the assets is 𝜌 = 0.5.  
 
 
 
where the portfolio weight of asset H for agent A is defined by: 
 
(5.13)  𝑤𝐴𝐻 =
𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0
𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0
 
 
Similar definitions apply for the return of agent B and the other portfolio weights.  
I assume a linear relation between tournament behavior and utility, but obviously 
other functional forms can also be applied. The utility function for agent A and agent B is 
now respectively defined by: 
 
(5.14)  max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[−exp(−𝜃𝐴(𝑊𝐴1 − 𝑊𝐴0)) + 𝜂𝐴(𝑅𝐴 − 𝑅𝐵)] 
max
𝑞𝐵𝐻,𝑞𝐵𝐿
𝐸[−exp(−𝜃𝐵(𝑊𝐵1 − 𝑊𝐵0)) + 𝜂𝐵(𝑅𝐵 − 𝑅𝐴)], 
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where 𝜂 is the parameter that indicates the sensitivity towards tournament behavior. For 
simplicity, tournament behavior for agent B is normalized to zero, so 𝜂𝐵 = 0. This means 
that the first order conditions for agent B remain the same as in the case without tournament 
behavior.59  
 
5.3.2.2. Solving the model 
The maximization problem for agent A can be rewritten to:  
 
(5.15)  max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[− exp(−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻(𝐷𝐻1 − 𝑃𝐻0) + 𝑞𝐴𝐿(𝐷𝐿1 − 𝑃𝐿0)}) + 𝜂𝐴(𝑤𝐴𝐻𝑅𝐻1 +
                 𝑤𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑤𝐵𝐻𝑅𝐻1 − 𝑤𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐿1)], 
 
Solving for 𝑞𝐴𝐻  leads to the following equation (see Appendix 5.A): 
 
(5.16) −exp(−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿}𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0) 
+
1
2
𝜃𝐴
2{𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2 + 2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿}) ∗ (−𝜃𝐴𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴
2𝑞𝐴𝐻𝜎𝐻
2
+ 𝜃𝐴
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿)
+
𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐻0)(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)−𝑃𝐻0𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐴𝐻−𝑃𝐻0𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐴𝐿
(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)2
= 0 
Solving the problem for 𝑞𝐴𝐿  as well leads to the following equation:  
 
(5.17) −exp (−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿}𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0 +
1
2
𝜃𝐴
2{𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2 + 
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿}) ∗ (−𝜃𝐴𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑃𝐿0 + 𝜃𝐴
2𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐿
2 + 𝜃𝐴
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿)
+
𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐿0)(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)−𝑃𝐿0𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐴𝐿−𝑃𝐿0𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐴𝐻
(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)2
= 0 
The first order conditions of agent B and the unit supply constraints remain the same: 
 
(5.18)  𝑞𝐵𝐻 =  
𝜇−𝑃𝐻0−𝜃𝐵𝜌𝑞𝐵𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐵𝜎𝐻
2  
 𝑞𝐵𝐿 =  
𝜇−𝑃𝐿0−𝜃𝐵𝜌𝑞𝐵𝐻𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝜃𝐵𝜎𝐿
2  
                                                          
59 Note that the model now only assumes tournament behavior and makes no assumptions on why 
tournament behavior exists. This could be due to a variety of reasons, or simply because the agents are 
competitive by nature. 
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 𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐵𝐻 = 1 
  𝑞𝐴𝐿 + 𝑞𝐵𝐿 = 1 
 
5.3.2.3. Model analysis 
Let us now investigate how the inclusion of tournament behavior influences the risk/return 
relation of the high- and low-risk assets in the example of Sub-section 5.3.1.4.  
 
FIGURE 5.3. Relation between expected return of the high- and low-risk asset and tournament 
behavior in the model with tournament behavior  
The figure shows the expected returns of the high- and low-risk asset (E[RH1] and E[RHL]) for different 
tournament behavior parameter values of agent A (ηA). Agent B does not get utility from tournament 
behavior, so 𝜂𝐵 = 0. Agent A and agent B have a risk-aversion parameter of 𝜃𝐴 =  𝜃𝐵 = 0.01. The 
volatility of the high-risk asset 𝜎𝐻 = 30 and the volatility of the low-risk asset 𝜎𝐿 = 20. Both assets 
have an expected payoff 𝜇 = 100 and the correlation between the assets is 𝜌 = 0.5.  
 
From Figure 5.3 we observe the impact when agent A also gets utility from 
tournament behavior. In case agent A does not have tournament behavior (𝜂𝐴 = 0), we 
logically get similar expected return as in Sub-section 5.3.1.4: an expected return of 6.4% 
for the high-risk asset and 3.6% for the low-risk asset. The more utility agent A gets from 
tournament behavior, the higher the demand for the high-risk asset. As a consequence, we 
expect the high-risk asset to have a higher price and a lower expected risk premium. 
Similarly, tournament behavior lowers the demand of agent A for the low-risk asset. Agent 
B will need to hold more of the low-risk asset, but is only willing to do that if the price is 
low enough and therefore the expected risk premium high enough. This is in line with what 
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we observe in Figure 5.3. In addition, the expected return of the low-risk asset remains lower 
than that of the high-risk asset; so the security market line becomes flatter, but not inverse.  
Figure 5.4 shows the quantities agents A and B hold of the high- and low-risk asset 
when tournament behavior is included in the model. We observe that agent A indeed holds 
more of the high-risk asset at the expense of the low-risk asset, the more important 
tournament behavior becomes. Due to the unit supply constraints and the lower price of the 
low-risk asset, agent B holds more of the low-risk asset.  
 
FIGURE 5.4. Relation between quantity and tournament behavior of the high- and low-risk asset 
in the model with tournament behavior  
The figure shows the quantities of the high- and low-risk asset (qH and qL, respectively) hold by agent 
A and agent B for different tournament behavior parameter values of agent A (ηA). Agent B does not 
get utility from tournament behavior, so 𝜂𝐵 = 0. Agent A and agent B have a risk-aversion parameter 
of 𝜃𝐴 =  𝜃𝐵 = 0.01. The volatility of the high-risk asset 𝜎𝐻 = 30 and the volatility of the low-risk 
asset 𝜎𝐿 = 20. Both assets have an expected payoff 𝜇 = 100 and the correlation between the assets is 
𝜌 = 0.5.  
 
Next, we can investigate the impact of tournament behavior on expected alpha. As 
the CAPM-model does not hold anymore, we expect alpha to be non-zero. I therefore 
compute the CAPM-beta and the expected alpha of the high- and low-risk asset. The market 
portfolio return is defined as:  
 
(5.19)  𝑅𝑀1 = 𝑤𝐿𝑅𝐿1 + 𝑤𝐻𝑅𝐻1, where 
𝑤𝐿 =
𝑃𝐿0
𝑃𝐻0+𝑃𝐿0
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  𝑤𝐻 =
𝑃𝐻0
𝑃𝐻0+𝑃𝐿0
 
 
The CAPM-beta and expected alpha are the usual60:  
 
(5.20) 𝛽𝐻,𝑀 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1,𝑅𝑀1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀1)
 
(5.21)  𝛼𝐻1 = 𝐸[𝑅𝐻1] − 𝛽𝐻,𝑀𝐸[𝑅𝑀1] 
 
FIGURE 5.5. Relation between expected alpha and tournament behavior of the high- and low-
risk asset in the model with tournament behavior  
The figure shows the expected alpha of the high- and low-risk asset (αH1 and αL1) for different 
tournament behavior parameter values of agent A (ηA). Agent B does not get utility from tournament 
behavior, so 𝜂𝐵 = 0. Agent A and agent B have a risk-aversion parameter of 𝜃𝐴 =  𝜃𝐵 = 0.01. The 
volatility of the high-risk asset 𝜎𝐻 = 30 and the volatility of the low-risk asset 𝜎𝐿 = 20. Both assets 
have an expected payoff 𝜇 = 100 and the correlation between the assets is 𝜌 = 0.5.  
 
Figure 5.5 shows the expected alpha of the two assets as a function of tournament 
behavior. When there is no tournament behavior we observe that the expected alpha of the 
assets is zero; in other words, CAPM holds. When tournament behavior becomes more 
important, we observe that the low-risk asset gets a positive expected alpha, while the high-
risk asset gets a negative expected alpha. In summary, according to the model, tournament 
behavior causes higher (lower) returns on low-risk (high-risk) assets then when tournament 
                                                          
60 See Appendix 5.B for details. 
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behavior is absent. Moreover, the stronger the tournament behavior, the higher (lower) the 
return on low-risk (high-risk) assets are or, in other words, the stronger the anomaly.  
 
5.3.2.4. Hypotheses 
I continue by defining hypotheses which can be tested empirically. Even though the model 
illustrates the main mechanism using a parsimonious setup with two assets and agents, the 
general intuition will likely extend to multiple assets and agents. The reason is that when 
there are more than two assets with different volatilities, the preference for high-risk assets 
for an agent with tournament behavior remains. The higher demand for high-risk assets, will 
reduce the expected alpha of these assets in comparison to low-risk assets. Furthermore, in 
case multiple agents exhibit tournament behavior, the demand for high-risk assets will 
increase, which causes the expected alpha of these assets to decrease. This holds, even if the 
managers do not equally care about tournaments, yet some exhibit stronger tournament 
behavior than others.  
As tournament behavior causes managers of similar mutual funds to compete with 
each other, these competing managers choose assets within one particular asset category. 
For example, managers of US large-cap mutual funds are all searching for the best stocks 
out of the same universe of US large-cap stocks with the aim to win the tournament. If 
tournament behavior is a cause for the low-risk anomaly, I expect the low-risk premium to 
be present within asset classes, but not across asset classes. The majority of the studies 
related to the low-risk anomaly, focus on the premium within asset classes and there seems 
to be little evidence for the low-risk anomaly across asset classes. Moreover, the presence 
of a positive equity risk premium seems to imply that there is no low-risk effect across asset 
classes.    
Based on Figure 5.5, I expect that when there is no tournament behavior within an 
asset category, there is also no low-risk premium and the stronger the tournament behavior, 
the stronger the anomaly. As there are many asset categories, I examine the prediction of the 
theoretical model within multiple asset categories. The advantage of examining multiple 
asset categories concurrently is to increase the number of observations and consequently 
increase the robustness of the results. Therefore, I define the first testable hypothesis as: 
1) The low-risk effect in a particular asset category is stronger in a period following 
stronger tournament behavior. 
With this hypothesis I therefore examine the time-series relation between the low-risk 
premium and tournament behavior.  
138 Chapter 5 
As the model can in fact predict multiple tournaments, I would expect that in those asset 
categories where managers exhibit stronger tournament behavior, the low-risk anomaly is 
stronger. I therefore define the second hypothesis: 
2) The low-risk effect is stronger in asset categories where tournament behavior is 
stronger. 
I refer to this hypothesis when investigating the low-risk premium and tournament behavior 
across asset categories.61 In the next sessions I investigate these questions empirically.  
 
5.4. Data low-risk premiums and tournament behavior 
 
In this section I describe the data used in the study and the measures employed to compute 
tournament behavior and the low-risk premiums.  
 
5.4.1. Tournament behavior 
 
To measure tournament behavior I make use of the Morningstar mutual fund database with 
monthly returns and market values in US Dollars from January 1990 to December 2013. The 
study covers 12 different asset categories, consisting of bond classes, regional equity classes 
and style sub-classes within US equities. To obtain global coverage, I combine the funds 
from the Morningstar US and EAA (Europe/Africa/Asia) database, which are two separate 
databases containing funds depending on where these are domiciled. The databases contain 
funds with multiple listings and almost identical returns. To prevent a fund to dominate the 
final result, I only use the listing with the longest return history in the final dataset. Table 
5.1 presents the total number of unique funds per asset category. In addition it presents the 
number of funds per category at the beginning and at the end of the sample period.  
We observe large numbers of funds per asset category, where US Investment Grade 
Bonds contains the lowest number of funds with 124 in total and Global Equities the highest 
number of funds with 4,148. Furthermore, we observe a large increase in number of funds 
for all asset categories. A remarkable category is Emerging Markets Equities which starts 
with only 9 funds in January 1990 and ends with 771 funds in December 2013. The number 
                                                          
61 We do not have to make assumptions of managers investing in only asset category. Theoretically, a 
manager (agent) can manage multiple funds and therefore invest in assets of multiple asset categories. 
In that case the manager can get utility from tournament behavior of more than one asset category. 
Alternatively, a multi-asset manager allocates assets across categories and therefore invests in multiple 
asset classes. In that case it is more common to allocate to index futures or specific funds then selecting 
individual securities within that asset class. That would imply that it is unlikely that such a manager 
participates in the tournaments within asset categories.   
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of funds in this asset category increases fast, with 100 emerging markets funds at the end of 
1994 (not reported in table).  
 
TABLE 5.1. Number of funds per asset category 
The table contains the total number of funds per asset category and the number of funds in January 
1990 and December 2013.  
 
  As a measure for tournament behavior, I use a test statistic in line with Brown et 
al. (1996) as commonly reported in academic literature. They investigate whether mid-year 
losers take substantially more risk than mid-year winners in the second half of the year. More 
specifically, each year I compute the tournament behavior in the different fund categories. 
To measure this behavior the funds within an asset category are ranked annually at the end 
of June based on their January to June returns and determine the 25 percent winner and loser 
funds. Accordingly, for each fund I measure the Risk Adjustment Ratio (RAR) of Brown et 
al. (1996) by computing the ratio of the standard deviation of the returns in the second half 
of the year to the standard deviation of the returns in the first half-year. I then compute the 
median RAR of the losers and divide by the median RAR of the winners. In case of 
tournament behavior we would expect this ratio to be larger than 1. 
 
Asset class
Total 1990-01 2013-12
US Value Equities 916 116 401
US Blend Equities 2,167 221 950
US Growth Equities 1,372 186 614
US Mid Cap Equities 1,124 118 496
US Small Cap Equities 1,294 83 606
Global Equities 4,148 202 2,298
European Equities 1,826 73 924
Japanese Equities 842 80 332
Emerging Markets Equities 1,208 9 771
US Government Bonds 648 175 184
US Investment Grade Bonds 124 10 102
US High Yield Bonds 476 62 240
Number of funds
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The average tournament behavior for each asset category is presented in Table 5.2, 
split in bull and bear markets, when the market return is positive and negative, respectively, 
in the first half-year. We observe that tournament behavior is generally present, in line with 
Brown et al. (1996), as the average tournament behavior statistic (median RAR losers 
divided by median RAR winners) is larger than 1 (1.03). However, the results clearly show 
that tournament behavior is time-varying and not continuously present within each asset 
category. In line with Kempf et al. (2009), we observe that tournament behavior is stronger 
when the market return is positive in the first half-year than when the market return is 
negative. This result holds for all asset categories, visible from the bottom line in the table 
where the difference in tournament behavior between bull and bear markets is presented. It 
is therefore important to take the time dimension into account when analyzing the relation 
between tournament behavior and the low-risk anomaly. 
 
5.4.2. Low-risk premiums 
 
To link tournament behavior to the low-risk anomaly, historical low-risk premiums of the 
relevant asset categories are required. In spirit of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), I construct 
leveraged low-minus-high risk portfolios based on the past year volatility of individual 
securities (top and bottom one-third) for each of the asset categories. For government bonds 
I use the returns of short minus long duration bonds (1-3 years versus 7-10 years).62 
Table 5.3 shows that the low-risk anomaly is present in almost all asset categories, 
consistent with Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). Only for US High Yield Bonds we observe a 
slightly negative low-risk period over the whole sample. We observe the largest low-risk 
premium for US Small Cap Equities with a Sharpe ratio of 1.05. Additionally, we see strong 
differences over the two sub-samples, as for example, Japanese and Emerging Markets 
Equities have negative low-risk premiums in the first sample period, while positive low-risk 
premiums in the second part of the sample period. 
   
                                                          
62 For government bonds we construct low-minus-high risk portfolios based on the maturity of bonds. 
For the other asset categories we use as a proxy for the low-risk anomaly the low-volatility effect. The 
low-risk effect refers to both low-beta and low-volatility. The returns of the low-beta and low-volatility 
effects are highly correlated. The difference is that correlations with the market are not taken into 
account for the low-volatility effect. The reason to use volatility instead of the beta as a measure are 
twofold: 1) An advantage of the low-volatility measure is that no (arbitrary) benchmark needs to be 
assumed and 2) there are studies that find the low-volatility effect to be stronger than the low-beta 
effect [e.g. Blitz and van Vliet (2007) and Cederburg and O’Doherty (2016)]. 
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Furthermore, we observe that the volatility of the low-risk premiums can differ significantly. 
Although in terms of Sharpe ratio, the low-risk premium of Global Equities and US 
Government Bonds are equal, the low-risk premium is almost six times higher for Global 
Equities obviously because the equity premium has also been higher than the bond premium. 
Finally, we observe a low correlation of 0.28 among the low-risk return series of different 
asset categories. Due to this finding it is unlikely that a global risk factor which is non-asset 
class specific, such as TED-spread and inflation, can fully explain the low-risk anomaly, as 
used by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Cohen et al. (2005), respectively. 
 
5.5. The low-risk anomaly and tournament behavior 
 
In the following analyses, I empirically investigate the relation between tournament behavior 
and the low-risk premium. It starts with the first hypothesis where I investigate whether, for 
a particular asset category, the low-risk effect is stronger in a period following stronger 
tournament behavior. It follows in Sub-sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 where I empirically test the 
second hypothesis to determine whether the low-risk effect is stronger in asset categories 
where tournament behavior is stronger.  
  
5.5.1. The time-series relation  
 
To investigate whether for a particular asset class, the low-risk effect is stronger in a period 
following stronger tournament behavior, I start the empirical analyses with pooled OLS 
regressions on multiple asset categories. The advantage of examining multiple asset 
categories simultaneously is that it increases the number of observations and it allows to 
assess the robustness of the results. From Table 5.2 we saw that the volatility of the low-risk 
premiums differs significantly across asset categories. To prevent risky asset categories 
(such as US Small Cap Equites) to dominate the results and asset categories with a low-risk 
(such as US Government Bonds) to have little impact, I standardize the low-risk premiums 
of the asset categories based on their own sample histories. The pooled OLS regressions are 
specified as follows:  
 
(5.22) 𝑍𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑍𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
In this equation Zri,t is the low-risk premium of asset category i in year t where I standardize 
the low-risk premium by subtracting the asset category’s sample median annual low-risk 
premium and divide by the asset category’s sample median standard deviation. This ensures 
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comparability of the low-risk premium across asset categories. ZRARLosWini,t is the time-
series standardized tournament behavior in asset category i in year t, where tournament 
behavior is standardized by subtracting the average tournament behavior of that asset 
category and dividing by the asset category’s historical standard deviation of tournament 
behavior. This standardization again ensures a time-series comparison. Table 5.4 shows the 
regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics. In addition, I present the adjusted R-
squared values. I perform the regression on all data points in the complete sample and also 
split the sample in the two sub-periods 1990 to 2002 and 2003 to 2013 to investigate the 
robustness of the results.  
We observe a positive and significant relation between tournament behavior and 
the low-risk premium with a t-statistic of 2.93. When we consider the last two columns in 
the table, we observe that the relation is also positive and significant in both sub-periods. I 
therefore conclude that there is a positive relation between tournament behavior and the low-
risk premium over time.  
 
TABLE 5.4. Pooled OLS-regression results for the relation between low-risk premium and 
tournament behavior across time 
This table reports pooled OLS-regression results of low-risk premiums regressed on tournament 
behavior over the period January 1990 until December 2013 and over the two sub-periods 1990 to 
2002 and 2003 to 2013:  
(5.22) 𝑍𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑍𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
where Zri,t is the low-risk premium of asset category i in year t where I standardize the low-risk 
premium by subtracting the asset category’s sample median annual low-risk premium and divide by 
the sample median standard deviation. ZRARLosWini,t is the time-series standardized tournament 
behavior in asset category i in year t, where tournament behavior is standardized by subtracting the 
average tournament behavior of that asset category and dividing by the asset category’s historical 
standard deviation of tournament behavior. The table presents the average coefficient estimates of the 
different time periods together with their t-values (second row). In addition, the table shows the R-
squared values of the regressions.  
 
1990-2013 1990-2002 2003-2013
Constant -0.02 0.16 -0.22
-0.27 1.32 -2.09
ZRARLosWin 0.24 0.21 0.33
2.93 2.01 2.26
R2 3.0% 2.8% 3.8%
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5.5.2. Across asset categories 
 
In this subsection and the following I focus on the second hypothesis based on the theoretical 
model, namely a cross-sectional comparison of tournament behavior and the low-risk 
premiums. So far, the empirical analysis showed a positive relationship between tournament 
behavior and the low-risk premiums across time, in line with the first hypothesis. Is there 
also a positive relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium across asset 
categories? I therefore continue the empirical analyses with a sorting test. Based on their 
tournament behavior I sort the asset categories in groups and investigate their low-risk 
premiums. More specifically, each year the asset categories are sorted into terciles based on 
their tournament behavior in that year. For the three resulting groups each containing 4 asset 
categories, I compute the low-risk premium over the subsequent year. Because of the 
differences in volatility of the low-risk premiums across asset categories, I compute risk-
weighted low-risk premiums of each group, where the weights are proportional to the inverse 
of the sample standard deviation of the low-risk premiums of the asset categories. The results 
are presented in Figure 5.6.  
 
FIGURE 5.6. Cumulative low-risk returns of an investment strategy based on tournament 
behavior 
Cumulative log low-risk returns of top and bottom tercile portfolios of asset categories with the 
strongest and weakest tournament behavior, respectively. Each year over the period 1990 to 2013, the 
asset categories are sorted into terciles based on their tournament behavior in that year. Next, for the 
three resulting groups, the low-risk premium over the subsequent year is computed. The weights of the 
asset categories are proportional to the inverse of the historical standard deviation of the asset 
categories’ low-risk premiums. 
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We observe a positive relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk 
premium. The tercile group with the strongest tournament behavior performs significantly 
better than the group with the weakest tournament behavior. In 17 out of the 23 calendar 
years, the top terciles group (strong tournament behavior) outperforms the bottom portfolio 
(weak tournament behavior). The asset categories with the weakest tournament behavior 
earned a low-risk premium of around 0%; in other words, the low-risk premium is not 
present for the asset categories where tournament behavior is weakest.  
 
TABLE 5.5. Long-short investment strategy of the low-risk premium based on tournament 
behavior 
Panel A shows the results of an investment strategy where each year I take 100% long (short) positions 
in the low-volatility strategy of the one-third asset categories with the strongest (weakest) tournament 
behavior. Weights are inverse to the volatility of the low-risk premiums in that asset category. Sample 
period: 1990-2013. The timing benchmark is based on fixed weights per asset category, where I 
average the weights of each asset category in the long/short strategy over the whole sample period. 
Panel B shows the results of the investment strategy corrected for loadings to a set of market indices. 
Second row contains t-statistics. 
 
Strategy
Strategy -/- 
timing 
benchmark
Timing 
benchmark
Panel A. Return statistics investment strategy
Excess return 5.09% 5.18% -0.08%
Standard deviation 10.21% 10.34% 1.06%
Sharpe ratio 0.50 0.50 -0.08
t -statistic 2.39 2.40 -0.38
Panel B. Strategy return corrected for market factors
Constant 7.05%
2.23
Equities 0.01
0.05
GovBonds -0.70
-1.10
HYBonds 0.01
0.06
Adj. R2 9.1%
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Continuing the analyses further, I consider the low-risk premium statistics of the 
top-minus-bottom tercile portfolio of Figure 5.6. In other words, each year we take 100% 
long (short) positions in the low-volatility strategy of the one-third asset categories with the 
strongest (weakest) tournament behavior. Weights are inverse to the volatility of the low-
risk premiums in that asset category. Panel A of Table 5.5 presents the annualized excess 
low-risk premium of the strategy, together with the associated annual standard deviation, 
Sharpe ratio and t-statistic. We observe strong and significant returns of on average around 
5% per annum with a t-statistic of 2.39.  
Next, I investigate whether the positive relation between tournament behavior and 
the low-risk premiums are driven by the structural positions in particular asset categories 
that have done very well over this sample period. For that, I construct a so-called timing 
benchmark which is based on fixed weights per asset category, where I use the average 
weight of each asset category in the long/short strategy over the whole sample period. I then 
compute the return of this timing benchmark. Panel A of Table 5.5 shows that the timing 
benchmark (column 3) has performed poorly with an average return just below zero. This 
means that the results of the investment strategy compared to this timing benchmark remain 
very similar with 5.18% per annum. We can therefore conclude that the positive relation 
between tournament behavior and the low-risk premiums cannot be attributed due to 
structural positions in particular asset categories.  
Proceeding, I perform a multiple regression of the investment strategy returns on 
general market returns to investigate if the magnitude of the returns is affected by exposures 
to these market returns. For purposes thereof, I estimate the following regression equation:  
 
(5.23)  ttHYBondsHYBondstGovBondsGovBondstEquitiesEquitiestTMB RRRR   ,,,,  
 
where RTMB,t is the low-risk premium of the top-minus-bottom tercile portfolio, REquities,t is 
the return of global equities, proxied by the equally-weighted returns of the largest 2,800 
stocks each month of the S&P Developed Broad Market Index, RGovBonds,t is the return of US 
government bonds (1-10 years, Datastream) in excess of the repo rate and RHYBonds,t is the 
return of US High Yield Bonds (Barclays) in excess of US government bonds. An alpha 
statistically different from zero implies that the excess returns of the investment strategy 
cannot be explained by general market factors.  
 When we consider the coefficient estimates of the regression in Panel B of Table 
5.5, we observe a low-risk premium of the investment strategy, which is even somewhat 
higher after correcting for exposures to general market indices. Moreover, we observe no 
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significant exposures to the three market indices. So, the positive relation between 
tournament behavior and the low-risk premiums remains or even becomes somewhat 
stronger when corrected for loadings to general market returns or structural positions.  
 
5.5.3. Corrected for other effects 
 
To further investigate the impact of tournament behavior on the low-risk premiums as 
described with the second hypothesis, I next perform cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regressions. The advantage of this method is that we can easily control for multiple 
other effects that might have impact on the relationship between tournament behavior and 
the low-risk premium. Therefore, I yearly regress the low-risk premiums on tournament 
behavior and other factors in the prior year that could potentially influence the results:  
 
(5.24) 𝑍𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏1𝑡𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
 
Zri,t is again the standardized low-risk premium of asset category i in year t. The variable 
RARLosWini,t is the tournament behavior in asset category i in year t and ControlVari,t is a 
control variable for asset category i in year t.  
I investigate four control variables. First, I control for the activeness of the market. 
The idea here is that the larger the mutual fund market of a particular asset category, the 
larger the low-risk premium. In case of strong tournament behavior in an asset category, but 
a relatively small mutual fund market, the impact on asset prices will likely be low. I use 
two proxies for the activeness of the market in year t: 1) NFunds, which is the number of 
mutual funds in a particular asset category and 2) PercMCap, which is the ratio of the total 
net market value of the mutual funds in an asset category divided by the total market value 
of that asset category.63 I proxy the latter by the total market cap of the individual securities 
in the universe of that asset category which I use to compute the low-risk premium. Second, 
I control for the relative market volatility over the past 12 months ZMarketVol, which I 
standardize by subtracting the sample mean of that asset category and divide it by its 
standard deviation. This makes volatility comparable across asset categories. The reason to 
include this variable is to investigate whether selecting relatively low-volatile asset 
categories could drive the higher low-risk premium. Last, I use the return-to-risk ratio of the 
                                                          
63 The market value data of mutual funds in the Morningstar database are often not continues series. 
In case of a missing observation I take the last available market value in case of less than a year missing 
market values. 
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market of the asset category each year, labelled MarketReturnRisk. The idea is to investigate 
whether asset categories that have performed well are also the asset categories with a high 
low-risk premium. Table 5.6 presents the average coefficient estimates of the different 
regression models together with the associated t-values which are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987). Additionally, the table 
presents the average adjusted R-squared values of the regressions. 
The resulting coefficient estimates of the base case regression in column (1) show 
a large and significant coefficient for tournament behavior. Columns (2) to (5) of Table 5.6 
show the coefficient estimates when we augment the base case regression model with each 
of the four control variables. If the positive relation between tournament behavior and the 
low-risk premiums can be attributed to control variables, we should observe that augmenting 
the cross-sectional regressions of the low-risk anomaly on tournament behavior with control 
variables should lead to a significant decrease of the estimated coefficient of tournament 
behavior. In addition we should observe that the coefficient estimates of the control variables 
become significant. However, in almost all cases we observe that the coefficient estimate 
for RARLosWin remains significant and nearly unchanged. Only when controlling for market 
volatility we observe a lower t-statistic for tournament behavior. Moreover, apart from 
market volatility, none of the coefficient estimates for the control variables turns out 
significantly different from zero. The reason that the two proxies for the activeness of the 
market do not show up significantly, could be because I use only large and relevant asset 
categories, which have a relatively large mutual fund market.  
The last row of the table shows the adjusted R-squared values. From the first 
column  we observe that tournament behavior explains 8.90% of the variability of the low-
risk premiums. We observe a moderate increase in explanatory power once control variables 
are added to the regression. When market volatility is added, the explanatory power 
increases to 12.20% (column 4). This means that still the majority of the variation is 
explained by tournament behavior. In case the return-to-risk ratio of the asset categories is 
added, we observe that the R-squared value increases to 17.80% (column 5), which is double 
that of the base case regression. This seems to suggest that the risk-return ratio of the 
categories can explain part of the variability of the low-risk premiums. However, the 
estimation coefficient shows that the relation between this control variable and tournament 
behavior is not statistically significant, while tournament behavior remains statistically 
significant.   
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TABLE 5.6. Fama-MacBeth regression results for the relation between low-risk premium and 
tournament behavior across asset categories  
This table reports Fama-MacBeth regression results of low-risk premiums regressed on tournament 
behavior while controlling for other effects over the period January 1990 until December 2013. Each 
year the following regression is performed:   
(5.24) 𝑍𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏1𝑡𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where Zri,t is the low-risk premium of asset category i in year t where I standardize the low-risk 
premium by subtracting the asset category’s sample median annual low-risk premium and divide by 
the sample median standard deviation. The variable RARLosWini,t is the tournament behavior in asset 
category i in year t. The base case regression in Equation 5.24 is augmented with four control variables 
ControlVari,t for asset category i in year t. The four control variables: NFunds is the number of mutual 
funds in a particular asset category; PercMCap is the ratio of the total net market value of the mutual 
funds in an asset category divided by the total market value of that asset category; ZMarketVol  is the 
relative market volatility over the past 12 months standardized by subtracting the sample mean of that 
asset category and divide by the standard deviation; MarketReturnRisk is the return-to-risk ratio of the 
market of the asset category each year. The table presents the average coefficient estimates of the 
different regression models together with their t-values (second row) computed using Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors. In addition, the table shows the average adjusted R-squared values of the 
regressions.  
 
  All in all, the outcomes of the Fama-MacBeth regressions are consistent with the 
results based on the sorting test of the previous sub-section. It appears that the finding that 
the low-risk premium is positive related to tournament behavior is robust to the method that 
is used to investigate the relation between the two variables. Moreover, the relation is not 
affected by the activeness of the market, market volatility and risk-return ratio of the market. 
(1) (2) (3) (3) (5)
Constant -1.21 -1.26 -1.29 -1.09 -0.90
-2.12 -1.78 -2.11 -1.64 -1.86
RARLosWin 1.23 1.26 1.28 1.14 0.92
2.49 2.01 2.31 1.83 2.16
Nfunds 0.00
0.25
PercMcap 0.08
0.95
ZMarketVol -0.38
-3.23
MarketReturnRisk 0.06
0.66
Adj. R2 8.90% 11.90% 9.10% 12.20% 17.80%
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I therefore conclude that there is also a positive relation between tournament behavior and 
the low-risk premium over the cross-section. 
 
5.6. Extensions and further discussions 
 
The theoretical model I present in this study together with the empirical analyses show that 
tournament behavior can go a long way towards explaining the low-risk anomaly. In this 
section I discuss several possibilities to extend the general equilibrium model.  
 
5.6.1. Tournament behavior and the type of market 
 
Although a vast amount of literature demonstrates the existence of tournament behavior 
across mutual funds, Kempf et al. (2009) argue that it is dependent on the market return in 
the first half-year. More specifically, they show that tournament behavior exists when the 
first half-year is a bull market and not when it is a bear market. They relate this to the relative 
importance of compensation and employment incentives. The authors argue that 
employment risk is more important than compensation incentives after bear markets. The 
study shows that fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk 
relative to leading managers after bear markets to prevent potential job loss (weak 
tournament behavior). Contrary, employment risk is low after bull markets and 
compensation incentives become more relevant. Accordingly, they find that fund managers 
with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners after 
bear markets (strong tournament behavior). As mutual fund investors chase returns over 
time, these compensation incentives become stronger after bull markets. This would imply 
strong tournament behavior and higher low-risk premiums after bull markets, while weaker 
tournament behavior and lower low-risk premiums after bear markets. 
 If we return to the theoretical model of Section 5.3 then Equation 5.14 presents the 
utility function extended with tournament behavior, where 𝜂 is the parameter that indicates 
the sensitivity towards tournament behavior: 
 
(5.14) max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[−exp(−𝜃𝐴(𝑊𝐴1 − 𝑊𝐴0)) + 𝜂𝐴(𝑅𝐴 − 𝑅𝐵)]. 
 
An extension of the model would be to let the parameter 𝜂 depend on the type of market, 
based on the findings of Kempf et al. So, giving it a higher value after bull markets, 
indicating an increased sensitivity to tournament behavior after bull markets. The difficulty 
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for agents is to forecast whether the coming period will be a bear or a bull market and to 
adjust their behavior accordingly.  
 Table 5.1 already showed that in line with Kempf et al., tournament behavior is 
stronger when the market return is positive in the first half-year than when the market return 
is negative. We could next investigate whether this is also associated more often with a 
positive low-risk premium. For that I construct so-called 2x2 contingency tables of 
tournament behavior and the low-risk premium based on all 276 observations (12 asset 
categories times 23 calendar years). I divide the observations in high and low tournament 
behavior (RARLosWin) where I use the median RARLosWin of the sample as a cut-off point. 
Furthermore, I also split the observations in a high or low low-risk premium segment 
depending on whether the standardized low-risk premium is larger or smaller than the 
median value (which is zero), respectively. Moreover, I perform the same analysis, but then 
based on the observations for which there was a bull market (positive market return) or bear 
market (negative market return) in the first half-year. The null hypothesis in these tests is 
that the percentage of observations falling into each of the four cells is equal to the expected 
values, which implies that the tournament behavior and the low-risk premium are 
independent. The alternative hypothesis, in case tournament behavior is positively related to 
the low-risk premium, is that the ‘high tournament behavior/high low-risk premium’ and 
‘low tournament behavior/low low-risk premium’ would have larger frequencies than the 
other two outcomes. I test the significance of the frequencies with a chi-square test. The 
percentage of the observations of each segment are presented in Table 5.7, together with the 
2  test statistics and the associated p-values.  
 
TABLE 5.7. Contingency tables of tournament behavior and the low-risk premiums 
The contingency table reports the percentage of sample observations when these are split in high and 
low tournament behavior (RARLosWin) based on the median RARLosWin of the sample as cut-off point 
and in a high or low low-risk premium segment depending on whether the standardized low-risk 
premium is larger or smaller than the median value, respectively. The table shows the outcome on all 
sample observations and in addition on the observations for which there was a bull market (positive 
market return) or bear market (negative market return) in the first half-year. The table presents the total 
number of observations and the chi-squared test-statistic with its associated p-value.   
 
Observations High premium Low premium High premium Low premium X
2
p -value
All 276 30.07% 19.93% 22.10% 27.90% 7.03 0.008
Bull 197 32.49% 20.81% 22.34% 24.37% 3.41 0.065
Bear 79 24.05% 18.00% 22.00% 37.00% 3.29 0.070
High RARLosWin Low RARLosWin
2
The low-risk anomaly and mutual fund tournaments 153 
 
In case of no relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk anomaly, we 
would expect 26.1% of the observations in each of the ‘high low-risk premium’ segments 
and 23.9% in each of the ‘low low-risk premium’ segments and no significant deviations 
from these numbers. 64  However, we observe most observations and much more than 
expected in the entire sample fall in the ‘high tournament behavior/high low-risk premium’ 
and ‘low tournament behavior/low low-risk premium’ segments. More specifically, we 
observe 58.0% of the observations in these two segments versus 42.0% in the ‘high 
tournament behavior/low low-risk premium’ and ‘low tournament behavior/high low-risk 
premium’ segments. This finding is in line with earlier results where I show a positive 
relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium. The chi-squared test 
statistic and associated p-value show that these values are statistically significantly different 
from their expected values.  
Interestingly, during bull markets we observe most observations in the ‘high 
tournament behavior/high low-risk premium’ segment and during bear markets in the ‘low 
tournament behavior/low low-risk premium’ segment. These findings are in line with the 
hypothesis that mutual fund manager’s incentives to perform well are strongest during bull 
markets.  
 
5.6.2. Investment horizon 
 
Up to now, I have empirically investigated the link between tournament behavior in year t-
1 and low-risk premiums in year t. This is in line with the general equilibrium model from 
Section 5.3 where tournament behavior at time t-1 is linked to the returns of the asset from 
time t-1 to time t. However, tournament behavior cannot be measured at one particular 
moment in time. I measure it over a calendar year in line with Brown et al. (1996). 
Accordingly, I measure the return over the next year. Intuitively, this is a logical choice, as 
the tournaments also follow an annual frequency. However, the choice for the length of the 
period to measure the low-risk premium can be made dependent on the investment horizon 
of the investor, which is not known beforehand. I therefore investigate in this sub-section 
the relationship between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium, where the low-risk 
premium is measured over a 2- and 3-years horizon as well. I expect the relation to be weaker 
                                                          
64  I compute these expected values based on the number of observations of the four groups 
independently. E.g. 138 of the 276 observations are defined as high RARLosWin and 144 of the 176 
observations are defined as high low-risk premium. Then, in case of independence, we would expect 
138/276*144=26.1% of the observations in the ‘high tournament behavior/high low-risk premium’ 
segment. 
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when the low-risk premium is measured over a longer time period, as new tournaments have 
already started.  
  
TABLE 5.8. Relation between low-risk premium and tournament behavior across asset 
categories with different investment horizons  
Panel A reports pooled OLS-regression results of low-risk premiums regressed on tournament 
behavior:  
(5.22) 𝑍𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑍𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
where Zri,t is the low-risk premium of asset category i in year t, year t to t+1 and year t to t+2, where 
the low-risk premium is standardized by subtracting the asset category’s sample median and divide by 
the sample median standard deviation. ZRARLosWini,t is the time-series standardized tournament 
behavior in asset category i in year t, where tournament behavior is standardized by subtracting the 
average tournament behavior of that asset category and dividing by the asset category’s historical 
standard deviation of tournament behavior.  
Panel B reports Fama-MacBeth regression results of low-risk premiums regressed on tournament 
behavior. Each year the following regression is performed:   
(5.24) 𝑍𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑏1𝑡𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where Zri,t is the low-risk premium of asset category i in year t, year t to t+1 and year t to t+2. The 
variable RARLosWini,t is the tournament behavior in asset category i in year t. The table presents the 
coefficient estimates together with their t-values (second row) over the sample period January 1990 
until December 2013. In addition, the table shows the R-squared values of the regressions.  
 
For that purpose, I repeat the analyses from Table 5.4 and Table 5.6 for the base 
case test. Table 5.4 showed the results of the time-series relation between the low-risk 
premium and tournament behavior based on pooled OLS regressions. I now perform the 
Investment horizon 1 year 2 years 3 years
Panel A. Time-series
Constant -0.02 -0.05 0.04
-0.27 -0.60 0.42
ZRARLosWin 0.24 0.19 0.01
2.93 2.45 0.08
R2 3.00% 2.24% 0.00%
Panel B. Cross-sectional
Constant -1.21 -0.73 -1.02
-2.12 -1.31 -0.77
RARLosWin 1.23 0.74 1.15
2.49 1.68 1.00
Adj. R2 8.90% 8.87% 16.27%
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same analysis, where I compute the low-risk premium on a 2-years and 3-years horizon as 
well, besides the 1-year horizon. Results are presented in Panel A of Table 5.8.  
From the table we observe still a positive and significant relationship between 
tournament behavior and the low-risk anomaly when the low-risk premiums are measured 
on a 2-years horizon. However, the coefficient and associated t-statistic are somewhat lower, 
in line with expectations. On a 3-years horizon, the relation is weak and insignificant.  
I next present the results of cross-sectional analyses to the relation between 
tournament behavior and the low-risk premium, as shown in Table 5.6. Again I compute the 
low-risk premium on a 2-years and 3-years horizon as well. Results are presented in Panel 
B of Table 5.8. We observe a similar effect as in Panel A. The results become weaker and 
insignificant when I increase the length of the period to compute the low-risk premium. The 
results imply that tournaments have most impact on the prices of low- and high-risk asset in 
the year following the tournaments. This could be caused by new tournaments that have 
started where the ‘newest’ high-risk stocks are being selected and for which the demand is 
higher than the ‘older’ high-risk stocks.  
 
5.6.3. Other extensions 
 
There are several other interesting research areas to extend the presented theoretical model, 
which are beyond the scope of this study. One is to extend the model to a two-period, and 
therefore multi-period, model. The advantage is that the high-risk asset will not always be 
the same asset, but that this can change through time, which makes the model more general. 
My expectation is that the outcome of the model will remain the same. In other words, 
tournament behavior will decrease the expected return of the high-risk asset. However, this 
needs to investigated further in follow-up research.  
 Another extension is to increase the number of agents in the model. The advantage 
of more agents is that there is less impact of a single agent on the market price. In case of 
two agents, if one agent wants to buy asset A and sell asset B, the other agent will only buy 
asset B in case the price is low enough. With more agents, the effect on prices are expected 
to be lower. In a model with more than two agents, it would be interesting to analyze the 
shape of the security market line again, as presented in Figure 5.3. This could potentially 
lead not only to a flatter, but also to an inverse shape of the security market line.  
 A different angle to the model would be to extend it with a risk-free asset. If 
leverage is unrestricted and cheap, taking more leverage is also a way to increase risk. This 
could mean that shorting the risk-free rate and buying the low-risk asset might also become 
an attractive alternative to increase the risk-profile of the portfolio in case of tournament 
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behavior. In that case we would expect a somewhat lower impact of tournament behavior on 
the prices of low-risk assets. I would also expect a less strong relation between tournament 
behavior and the low-risk premiums in case an agent would short the high-risk asset. In the 
current model that is already possible. However, it could be that the limitation to two assets, 
limits the possibilities for the agents to do so, as the price of the high-risk asset must be so 
attractive for the other agent to buy it. However, if leverage is restricted and/or costly, high-
risk securities become more attractive and fund managers are prepared to pay a premium 
which decreases the return on these high-risk securities. In the real world there are however 
restrictions on leverage. For many mutual funds leverage is not allowed.65 If leverage is 
limited and all fund managers would use the allowed amount of leverage, then again the way 
to take more risk, is to buy high-risk assets. Moreover, leveraging is not for free, which also 
pushes fund managers in the direction of buying high-risk asset instead of taking more 
leverage (in case that is allowed).  
 
5.7. Concluding remarks 
 
Due to the large shift of assets from individual investors to fund managers over the past 
decades, the impact of these managers’ behavior on asset prices has grown. A large stream 
of literature has been developed on an important behavior characteristic of these 
intermediaries, namely tournament behavior. In this study I show that this behavior is an 
important driver in explaining one of the most important asset pricing anomalies: the low-
risk premium. The academic literature is inconclusive on why this anomaly exists, as not 
many studies examined the cause of this anomaly. This study contributes to the literature in 
many aspects.  
 First, the general equilibrium model I developed shows that tournament behavior 
causes the securities market line to be flatter than expected according to the CAPM. Second, 
the empirical analyses across different asset categories confirm this positive relationship 
between tournament behavior and the low-risk returns. The results indicate that not only the 
low-risk effect is more prominent in a period following stronger tournament behavior, but 
also that the anomaly is larger in asset categories where more tournament behavior is 
observed. Irrespective of whether I use panel OLS-regressions, a sorting approach, Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) analyses or contingency tables, I find that the low-risk premium can be 
attributed to tournament behavior.   
                                                          
65 For example, European UCITS funds are not allowed to take physical short positions in individual 
stocks and can only take limited short positions in futures. Source www.esma.europa.eu.  
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 The finding of a positive relationship between tournament behavior and the low-
risk premiums helps to explain the low-risk anomaly across a wide range of asset classes. I 
acknowledge that other explanations could strengthen this effect. For example, leverage and 
shorting restrictions could intensify the positive relation between tournament behavior and 
the low-risk premium, which would be an interesting direction for follow-up research.   
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5.A. Solving the model with tournament behavior  
 
In this appendix I solve the maximization problem with tournament behavior for agent A: 
 
(5.15) max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[− exp(−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻(𝐷𝐻1 − 𝑃𝐻0) + 𝑞𝐴𝐿(𝐷𝐿1 − 𝑃𝐿0)}) + 𝜂𝐴(𝑤𝐴𝐻𝑅𝐻1 +
𝑤𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑤𝐵𝐻𝑅𝐻1 − 𝑤𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐿1)], 
 
We can further write Equation 5.15 as: 
 
(5.25) max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸[− exp(−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻(𝐷𝐻1 − 𝑃𝐻0) + 𝑞𝐴𝐿(𝐷𝐿1 − 𝑃𝐿0)}) + 𝜂𝐴(𝑤𝐴𝐻𝑅𝐻1 +
𝑤𝐴𝐿𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑤𝐵𝐻𝑅𝐻1 − 𝑤𝐵𝐿𝑅𝐿1)] 
   = max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐸 [− exp(−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻(𝐷𝐻1 − 𝑃𝐻0) + 𝑞𝐴𝐿(𝐷𝐿1 − 𝑃𝐿0)}) +
𝜂𝐴 (
𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0
𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0
(
𝐷𝐻1
𝑃𝐻0
− 1) +
𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0
𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0
(
𝐷𝐿1
𝑃𝐿0
− 1) −
𝑞𝐵𝐻𝑃𝐻0
𝑞𝐵𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐵𝐿𝑃𝐿0
(
𝐷𝐻1
𝑃𝐻0
− 1) −
𝑞𝐵𝐿𝑃𝐿0
𝑞𝐵𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐵𝐿𝑃𝐿0
(
𝐷𝐿1
𝑃𝐿0
− 1))] 
   = max
𝑞𝐴𝐻,𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝐹 +
𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐴𝐻+𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐴𝐿
𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0
−
𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐵𝐻−𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐵𝐿
𝑞𝐵𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐵𝐿𝑃𝐿0
 
 
where 𝐹 = −exp(−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿}𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0 +
1
2
𝜃𝐴
2{𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2 +
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿}) from Equation 5.6. 
 
Then the first order condition of agent A for asset H is given by: 
 
(5.26)  𝐹 ∗ 𝐺 +
𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐻0)(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)−𝑃𝐻0𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐴𝐻−𝑃𝐻0𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐴𝐿
(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0+𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)
2 = 0 
 
where 𝐺 = −𝜃𝐴𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴
2𝑞𝐴𝐻𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝜃𝐴
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿. Solving Equation 5.26 leads to: 
 
(5.27)  𝐹 ∗ 𝐺 +
𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0−𝜂𝐴(𝜇−𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐻0
𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝑃𝐻0
2 +2𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0+𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝑃𝐿0
2 = 0 
 
The full equation is then: 
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(5.16) 
−exp (−𝜃𝐴{𝑞𝐴𝐻 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿}𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0
+
1
2
𝜃𝐴
2{𝑞𝐴𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2 + 2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿}) ∗ (−𝜃𝐴𝜇 + 𝜃𝐴𝑃𝐻0 + 𝜃𝐴
2𝑞𝐴𝐻𝜎𝐻
2
+ 𝜃𝐴
2𝜌𝑞𝐴𝐿𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿)
+
𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐻0)(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)−𝑃𝐻0𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐻0)𝑞𝐴𝐻−𝑃𝐻0𝜂𝐴(𝜇 − 𝑃𝐿0)𝑞𝐴𝐿
(𝑞𝐴𝐻𝑃𝐻0 + 𝑞𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐿0)2
= 0 
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5.B. CAPM-beta 
 
The CAPM-beta is defined as:  
 
(5.20) 𝛽𝐻,𝑀 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1,𝑅𝑀1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀1)
, where 
 
(5.28) 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1, 𝑅𝑀1) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1, 𝑤𝐿𝑅𝐿1 + 𝑤𝐻𝑅𝐻1) = 𝑤𝐿𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1, 𝑅𝐿1) + 𝑤𝐻𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝐻1)
=  𝑤𝐿𝑐𝑜𝑣 (
𝐷𝐻1
𝑃𝐻0
,
𝐷𝐿1
𝑃𝐿0
) + 𝑤𝐻𝑣𝑎𝑟 (
𝐷𝐻1
𝑃𝐻0
)
= 𝑤𝐿
1
𝑃𝐻0𝑃𝐿0
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐷𝐻1, 𝐷𝐿1) + 𝑤𝐻
𝜎𝐻
2
𝑃𝐻0
2 = 𝑤𝐿
𝜌𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝑃𝐻0𝑃𝐿0
+ 𝑤𝐻
𝜎𝐻
2
𝑃𝐻0
2  
 
and  
(5.29) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀1) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑤𝐻𝑅𝐻1 + 𝑤𝐿𝑅𝐿1)
= 𝑤𝐻
2 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝐻1) + 𝑤𝐿
2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝐿1) + 2𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐻𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1, 𝑅𝐿1)
=  𝑤𝐻
2
𝜎𝐻
2
𝑃𝐻0
2 + 𝑤𝐿
2
𝜎𝐿
2
𝑃𝐿0
2 + 2𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐻
𝜌𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝑃𝐻0𝑃𝐿0
 
 
If we fill in Equations 5.28 and 5.29 in Equation 5.20, we get: 
 
(5.30)  𝛽𝐻,𝑀 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝐻1,𝑅𝑀1)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑀1)
=
𝑤𝐿
𝜌𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝑃𝐻0𝑃𝐿0
+𝑤𝐻
𝜎𝐻
2
𝑃𝐻
2
𝑤𝐻
2 𝜎𝐻
2
𝑃𝐻0
2 +𝑤𝐿
2 𝜎𝐿
2
𝑃𝐿0
2 +2𝑤𝐿𝑤𝐻
𝜌𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐿
𝑃𝐻0𝑃𝐿0
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 Summary 
 
This dissertation discusses possible explanations of anomalies in financial markets: 
empirical patterns in asset returns that cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models. 
Examples of well-known anomalies are value, momentum, size, low-risk and short-term 
reversal. Currently, there is no consensus in the academic literature on the underlying causes 
of these anomalies. The explanations that have been given in different studies can be grouped 
into four categories: 1) the anomaly is a result of data mining; 2) the anomaly disappears 
when trading costs are taken into account; 3) the return premium associated with the anomaly 
is a compensation for a particular form of risk or 4) the anomaly has a behavioral 
explanation, meaning that behavior of market participants systematically influences asset 
prices and thereby causes market inefficiencies. The motivation of this thesis is to gain more 
and better insight into possible explanations for well-known asset pricing anomalies. Each 
of the chapters of this thesis focuses on one of the four categories of explanations for asset 
pricing anomalies.  
In the second chapter we analyze whether well-known asset pricing anomalies, such 
as value and momentum effects, are also present in the new emerging equity markets, the 
so-called frontier emerging markets. The focus in this chapter is on the data mining 
explanation, as we investigate whether asset pricing anomalies that have been documented 
in developed countries also exist in these markets, where they have not been analyzed before. 
We document the presence of economically and statistically significant value and 
momentum effects, and a local size effect and can therefore conclude that data mining as an 
explanation for these effects is unlikely. Our results indicate that the value and momentum 
effects still exist when incorporating conservative assumptions of transaction costs. 
Additionally, we show that value, momentum, and local size returns in frontier markets 
cannot be explained by global risk factors. 
The third chapter focuses on trading costs as a possible explanation for the short-
term reversal anomaly. Although trading costs are relevant for every asset pricing anomaly 
when it is being exploited by investors, the short-term reversal effect is the most interesting 
anomaly on which to analyze the effect. Gross returns are very high for this strategy, but so 
are turnover and therefore trading costs. The trade-off between gross returns and trading 
costs for this strategy is therefore extremely delicate. Several studies report that the return 
premium associated with short-term reversal investment strategies diminishes once trading 
costs are taken into account. We show that the impact of trading costs on the strategies’ 
profitability can largely be attributed to excessive trading in small-cap stocks. Limiting the 
stock universe to large-cap stocks significantly reduces trading costs. Applying a more 
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sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm to lower turnover reduces trading costs even 
further. Our finding that reversal strategies generate 30–50 basis points per week net of 
trading costs poses a serious challenge to standard rational asset pricing models.  
 In the fourth chapter we examine risk as an explanation for the value and size 
effects. We revisit the question whether the Fama-French factors are a manifestation of 
distress risk premiums. To this end, we develop new tests specifically aimed at dissecting 
the Fama-French factor returns from a distress risk premium. While we find that value and 
small-cap exposures are typically associated with distress risk, our results also indicate that 
distress risk is not priced and that the small-cap and value premiums are priced beyond 
distress risk. Moreover, the distress risk exposures of common small-cap and value factors 
do not have explanatory power in asset pricing tests. Our results have important implications 
for investors engaging in small-cap and value strategies, as by avoiding distress risk, they 
can capture the value and small-cap premiums with much lower risk. 
 In the fifth and final chapter we examine a behavioral explanation for the low-risk 
anomaly. We investigate the relation between tournament behavior of mutual fund managers 
and the low-risk anomaly. Based on a general equilibrium model we show that tournament 
behavior causes the returns of low-risk (high-risk) assets to be larger (smaller) than expected 
according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Using mutual fund data and pricing data of 
individual assets from twelve different asset categories, we find a positive and significant 
relation between tournament behavior and the low-risk premium. The results indicate that 
the low-risk effect is not only more prominent in a period following stronger tournament 
behavior, but this anomaly is also larger in asset categories where more tournament behavior 
is observed. As there is no reason to assume that tournament behavior among mutual fund 
managers is likely to disappear anytime soon, investors can be more confident to capture the 
low-risk premium going forward. 
 Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift bespreekt mogelijke verklaringen voor anomalieën in de financiële markten: 
empirische patronen in rendementen van beleggingsobjecten die niet verklaard kunnen 
worden door standaard beleggingsmodellen. Voorbeelden van bekende anomalieën zijn 
waarde, momentum, size, laag-risico en kortetermijn-reversal. Momenteel is er geen 
consensus in de academische literatuur over de onderliggende oorzaken van deze 
anomalieën. De verklaringen die gegeven zijn in verschillende studies kunnen gegroepeerd 
worden in vier categorieën: 1) de anomalie is het resultaat van data mining; 2) de anomalie 
verdwijnt wanneer transactiekosten worden meegenomen; 3) de rendementspremie van de 
anomalie is een compensatie voor een bepaalde vorm van risico of 4) de anomalie heeft een 
gedragsverklaring, wat betekent dat het gedrag van marktdeelnemers de prijzen van 
beleggingsobjecten systematisch beïnvloedt en daardoor marktinefficiënties veroorzaakt. De 
motivatie voor dit proefschrift is om meer en beter inzicht te krijgen in de verschillende 
mogelijke verklaringen voor bekende anomalieën. Elke van de hoofdstukken richt zich op 
één van de vier categorieën van verklaringen voor deze anomalieën. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk analyseren we of bekende anomalieën, zoals waarde- en 
momentumeffecten ook aanwezig zijn in de nieuwe opkomende markten, de zogenaamde 
frontier-markten. Dit hoofdstuk richt zich op de data mining-verklaring, aangezien we 
onderzoeken of bekende anomalieën die zijn gedocumenteerd in ontwikkelde markten, ook 
in deze markten bestaan, waar ze nog niet eerder zijn onderzocht. We documenteren de 
aanwezigheid van economisch en statistisch significante waarde- en momentumeffecten, en 
een lokaal size-effect en concluderen daarom dat data mining een onwaarschijnlijke 
verklaring is voor deze effecten. Onze resultaten wijzen erop dat de waarde- en 
momentumeffecten nog steeds bestaan wanneer we conservatieve aannames gebruiken of 
transactiekosten meenemen. Bovendien laten we zien dat waarde-, momentum- en lokale 
size-rendementen in frontier-markten niet kunnen worden verklaard door wereldwijde 
risicofactoren. 
In het derde hoofdstuk staan transactiekosten als een mogelijke verklaring voor de 
kortetermijn-reversal-anomalie centraal. Al zijn transactiekosten relevant voor elke 
financiële anomalie wanneer beleggers deze willen exploiteren, het kortetermijn-reversal-
effect is de meest interessante anomalie om dit effect te analyseren. Brutorendementen zijn 
namelijk erg hoog voor deze strategie, maar ook de omzet en daarmee de transactiekosten. 
Het is daarom belangrijk een zorgvuldige afweging te maken tussen brutorendementen en 
transactiekosten. Verschillende studies rapporteren dat de rendementspremie die 
samenhangt met kortetermijn-reversal-beleggingsstrategieën verdwijnt zodra rekening 
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wordt gehouden met transactiekosten. We tonen aan dat de impact van de transactiekosten 
op de winstgevendheid van de strategieën grotendeels kan worden toegeschreven aan 
overmatige handel in kleine aandelen, d.w.z. aandelen met een lage marktwaarde. Het 
beperken van het aandelenuniversum tot grote aandelen, d.w.z. aandelen met een hoge 
marktwaarde, verlaagt de transactiekosten aanzienlijk. Het toepassen van een meer 
geavanceerd portefeuilleconstructiealgoritme om de omzet te reduceren verlaagt 
transactiekosten nog verder. Onze bevinding dat reversal-strategieën 30 tot 50 basispunten 
per week genereren na aftrek van transactiekosten, vormt een serieuze uitdaging voor veel 
gebruikte beleggingsmodellen.  
In het vierde hoofdstuk analyseren we risico als een verklaring voor het waarde- en 
het size-effect. We heronderzoeken de vraag of de Fama-French-factoren een manifestatie 
zijn van de faillissementspremie. Hiervoor ontwikkelen we nieuwe testen die specifiek 
gericht zijn op de opsplitsing van de Fama-French-factorrendementen van een 
faillissementspremie. Ondanks dat we vinden dat waardeaandelen en aandelen met een lage 
marktwaarde vaak samenhangen met een hoger faillissementsrisico, geven onze resultaten 
ook aan dat faillissementsrisico niet geprijsd is en dat de premies op waardeaandelen en 
kleine aandelen buiten faillissementsrisico zijn geprijsd. Bovendien, het faillissementsrisico 
behorend bij typische size- en waardefactoren heeft geen verklarende kracht in asset pricing-
testen. Onze resultaten hebben belangrijke gevolgen voor beleggers die beleggen volgens 
size- en waardestrategieën, omdat door het vermijden van faillissementsrisico beleggers 
beter in staat zijn om waarde- en small-cap-premies te verdienen met veel lager risico. 
In het vijfde en laatste hoofdstuk onderzoeken we een gedragsverklaring voor de 
laag-risico anomalie. We onderzoeken de relatie tussen toernooigedrag van managers van 
beleggingsfondsen en de laag-risicoanomalie. Op basis van een algemeen evenwichtsmodel 
laten we zien dat toernooigedrag ervoor zorgt dat de rendementen van laag-risico 
(risicovolle) beleggingsobjecten groter (kleiner) zijn dan verwacht volgens het Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. Met behulp van data van beleggingsfondsen en prijsdata van afzonderlijke 
beleggingsobjecten uit twaalf verschillende beleggingscategorieën, vinden we een positieve 
en significante relatie tussen toernooigedrag en de laag-risico premie. De resultaten wijzen 
erop dat het laag-risico-effect niet alleen prominenter aanwezig is in een periode volgend op 
sterker toernooigedrag, maar ook sterker is in beleggingscategorieën waar meer 
toernooigedrag is waargenomen. Omdat er geen reden is om aan te nemen dat 
toernooigedrag tussen managers van fondsen verdwijnt, kunnen beleggers meer vertrouwen 
hebben om in de toekomst de premie op laag-risicoaandelen te verdienen.  
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One of the most important challenges in the field of asset pricing is to understand anomalies: empirical 
patterns in asset returns that cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models. Currently, there is 
no consensus in the academic literature on the underlying causes of well-known anomalies, such as 
the value and momentum anomalies. Anomalies could be the result of data mining, disappear when 
trading costs are taken into account, be a compensation for a particular form of risk, or have a behavioral 
explanation. The motivation of this research project is to gain more and better insight into possible 
explanations for well-known asset pricing anomalies. Understanding asset pricing anomalies is of the 
utmost importance for investors. It allows them to make better informed investment decisions, and 
thereby achieve higher return premiums. 
The first study in this dissertation shows that the value, momentum and size anomalies are also present 
in the new emerging equity markets, the so-called frontier emerging markets, which makes data 
mining as an explanation for these anomalies unlikely. The second study focuses on trading costs as a 
possible explanation for the short-term reversal anomaly. Focusing on large-cap stocks and applying a 
more sophisticated portfolio construction algorithm lower trading costs significantly, such that reversal 
strategies generate profitable results net of trading costs. The third study examines risk as an explanation 
for the value and size anomalies. Although value and small-cap exposures are typically associated with 
distress risk, the results indicate that distress risk is not priced and that the small-cap and value premiums 
are priced beyond distress risk. The fourth and last study examines a behavioral explanation for the 
low-risk anomaly. Based on a general equilibrium model, tournament behavior causes the returns of 
low-risk (high-risk) assets to be larger (smaller) than expected according to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. In addition, empirical analyses confirm a positive and significant relation between tournament 
behavior and the low-risk premium. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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